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Abstract 
The objective of the thesis is to use econometric analysis to assess the impact of 
power sector reforms in Africa during the period 1988-2005, using panel data 
analysis. The study uses fixed effects model, where all the reform variables are 
assumed to be strictly exogenous, but goes a step further, to endogenise the 
variables using 1-step Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation. To 
ensure the robustness of the results, the study makes use of both static and 
dynamic models and other econometric methods to reduce as far as practicable, 
the likelihood of spurious correlation.   
 
The main conclusion from the generation sector study is that, the establishment of a 
regulatory agency is generally associated with favourable generation outcomes. 
These are likely to be achieved after a minimum period of 2 years for installed plant 
capacity, 3 years for plant energy output, and 7 years for plant utilization. Passage 
of energy sector law seems likely to enhance both installed generation capacity and 
actual plant energy output. 
 
On the impact of private sector participation (PSP) in the generation sector, 
management and lease contracts, as well as greenfield projects seem likely to 
enhance installed capacity and actual plant output. On plant utilization, the 
favourable outcome is associated with concessions and greenfield projects.   
 
 
For the network sector, the result seems to indicate that the co-existence of energy 
sector law and regulatory agency can reduce transmission network loss levels. The 
result on the distribution system however show that though energy sector law and 
regulation are necessary, they are not likely to be sufficient to reduce the system 
loss level. Effective loss reduction in the distribution sector is likely to be achieved if 
management and lease contract is present as a PSP option.  
 
 
The long lags associated with the existence of regulation, underline the notion that 
institutional changes alone are unlikely to be sufficient, if the workforce is not 
competent and well trained. This implies that regulatory agencies in Africa are still 
fragile, and it will take quite sometime to build the capacity of key professional staff 
to operate whatever institutional and regulatory frameworks are chosen.  
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Problem Statement 
Africa’s energy resource base is rich and this is manifested by the hydro-power 
potential of Africa estimated at 10% of total world hydro power, with most of it still 
untapped (ESMAP 2006). Out of this, 65% of the exploitable hydro capacity is in 
East and South Africa, 34% in West Africa and about 1% in North Africa (Redwood-
Sawyerr 2002)1. Currently, 7%, 6%, and 7.β% of the world’s proven reserves of oil, 
coal and natural gas respectively, are in Africa (British Petroleum 2004), while 7 out 
of 8 recent oil finds or a growing number of new gas fields are in Africa (Davidson 
2002). Africa’s coal reserves amount to 63 Billion tons, with over 90% in southern 
part of Africa (Karekezi and Mackenzie 1993). 
 
Despite the fact that the continent is richly endowed with fossil fuels (i.e. coal, oil 
and gas) averaging about 7% of the world resources, exploiting them to provide 
good quality of life has remained an uphill task, and the continent still depends on 
non-commercial fuels to satisfy its energy needs (ESMAP 2006)2. Though Africa is 
estimated to produce about 7% of world commercial energy, it only consumes 3% 
(Davidson and Sokona 2002). In the majority of sub-Saharan African countries, 
wood-fuel constitutes about 80%-90% of energy consumption of the residential 
energy needs of low-income households (International Energy Agency, IEA,   2002). 
According to IEA (2002), since there is a correlation between a country’s poverty 
level3 and electricity access4, the extremely low electrification rate5 is an indicator of 
                                                 
1
 Africa is estimated to possess a technically exploitable hydro potential of 1,888 TWh/year, with about 
415 in the Democratic Republic of Congo. See further details in US Department of Energy, DOE, 
(2000): See also ESMAP (β006), “Energy and the Millennium Development Goals in Africa”, A paper 
commissioned by the Forum for Energy Ministers in Africa, for the UN World Summit, held in 
September, 2005. 
2
 Smith (1998) notes that the inefficient use of firewood and charcoal, especially in poorly ventilated 
areas, has lead to adverse emissions which has been linked to diseases and other chronic respiratory 
diseases such as tuberculosis, bronchitis and lung cancer. Detailed discussions are in Smith, R. 
(1λλ8), “The National Burden of Diseases from Indoor Air Pollution in India”, Mumbai, Indra Gandhi 
Institute of Development Research. 
3
 According to the World Bank (2001), being below the poverty line is defined as having income of less 
than US$β per day. People with income below US$1 per day are classified as ‘very poor’.  
4
 Access to electricity is defined as the number of people with electricity in their homes, either grid or 
off-grid.  
5
 In Africa, the average electrification level is about 34%, compared to the developing country average 
of 64% and the world average of 73%. 
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Africa’s stagnant economic development. Modern energy has the biggest effect on 
poverty by boosting poor people’s productivity and their income, and it is imperative 
that the energy sector works with other sectors to ensure that the poor benefit from 
greater accessibility (World Bank 2000). 
 
The abundant energy resources in Africa have been under-utilized 6 , mainly 
because of weak institutional, structural, legal and regulatory frameworks, as well 
as lack of well-focused energy policy framework (Karekezi and Mutiso 1998; 
Economic Commission for Africa 2003). The inability of governments to mobilize the 
needed financial resource, and inappropriate energy pricing policies has also been 
a contribution factor (Bhagavan 1999; Economic Commission for Africa 2003). For 
instance, electricity supply functions were the sole responsibility of state-owned 
vertically and sometimes horizontally integrated entities, established by Acts of 
Parliament (Karekezi and Mutiso 1998; Mkhwanazi 2003). A distinctive feature of 
the energy sector in sub-Saharan Africa in the wake of independence was the 
virtual absence of any coherent institutional framework for formulating energy policy, 
monitoring and implementing, as well as updating those policies (Davidson and 
Karekezi 1993).  
 
To address the afore-mentioned problems, most African governments have 
demonstrated a lot of political will and support for energy sector reforms, by 
developing energy sector policies to provide a focused framework on the key areas 
of concern to which the energy sector development must be directed.  
According to Bacon and Besant-Jones (2001), Bacon (2001)7, Karekezi and Mutiso 
(1998), the reforms in African countries have generally been designed to address 
the following issues: 
i. Poor performance of the state-owned energy sector with respect to sub-
optimal costs, inadequate expansion and access to electricity and other 
energy services, poor quality of service delivery 
ii. Inadequate capital investment by governments, leading to the 
deterioration of infrastructure 
iii. To allow private sector participation in the provision of energy sector 
                                                 
6
 Mkhwanazi, X. (2003) is of the view that non-optimal utilization of the energy resources can partly be 
attributed to the absence of local demand and lack of suitable transport infrastructure. 
7
 Presentation by Dr. Robert Bacon of the World Bank on “The State of Power Sector Reform in Sub-
Saharan Africa”, in Nairobi, Kenya in April, 2001, and published in AFREPREN Occasional Paper No. 
5, pp. 18-20.  
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iv. To allow the charging of efficient and economic cost-recovery prices and 
removal of subsidies 
v. To raise revenue for government through disposal of state-owned assets 
vi. To promote energy conservation and efficiency 
vii. Improve accessibility to electricity, through a focused rural electrification 
policy  
viii. Encourage inter-connection to neighbouring countries as a way of 
reducing the high cost of supply, through economies of scale 
 
The reforms of the power sector therefore starts from a market structure that is 
dominated by a state-owned national power utility with a legally endowed monopoly 
(Karekezi et al. 2001) and a vertically integrated supply chain comprising power 
generation, transmission, distribution and customer services (Bacon and Besant-
Jones 2001) 8 . These state-run utilities had no managerial autonomy to take 
decisions based on economic efficiency considerations without political interference, 
and by mid-1990, most decisions were actually made by the sector ministries 
(Karekezi and Mutiso 1998; Bhagavan 1999). Karekezi and Mutiso (1998) noted 
that in the mid-1λλ0’s, the government determined personal salaries for 
Tanzanian’s state-owned utility called TANESCO, took all investment and tariff 
decisions. In Zambia, it was the Minister of Energy who approved the tariffs, 
investment plans and the budget for the utility company (Dube 1998).  The level of 
political interference in the operations of African electric utility companies was 
observed in Ethiopia between 1974-1992, when the actual supervision and decision 
making of the Ethiopian Electric Light and Power Authority (EELPA)9, rested with 
the Ministry of Mines and Energy (Taferra 2004). The Ministry of Mines and the 
central government was in charge of making decisions and seeing to the 
implementation of power sector development (Lemina and Wondimu 1996). 
 
The level of political interference in Africa’s power sector was criticised by the World 
Bank because it believed that managerial autonomy was critical to good investment 
                                                 
8
 According to IEA (2002), the ultimate objective of the reforms should be an industry structure which 
encourages sufficient number of players to compete on equal terms, with the monopoly power of the 
established state-owned entities truly constrained. IEA (2002) however concede that while that is 
feasible in most developed countries, this may be an unrealistic early objective in the developing world. 
9
 As part of the power sector reforms in Ethiopia (through commercialisation/corporatization), EELPA 
was replaced by the Ethiopian Electric Power Company (EEPCO), as a public, commercial entity by a 
Ministerial Council Regulation.  
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and operating decisions by the utilities, which should be based purely on economic 
efficiency (ESMAP 1996). The electric utilities must be able to adopt efficient 
operating procedures, contract out services whenever economic to do so, make 
investment decisions based on cost-benefit and least cost principles and enter into 
joint ventures or form partnerships with the private sector if necessary (Karekezi 
and Mutiso 1998). This level of autonomy and degree of flexibility will ensure that 
management can be held accountable for their decisions while attempting to 
achieve the enterprise performance goals (ESMAP 1996). 
 
Under state ownership, prices were set to levels that could not cover investment 
needed to meet growing demand (Kessides 2004). Governments at some stage 
could no longer cope with the high costs of utility inefficiencies, stopped significant 
investment10 in the electricity sector, which affected service coverage rate. The 
inability of utility companies to mobilise sufficient investment capital for electricity 
sector development meant that the choice was between rationing electricity 
supplies, and embarking on comprehensive reforms (Karekezi and Kimani 2000)  
 
1.2 Need for Restructuring 
The lack of adequate internal funding, mismanagement and poor operating 
practices have resulted in maintenance backlogs that adversely affected plant 
performance and network availability (Karekezi and Mutiso 1998; Karekezi et al. 
2001; International Energy Agency 2002; Wamukonya 2003). In developing 
countries, publicly owned utility companies suffered from low labour productivity, 
deteriorating fixed facilities, poor service quality, high system losses, non-cost 
recovery tariffs, service unavailability to large portions of the population and 
inadequate investment (World Bank 1994; Bacon and Besant-Jones 2001). In the 
early 1990s for example, developing countries incurred annual losses of US$180 
billion due to low pricing and technical inefficiency in the infrastructure sector (World 
Bank 1994).  
 
To deal with the problem of lack of funding, low private sector participation and 
overall low sector efficiency, African governments were compelled to put in place 
favourable legal and regulatory reforms, strengthen the role of the independent 
                                                 
10
 African governments have traditionally guaranteed the financing of power sector investments in the 
past. 
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regulatory agencies and encourage realization of regional integration energy 
projects (Economic Commission for Africa 2003). 
  
The catalysts for the power sector reforms in Africa and most developing countries 
are therefore due to economic and financial concerns (International Energy Agency, 
IEA,  2002), as well as donor conditions for further financial support to the sector 
(Wamukonya 2003)11.  IEA (2002) and Bhagavan (1999) however caution that in 
carrying out the reforms, proper thinking and innovative sequencing of events are 
very crucial for successful reforms12 . Table 1.1 below, lists some examples of 
countries and conditions which must be satisfied for IMF lending, for borrowing 
countries in Africa. 
 
Table 1.1 Conditions for International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending  
Country Letters Of 
Intent Date 
Key Reform Area 
Benin 26/12/00 Privatisation strategy for water and electricity utility to 
be decided by January, 2001. Privatisation to be 
completed before the end of third quarter 
Burkina Faso 17/4/00 Waiver requested for the completion of the 
privatisation of the electricity company, SONABEL 
Cameroon 6/12/00 Successful bidders for the electricity company, 
SONEL, to be selected by February, 2001. 
Cape Verde 26/4/99 Privatisation receipts expected in the second half of 
the year  from various public enterprises, including the 
electricity company  
Central 
African 
Republic  
15/12/00 Government plans to speed up the implementation of 
structural reforms with technical and financial 
assistance from the World Bank. The energy sector is 
                                                 
11
 Part of the loan extended to reforming countries is earmarked for commercialisation or effectively 
restructuring power utilities to make hem attractive to the private sector. See details  Wamukonya, N. 
(β00γ), “African Power Sector Reformsμ Some Emerging Lessons”, UNEP Collaboration Centre on 
Energy and Environment, Roskilde, Denmark. 
12
 International lenders and major financial institutions have learned many new lessons the ‘hard way’, 
and most major lenders have switched away from energy projects to energy programmes, with sector 
reforms now aimed at paving the way for private sector participation. Major lenders are now 
emphasising proper sequencing of reform steps, which is expected to vary from country to country. 
More discussions can be found inμ IEA (β00β), “World Energy Outlook β00βμ Energy and Poverty” 
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one area where there are ongoing operations to 
privatise or restructure companies  
Chad 6/7/00 Negotiations on the privatisation of the management of 
the water and electricity company, STEE, began in the 
third quarter of 1999 
Republic of 
Congo 
3/11/00 A management contract to be signed by June 2001 for 
the Société Nationale d’Electricité (SNE) electricity 
company. 
Ethiopia 29/1/01 The restructuring of the telecommunications and 
electricity utilities will be finished, regulatory 
frameworks put in place, and decisive progress made 
with private participants in these activities in 
2001/2002  
Ghana 25/6/00 A sales advisor for the Electricity Company of Ghana 
(ECG) to be appointed by the end of September 2000  
Guinea 6/12/00 An action plan for restructuring the energy sector 
should be prepared by the end of the year, under 
which the liquidation of the electricity company, 
ENELGUI, will be launched 
Guinea-
Bissau 
3/11/00 The government will: (1) open financial bids for a long-
term  leasing contract (contract d’affermage) of the 
power and water utility, EAGB, by November 15, 2000 
(2) create an independent regulator agency  by end of 
January, 2001 
Lesotho 12/2/01 A private company to take over the management of the 
Lesotho Electricity Corporation (LEC). The 
management company will restructure and prepare the 
enterprise for privatisation in mid-2002.  
Mali 11/8/00 The final call for bids to privatise at least 60% of the 
capital of Electricité de Mali was launched in August 
2000. 
Mauritania 25/5/00 The sale of 4λ% of SONELEC’S electricity component 
to a strategic partner was deferred to March 2001, 
when the entire responsibility for managing the 
company will be assumed by the strategic partner 
Niger 21/11/00 The terms and conditions for the privatisation of 
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NIGELEC electricity were finalised, with a concession 
arrangement for the generation, import and distribution 
of  electricity 
Senegal 4/6/99 Government shares in six large enterprises including 
the electricity company, SENELEC, were scheduled 
for sale in 1999  
Uganda 21/8/00 Government approved legislation in November, 1999, 
to remove the state monopoly, establish an 
independent regulatory agency and unbundle the 
Ugandan Electricity Board (UEB) into separate 
distribution, transmission and generation companies.  
Zambia 30/6/00 Elimination of government majority ownership of the 
electric utility, ZESCO. 
Source: Wamukonya (2003), published in Energy for Sustainable Development, Volume 7, No.1, March 2003. 
 
Restructuring, privatisation and regulation reforms have made network utilities to be 
more efficient in developing and transition economies, due to policy options 
previously denied to state enterprises (Kessides 2004).The reforms are expected to 
ensure adequate, reliable, efficient and price competitive provision of electricity in 
countries of rapidly increasing demand. The creation of a regulatory framework as 
one of the main components of the reform is expected to put the necessary 
mechanisms in place to oversee the sector and set targets towards the attainment 
of overall sector objectives. The reform process involved the following: 
 
i. Privatisation and Public-Private Partnerships 
ii. Introduction of competition, where feasible 
iii. Undertaking regulatory reforms 
 
The research study therefore is an effort to carry out econometric assessment of 
the effects of power sector reforms comprising privatisation, competition and 
regulatory reforms in Africa for the period 1988-2005, using panel data analysis. It 
is hoped that the results of the study will go a long way to assist African 
governments to formulate power policies aimed at making the power sector more 
viable and financially sustainable, while enhancing the overall efficiencies in the 
industry.   
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1.3 Motivation  
The extent and pace of the power sector reforms in most developing countries have 
generated significant controversy, and in most cases, the reforms have been 
followed by major electricity tariff increases that have resulted in protests from 
consumers (Karekezi et. al 2001). Although some outcomes have been 
disappointing, there have been substantial, but always obvious gains (Kessides 
2004).  
 
The pessimists have argued that in most African and Latin American countries, 
electrification is not complete and there is a system size below which vertical 
separation and competition is not effective and worthwhile (Jamasb et. al 2005). 
This assertion seem to be supported by Borenstein (2002)13 and Smith (2002), 
when they stated that privatised and, or deregulated power industries, are more 
susceptible to failures in the presence of capacity constraints. According to 
Dagdeviren (2007)14, evidence seem to suggest that even in advanced countries, 
full or competition in the power sector is impracticable, and argues that intuition will 
suggest that it would be harder for similar reforms to work well in developing 
countries.  
 
The above arguments against power sector reforms in developing countries, seem 
to have found support also from Hunt (2002) and Yi-Chong (2005) who argued that 
the integrated model in the United States of America and other places are now 
being praised for its reliable supply, low prices and universal access. Daunting 
failures like California, Alberta and Ontario during 2001-2003, are believed to hold 
back the aggressive efforts for privatisation and reforms in developing countries 
(Dagdeviren 2007), 
 
The above arguments against the reforms have been opposed by Bessant-Jones 
and Tenenbaum (2001), when they argued that  using the California power crisis 
and other associated problems, to prove that undertaking the reforms is too risky is 
incorrect. They further argued that for developing countries, maintaining the status 
                                                 
13
 Detailed discussions can be found in Boreinstein, S. (β00β). “The trouble with electricity marketμ 
Understanding California’s restructuring disaster”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(1), pp. 191-
211 
14
 See details in Dagdeviren, H. (β007). “Privatisation of electricity and water – Is it still worthwhile?” 
Global Poverty Research Group, and Brooks World Poverty Institute Conference, University of 
Manchester. 
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quo in the power sector is the riskiest. This can impact negatively on economic 
growth through inadequate and poor quality of service. They supported their 
argument by stating that “like all human endeavours, power sector reforms can be 
done well or poorly”. What matters according to Bessant-Jones and Tenenbaum 
(2001) is that, the reform must focus on the starting point, identify the specific 
problems that need to be solved, as well as the appropriateness of the path 
selected for solving these problems.  
 
In assessing the results of reform outcomes, Kessides (2004) cautions that 
assessment can be complicated by the brief history of privatisation, restructuring 
and regulatory reforms in developing economies, and by severe measurement 
problems for crucial economic variables.  These difficulties not withstanding, most 
empirical evaluations of privatisation and restructuring seem favourable (Gray 2001; 
Megginson and Netter 2001). Most of the empirical studies to date have generally 
pointed to economic gains from privatisation, and that failure or success actually 
depended on post-privatisation regulation (Levy and Spiller 1996; Bortolotti, 
Siniscalco and Fantini 2000; Jamasb and Pollitt 2000; Arocena and Waddams-Price 
2002). 
 
Lack of empirical knowledge has also been cited as one of the main barriers to 
infrastructure policy analysis and reform in developing and transition economies 
(Kessides 2004). Kessides (2004) believes that empirical studies can put the 
pessimists in a better position to reflect on lessons, and identify the most important 
issues which need to be addressed. 
 
In the light of the above arguments for and against the power sector reforms, 
particularly in the developing countries, it is imperative that the actual impact of the  
reforms are analysed empirically, and not limited to a theoretical debate or to a 
qualitative approach. Though empirical and econometric studies of the impact of 
power sector reforms exist for OECD and advanced countries, most econometric 
studies for developing countries have been concentrated on Latin America 
countries, with emphasis on Chile and Argentina (Lalor and Garcia 1996; Chisari et 
al 1999). This assertion is further reinforced by Zhang et al. (2002) when they 
stated that “there is a lack of empirical study which covers the effects of 
privatisation, competition and regulation” for developing countries. 
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1.4 Thesis Objective 
The primary objective of the thesis is to carry out an econometric assessment of the 
effects of power sector reforms in African countries for the period 1988-2005, using 
panel data analysis. It is worthy to note that Eberhard (2005)15 has carried out non-
econometric case studies on African countries. Another empirical but non-
econometric study, was carried out by Estache et al. (2007). Their study focused on 
twelve countries in the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP), over the period 1998-
200516. This thesis is expected to fulfil the following key objectives: 
 
a.  to increase the body of knowledge on Africa’s power sector by providing a 
comprehensive and systematic data base for future empirical work on Africa’s 
electricity sector.  
b.   establish the relevance of using regulatory index for policy debate  
c.  measure the impact of reforms on key performance indicators in the generation, 
transmission and distribution sectors. 
 
1.5 Hypothesis 
A priori, reforms are expected to provide clearer objectives to utility management, to 
lead to higher efficiency. The creation of regulatory bodies to operate at arms-
length from governments is expected to enhance the economic regulation and 
pricing for the electric utilities. It is also expected that introduction of competition or 
private sector participation in the generation segment will serve as a catalyst for 
cost reduction and expansion of services. The hypotheses for the study have been 
formulated to cover the three segments of the Electricity Supply Industry as follows: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 Eberhard (2005) carried out non-econometric case studies to ascertain whether utility regulators in 
Africa have been able to facilitate an appropriate balance between development and investment 
outcomes. Details of the results of the studies can be found in Eberhard, A. (β005). “Regulation of 
Electricity Services in Africa: An Assessment of Current Challenges and an exploration of new 
regulatory models”, A paper prepared for the World Bank Conference towards Growth and Poverty, 
University of Cape Town, South Africa.   
16
 Estache et al. (2007) measured the economic efficiency in African electricity distribution, by 
estimating the productivity change using Malmquist Total Factor Productivity Index, 
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1. Generation Sector 
a. Regulation will increase installed generation  capacity, plant 
utilization and actual plant output 
b. In the presence of regulation, private sector participation in 
generation, will increase installed plant capacity and actual plant 
output 
c. Competition ‘for’ the market or private sector participation in 
generation, will lead to higher plant utilization and higher plant 
output. 
 
2. Transmission Sector 
a. The co-existence of Energy Sector Law and regulatory agency, 
will lead to reduction in transmission system loss level. 
b.  The existence of a regulatory agency will reduce transmission 
network loss level 
 
3. Distribution Sector 
a. Energy Sector Law and presence of autonomous regulation will 
lead to reduction of total distribution system loss level. 
b. Private Sector Participation will lead to lower total distribution 
system loss level. 
 
1.6  Approach and Research Technique 
Primary Information for the research study was obtained from the following: 
i. Specially designed questionnaire to obtain the following information from 
the countries which form the research sample:  Legal and Regulatory Framework  Industry Structure  Price Regulation  Generation System Data  Transmission System Data  Distribution System Data 
 
Details of the questionnaire are attached to this thesis as Appendix 1. Information 
from the questionnaire was supplemented with secondary data from the following 
sources: 
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ii. The World Bank Development Indicators 
iii. United States Energy Information Agency  
iv. Academic books, articles and reports from energy sector experts from 
the following:  The World Bank and International Monetary Fund  The African Forum of Utility Regulators (AFUR)  The African Energy Policy Research Network (AFREPEN)  Regulatory bodies and regional regulatory associations   Public Utilities Research Centre, University of Florida, USA.  The Institute for Public-Private Partnership (IP3), USA. 
v. Economic Freedom of the World Report, 2006 
vi. Political Constraint Index (POLCON) Report, 2006 
 
The empirical analysis was carried out using panel data econometric and was 
organised as follows: 
i. Postulating the hypothesis to be tested for the generation, transmission 
and distribution segments of the Electricity Supply Industry 
ii. Definition of the relevant performance indicators (i.e. dependent 
variables)   
iii. Definition of explanatory or independent variable, as well as 
identification of relevant control variables 
iv. Definition of  baseline econometric model 
v. Extension of baseline model to include other control variables  
vi.     Carrying out econometric analysis for both static and simple dynamic  
models   
 
1.7 Research Contribution 
1.7.1 Creation of reliable database 
One of the expected positive effects of the research is that it will serve to establish 
a comprehensive and expanded data base on the electricity sector for African 
countries for the entire electricity supply industry (i.e. generation, transmission and 
distribution sectors). Lack of empirical knowledge seems to be the main hindrance 
affecting infrastructure policy analysis and reforms in most developing and 
transition economies (Kessides 2004). Kessides (2004) further argues that since 
most reforms started in the early 1990s, until recently, there were not enough data 
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to carry out detailed evaluation of different ownership, structural and regulatory 
options. 
 
In that regard, this study will attempt to develop a reliable database, to make data 
available for future empirical studies on Africa’s electricity sector. It is expected that 
this would assist to increase the body of knowledge on the status of the continent’s 
electricity sector reforms.  
 
1.7.2 Decomposition of Regulatory Framework Index    
One reform variable, which requires some enhancement on how it has been 
measured in most previous empirical studies, is the degree of regulatory 
effectiveness. In the absence of a good indicator, researchers have adopted very 
simple measures of regulatory effectiveness, but this approach it has been 
observed, does not appear to satisfactorily assess the formal and informal aspects 
of regulation. This observation was corroborated by Brown et al. (2006) who noted 
the following three weaknesses in earlier regulatory evaluation studies: 
 
i. The earlier studies have focused almost exclusively on the institutional 
and legal attributes of regulatory systems 
ii. the evaluations do not carry out detailed analysis to ascertain whether 
the formal legal requirements have actually been implemented 
iii. the studies do not attempt to establish any link between the regulator’s 
actions or decisions  and sector outcomes 
 
From the economics literature, it was noted that Gutiérrez (2002) constructed a 7-
element regulatory index for the telecommunications sector. Cubbin and Stern 
(2005) also constructed a 4-element index for the formal attributes of regulatory 
governance. Zhang et al. (2005) produced a 4-element regulatory governance 
index for use as one of the key variables in the econometric analysis. A critical look 
at the factors used however shows that the index only measured the formal aspects 
of regulation. Montoya and Trillas (2006) also computed three indices namely IR1, 
IR2 and IR3 to measure (de jure) independence of Telecommunications Regulatory 
Agencies, of twenty-three Latin American countries over the period 1990-2004.17    
                                                 
17
 In the study by Muntoya and Trillas (2005), IR1 was used to measure regulatory independence 
based on the methodology of Gual and Trillas (2004 and 2006). IR2 was computed based on Edwards 
and Wavermann (2006), while IR3 was based on the methodology of Gutiérrez (2003). See details in 
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Zhang et. al (2002) and many authors that have studied the impact of reforms have 
acknowledged the limitation of the use of 0/1 dummy variable to capture the 
effectiveness of independent regulatory structure, (where 1 represents the 
existence of a regulatory body and 0 otherwise). This approach is not only too 
simple, but fails to critically assess both the formal (i.e. legal attributes of regulation) 
and informal aspects (i.e. regulatory practice and content) of regulation.  Zhang et 
al. (2002) therefore recommended that further research efforts are needed to 
develop more robust measures of electricity reforms in developing economies.  
 
This research is thus expected to make a contribution to the literature by attempting 
to model a regulatory framework index for each country in the research sample, by 
decomposing the index into formal and informal regulatory indices, for use as key 
independent variables, in the econometric analysis,  
 
1.7.3 Use of time-dimensioned variables   
Most econometric studies adopted simplified approaches to represent the key 
reform variables in the econometric models. For privatisation and regulation18, the 
usual approach has been the use of 0/1 dummy variable and for competition, 0/1 
dummy has also been used to gauge the degree of opening of markets to full or 
partial competition, where 1 is assigned for the occurrence of the event and zero 
otherwise 19 . Although such methodology may be acceptable in standard 
econometric modelling, this is not likely to yield robust econometric estimates 
because the switch from 0 to 1 in most cases is not dated or time-dimensioned. 
This is a gap which has been identified in the economics literature and an attempt 
would be made to improve upon this approach, by ensuring that all the variables for 
the econometric analysis are time-dimensioned. 
 
1.7.4   Scope of econometric analysis 
Another unique characteristic as well as an original aspect of the study, is that the 
econometric analysis will cover all the three segments of the electricity industry (i.e. 
the generation, transmission and distribution sectors). To achieve this objective, the 
                                                                                                                                         
Muntoya, M. and Francesc, T. (β006). “The Measurement of the Independence of 
Telecommunications Regulatory Agencies in Latin America”, Autonomous University of Barcelona, 
Spain. 
18
 Gutiérrez (2002, 2003) used a time dimensioned variable to construct a regulatory framework index 
for Latin American countries in the Telecommunications sector, See also Gutiérrez and Berg (1999) 
19
 For example, see Zhang et al. (2002), Wallsten (2001)  
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hypotheses have been carefully formulated, and the dependent variables for the 
econometric analysis, have also been carefully selected, to reflect the expected 
reform outcomes in the three segments of the industry.  
 
Estimating the impact of electricity losses separately on the transmission and 
distribution systems appears to be missing in most previous econometric studies20. 
There is no doubt that one of the main goals of electricity sector reforms is to 
improve quality of network efficiency by reducing system losses, particularly 
distribution system losses. The research will attempt to capture the separate impact 
of the reforms on total distribution and transmission network losses.   
 
1.7.5 Policy and Regulatory Implications 
The research study is also expected to guide power sector reformers and regulators 
on the right approach to adopt to ensure the success of the reforms. The study is 
also expected to aid policy makers to better compare the performance of public and 
privatised electricity generation and distribution companies. The conclusions will 
also guide policy makers on the impact of the regulatory framework on the 
efficiency of African utility companies and also measure the impact of regulatory 
framework on utility performance. The empirical results are expected to provide 
inter alia, answers to the following critical policy questions: 
i. Is competition the key driver of the performance of the utility companies? 
ii. Will privatisation alone achieve the desired results or it must co-exist 
with other reform variables? What strategies should governments that 
are reforming the electricity sector and pursuing privatisation adopt? 
iii. Will introduction of private sector participation stimulate investment in 
generation and distribution sectors of the Electricity Supply Industry (ESI) 
to enhance economic performance? 
iv. What is the appropriate market structure for non-sophisticated electricity 
markets in Africa? What is the best model of privatisation and how far 
can it employed to the maximum extent possible? 
v. Will presence of regulatory agency provide different incentive levels for 
improving utility performance? 
 
                                                 
20
 Econometric analysis by Cubbin and Stern (2005, 2006) covered combined technical distribution 
and transmission losses. 
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These questions are very important considering the fact that power sector reform is 
a politically challenging one. The politics of reforms is not only limited to the sector 
restructuring but most important, to the creation and maintenance of a conducive 
environment, which will permit investment to be made to meet the growing 
population demand.  
 
1.8 Thesis Outline 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: 
 
The literature review is presented in chapter 2 while chapter 3 describes in detail, 
the data collection methodology and key elements of the research questionnaire. 
Chapter 4 examines the proposed methodology for constructing the regulatory 
framework index, and presents the final results of formal and informal regulatory 
indices. In chapter 5, the dependent and independent variables for the econometric 
analysis are identified and defined for the generation and network sectors. The 
results from the econometric estimations are critically analysed and discussed in 
chapter 6, while final discussion and conclusions are presented in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 2  LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 Introduction 
Although econometric and other empirical evidence of the power sector reforms 
exist for advanced and industrialised countries, with the exception of few case 
studies, the impact of the reform experience in developing countries, especially in 
Africa has not been well-researched. Few studies on developing countries have 
only been concentrated on Latin American countries (Lalor and Garcia 1996). 
Research work has revealed that generally, there exist very few preliminary studies 
such as Zhang, Kirkpatrick and Parker (2002), Pargal (2003), Cubbin and Stern 
(2005) and Zhang, Kirkpatrick and Parker (2005). The section reviews the various 
empirical approaches for assessing the impact of electricity sector liberalisation. For 
ease of discussions, this section is sub-divided as follows: 
i. Effects of reforms variables on key performance indicators 
ii. Determinants of reforms and key steps 
iii. Productivity and efficiency studies 
 
2.2   Effects of reform variables on performance indicators 
One of the few studies that examined the impact of reforms in developing countries 
was by Zhang, Parker and Kirkpatrick (2002). The study carried out an econometric 
assessment of the effects of privatisation, competition, and regulation on the 
performance of the electricity generation sector using panel data for 51 developing 
countries over the period 1985-2000. The study specifically sought to identify the 
impact of the reforms on generating capacity, electricity generated, labour 
productivity as well as industrial and residential prices. 
On privatisation, they hypothesised that privatisation will lead to: 
i. Higher operating efficiency and higher capital utilisation 
ii. More capacity and hence higher output, provided that the regulatory 
regime is supportive of investor confidence 
iii. Higher prices to residential customers and lower prices to industrial 
users, as prices are aligned with marginal costs 
 
On Competition, Zhang et al. (2002) formulated the hypothesis that competition will 
lead to: 
i. Larger capacity, higher output and greater labour productivity 
ii. Lower industrial user prices and would either raise or lower residential 
user prices 
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Regarding the effects of regulation on electricity sector reforms, Zhang et al. (2002) 
put forward the following hypothesis: 
i. Independent regulation in place of direct government  department 
regulation, will improve productive efficiency 
ii. Independent regulation will raise prices charged to domestic consumers 
as cross-subsidies are removed 
 
One of the main drawbacks of the study is the use of 0/1 dummy for the key 
variables (i.e. privatisation, competition and regulatory reforms) which were not 
dated and therefore fail to capture the intensity of competitive pressure faced by 
incumbents, as well as the share of private capital in the generation sector, thus 
creating the problem of omitted variables. For instance the use of 0/1 dummy for 
privatisation will classify a leading electricity reformer like Argentina in the same 
category as a latter reforming country like Bulgaria (Jamasb, Mota, Newberry and 
Pollitt 2005).  
 
Zhang et al (2002) also admitted that the use of 0/1 dummy variable for regulation 
was particularly crude and could not reflect the effectiveness of the various forms of 
regulation, which was adopted by the various countries in the sample. They 
therefore suggested that future similar research work should focus on developing 
more robust measures of electricity reforms, through the use of better data and 
detailed studies, to gauge the effectiveness of the regulatory practice and 
processes.    
 
The above drawbacks notwithstanding, the empirical results of Zhang et al. (2002) 
seemed consistent with the findings of similar studies to assess the importance of 
competition and/or effective independent regulation. Specifically on privatisation, 
the study rejected the hypothesis that privatisation will lead to higher operating 
efficiency. This result is consistent with what pertains in the economic literature that 
competition rather than the ownership change is the key to performance 
improvement. The study also supported the idea that the generation capacity 
utilisation does not improve under privatisation, independent of competition and 
regulation. The results also suggested that privatisation, when linked with 
competition and/or regulation does not have a statistically significant effect on 
residential and industrial user prices. 
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With respect to the competition hypothesis, the econometric results supported the 
view that competition will lead to higher generating capacity per capita and a higher 
labour productivity. On prices, the results of competition was ambiguous in that 
competition does seem to lower industrial prices, but this result is reversed when 
competition is interacted with regulation. Zhang et al. (2002) also found out that 
competition does not necessarily lead to efficient capacity utilisation. This they 
explained can possibly be due to entry of competitors to expand generation 
capacity to cause a reduction in the system average generation utilisation. 
 
One feature of the result is that privatisation alone does not appear to improve 
labour productivity, but when interacted with independent regulation, there was a 
significant and a positive effect. The study rejected the hypothesis that regulation 
will raise domestic consumer prices as cross-subsidies are removed. Regulation 
was found to have no impact on industrial prices, although when interacted with 
competition, industrial prices were found to be higher. Though the results were 
generally consistent with those from similar studies, it failed to address the problem 
of simultaneity and used simple 0/1 dummy variables to measure the key reform 
variables.  
 
In order to address the short-comings of the study by producing better measures of 
regulation, competition and privatisation, Zhang et al. (2005) undertook another 
study to investigate the effects of regulation, competition and privatisation using 
panel data econometrics, for 36 developing and transitional countries for the period 
1985-2003. In the 2005 study, they constructed the privatisation variable as a 
percentage of generating capacity owned by private investors, while the competition 
variables was constructed based on the largest market share of the largest 
generators in the sector. For regulation, they constructed a 4-element regulatory 
governance index comprising: (i) whether there is an electricity or energy sector law 
(ii) whether the regulator claims to be independent (iii) whether there is fixed term of 
appointment for the head of the regulatory body (iv) whether the regulator is 
financed through fees and levies.  The main conclusion of the Zhang et al. (2005) 
study was that in developing countries, performance improvements in electricity 
generation are assured when competition or independent regulation is instituted.   
 
Cubbin and Stern (2005) carried out an assessment of good regulatory governance 
on electricity industry capacity and efficiency in 28 developing countries, including 
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four African countries21, over the period 1980-2001. The focus of their empirical 
research was on regulatory governance rather than regulatory content. In their 
study, Cubbin and Stern (2005) hypothesised that: 
i. The presence of an effective regulatory framework in a developing 
country will lead to increase in investment (local or foreign) in the 
electricity sector. 
To estimate the impact of regulatory effectiveness, they focused on the following: 
i. Electricity capacity levels, which were proxied by rated generation 
capacity per capita 
ii. Efficiency measures in developing countries, which were also proxied by 
capacity utilisation of generation and assessment of transmission and 
distribution technical losses. 
 
In providing justification for the performance indicators used in the study, Cubbin 
and Stern (2005) agued that once effective regulation is present to support a 
feasible financial framework, investment is encouraged and private investors have 
the prospect of earning a reasonable return on their investment. It is expected that 
the presence of an effective regulatory regime will encourage the growth of private 
investment and other private finance within state systems.  
 
In their study, Cubbin and Stern (2005) operationalised the effectiveness and 
quality of regulatory governance by using the following four-element regulatory 
index: 
i. Whether the country has an electricity or energy regulatory law 
ii. Whether the country has an autonomous or a Ministry regulator 
iii. Whether the country’s electricity regulator is funded from licence fees or 
out of government budget 
iv. Whether staff of the regulatory body remuneration is decoupled from civil 
service pay levels.   
 
Each element was measured by a 0/1 dummy, which implied that the highest 
governance score of 4 on the index is obtained by a regulator that possesses all the 
characteristics, afore-mentioned. The study went a step further to investigate the 
effect of age of the regulatory agency by ensuring that the date of switch from 0 to 1, 
is based on the date of enactment of the law. 
                                                 
21
 Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan and Uganda 
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Cubbin and Stern (2005) argued that the absence of purpose-designed data sets 
on which to carry out the econometric analysis similar to the one used in the 
telecommunications sector resulted in weaknesses in the data set. Some of the 
identified weaknesses include among others: 
i. Limited data on privatisation 
ii. Absence of limited cross-county data on efficiency 
iii. Data on the formal aspects of regulation allowed for a 4-element 
index, instead of a 7-element index used by Gutierrez, for the 
telecommunication regulation index 
iv. Limited time dimension for data on privatisation and competition 
v. Potential omitted variable bias due to the inability to test for the 
inclusion of many potentially significant variables 
 
Despite the weaknesses in the data set, the empirical results were generally robust. 
The main conclusion drawn from the study was that controlling for country specific 
fixed effects, regulatory effectiveness is positively and significantly related with 
higher per capital generation capacity levels and higher generation capacity 
utilisation factors (Cubbin and Stern 2005). 
 
Steiner (2001) examined the effect of regulatory environment, liberalisation and 
privatisation on the performance in the generation segment of the electricity market 
for 19 OECD countries for 1987-1996, using panel data techniques, across 
countries and years. Specifically, the study was aimed at examining the impact of 
regulatory reform on efficiency and price, as well as the relative efficiency of 
different reform strategies. Steiner (2001) measured efficiency by capacity 
utilisation rate and amount of reserve margin, using panel data set to compare 
empirically the experience of 19 OECD countries over the period 1986-1996. Her 
main hypothesis was that liberalising regulation, restructuring and privatisation are 
expected to yield improved efficiency, lower industrial electricity prices and lower 
industrial-to-residential price ratio. One of the major drawbacks of the study was the 
lack of controls for institutions or for macroeconomic policy.  
 
Though Steiner (2001) acknowledged that the analysis would aid in the assessment 
of the impact of regulation and industry structure on performance, she was of the 
view that the analysis could be enhanced by refining the regulatory indicators and 
 33 
finding a suitable proxy for quality and market power22. She also suggested that 
similar analysis should be extended to cover the distribution and the transmission 
segments of the electricity supply industry. 
 
In her conclusions, Steiner (2001) noted that utilisation rate is positively and 
significantly correlated with privatisation, and unbundling transmission from 
generation. The results confirmed the reserve margin hypothesis, but the coefficient 
on unbundling of generation and transmission and third party access, were not 
significant. She however found that privatisation was not necessarily correlated with 
increased competition, but the impact of reforms on the price ratio showed the 
benefit of reforms to be skewed in the direction of industrial customers. She also 
found that the price discrimination can persist and even intensify under reform, if 
market power is not reduced by structural measures such as horizontal unbundling. 
This result is in line with the economic literature and also raises a serious political 
issue in many countries where large and bulk customers seem to disproportionately 
benefit from price-realignment towards efficient costs, which is normally associated 
with unwinding of cross-subsidies. 
 
Unlike Steiner (2001), Hattori and Tsutsui (2004) carried out empirical research for 
the same 19 OECD countries for the period 1987-1999. They found the presence of 
an electricity wholesale market to be statistically significant and positive. The 
differences in the empirical results of Steiner (2001), and Hattori and Tsutsui (2004) 
are attributable to changes in the definition of the regulatory reform variables. While 
Steiner (2001) used a random effects model, Hattori and Tutsui (2004) used both 
random and fixed effects model. The key drawback in the two studies is the non-
inclusion of time effects, which become relevant the longer the time series. 
Furthermore, the econometric models used did not solve the problem of 
endogeneity through the use of instrumental variables. 
 
Holborn (2001) examined the effect of political risk on international expansion 
strategies of firms in electric power generation. Specifically, he tested the 
hypothesis that an individual firm’s entry to a particular market will increase with the 
degree of its previous experience on a similar type of market, as well as the risk of 
                                                 
22
 Steiner (2001) could not get a suitable proxy for quality, and since labour productivity is not a good 
measure of efficiency in a capital-intensive sector like electricity, she used reserve margin from 
‘optimal’ reserve margins as a proxy for efficiency. 
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expropriation. He tested the hypothesis using a data set covering privately-financed 
power generation projects outside North America, spanning 10 years, 191 
companies from 64 countries.  A careful analysis of the econometric model show 
that though country, market and institutional conditions   have been included, it fails 
to include important reform variables for regulatory reforms and type of industry 
structure.  
 
The above weaknesses notwithstanding, Holborn (2001) observed that prior 
experience from similar market has a substantial impact on the probability of entry, 
but firms tend to concentrate on one type of market environment (i.e. competition or 
monopsony). He also found that while higher levels of political risk typically 
discourage entry, the impact is significantly lower for firms with greater levels of 
international experience. 
 
Bergara, Henisz and Spiller (1997) tested the hypothesis that well-defined and 
credible political institutions are positively correlated with investment 23  in the 
electricity sector, for a sample of 91 developed and developing countries for only 
1997. Though the results supported the hypothesis, there were serious unanswered 
gaps in the analysis. For instance,  Bergara et al. (1997) did not include any post-
reform data in the analysis, while the use of generation capacity as a proxy for 
investment creates a serious measurement problem because, the composition of 
investment between generation, transmission and distribution will vary significantly 
from country to country (Jamasb et al.  2004) 
  
Siniscalco, Bortolotti and Fantini (2001) also carried out an empirical test to 
ascertain whether vertical integration will impact negatively on the number of 
privatisation , the aggregate proceeds of privatisation and on the percentage of 
privatised stock. They found that vertical integration was significantly negatively 
correlated with the number of sales and aggregate proceeds of privatisation, while 
the regulatory index was positively and significantly correlated with the number of 
sales and with privatisation proceeds. 
 
2.3     Elements of determinants of reforms                                          
One of the well-documented research studies on the determinants of reforms was 
by Bacon and Besant-Jones (2001). They used cross-section data on 115 
                                                 
23
 The main dependent variable used for the analysis was the log of public and private capacity per 
1000 people. 
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developing countries 24 .They tested the hypothesis whether country policy and 
institutions were positively correlated with reforms in the electricity sector, and 
whether country risk is negatively correlated with reform. A priori, one expects 
country policy and institution to be positively correlated with reforms, while political 
and economic risk is expected to be negatively associated with reforms. 
 
Their result was consistent with economic literature where the coefficient on the 
policy indicator as well as the risk indication, is significant and has the expected 
signs. Despite the consistency of results with economic literature, some drawbacks 
have been noticed which tend to affect the robustness of the results. For instance, 
though Bacon and Bessant-Jones (2001) based the country policy and institutional 
assessment variable on 20 indicators, these indicators are not clearly identified (i.e. 
economic management and sustainability) and there is a possibility of the risk of co-
linearity with the reform indicator. Though the hypothesis was specifically 
formulated to address electricity sector reforms, it is undoubtedly clear from the 
study that they refer to overall management of the economy and the public sector. 
The only variable specific to the electricity sector is the annual growth rate of 
energy use per capita (MWh per capita), which is an independent variable in the 
model. 
 
Unlike Bacon and Besant-Jones (2001), Drillisch and Riechmann (1998) examined 
the relationship between energy dependency, environmental commitment and the 
choice of liberalisation model. Their study covered 13 countries25, using cross-
sectional data for 1995, The liberalisation index was measured using wholesale 
reforms (i.e. pool, wholesale wheeling or competitive bidding), timing of reforms and 
retail reforms (i.e. regulated third party access, negotiated third party access) and 
timing of retail reforms.. The key independent variables used were prices and 
energy independence index.26 
 
                                                 
24
 The main reform variable used was Reform Scores calculated from the number of reform steps 
taken by each country in the ESMAP (1999), comprising corporatisation, restructuring, existence of 
sector law, existence of a regulator, IPP entry and divestiture. 
25
 The countries were: Australia, Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, Japan, Norway, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Sweden, Finland, U.K. and USA. 
26
 Calculated from total primary supply of each different fuel, total exports of each fuel, indigenous 
production of each fuel, share of each fuel in total electricity production. 
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Some of the drawbacks of the study are the non-inclusion of time effect in the 
model, though a temporal dimension is incorporated in the model, in the form of the 
impact of past decisions on energy and electricity dependency and environmental 
commitment. Another drawback is the narrow definition of liberalisation index which 
did not take account of such key variables like corporatisation, privatisation, 
restructuring, regulatory change and the presence of effective, credible and 
independent regulatory body. 
 
Despite the afore-mentioned shortfalls, the results of Drillisch and Riechmann (1998) 
provide some interesting observations. They found a positive correlation between 
fuel import independence and liberalisation. The study also found that the estimated 
overall energy independence index to be much more significant than the electricity 
sector index. Results of the study did not however establish a significant inter-
dependence between environmental commitment and the choice of liberalisation 
model. 
 
Also, Ruffin (2003) carried out an econometric assessment of institutional 
determinants of competition, ownership and extent of reforms (i.e. dependent 
variable). He tested the hypothesis that judicial independence, economic ideology 
and distributional conflict influence competition. He also tested the hypothesis that 
judicial independence, economic ideology and distributional conflict influences 
private ownership. The study used a cross-section Ordinary-Least Squares (OLS) 
analysis for 75 developed and developing countries. The study finds that the 
relationship between judicial independence and competition and ownership is 
ambiguous i.e. insignificant coefficients, or when significant, their sign shifts across 
models. The results also suggested that greater distributional conflict was 
significantly correlated with a higher degree of monopoly, while the relationship 
between economic ideology in favour of competitive and private ownership, was 
generally positive and significant. 
 
Estache and Rossi (2004) carried out an empirical study to examine whether 
increases in labour productivity have had any impact on lower prices for final 
consumers, by comparing the relative performance of public and privatised Latin 
American electricity distribution companies for 1994-2001. In the study, they used 
number of employees and capital input, measured by kilometres of distribution 
network, as the independent variable and three outputs namely number of final 
customers, total energy supplied to final customers and the service area (square 
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metres) as the dependent variables. The main econometric model used was OLS, 
but in order to assess the robustness of the results, four alternative model 
specifications namely Stochastic Frontier Model, Model in First Differences and 
Operating and Maintenance Model, were also used. 
 
From their results, Estache and Rossi (2004) concluded as follows: 
i. Privatised firms are more labour efficient than their public counterparts. 
Private firms use about 30% to 45% less labour to produce a given 
bundle of outputs, compared to public firms 
ii. Private firms operating under price cap and hybrid regulating schemes 
are more labour efficient than both public and private firms under rate-of-
return regulation 
iii. Private firms operating under Rate of Return regulation have at most, 
similar labour efficiency as public firms 
 
Estache and Rossi (2004) however cautioned that the empirical evidence from the 
study should be interpreted with care, for it does not provide definitive conclusions 
about the effects of privatisation and incentive regulation, on the efficiency of 
electricity distribution firms in Latin America countries because of the problem of 
omitted variables. In that regard, they suggested additional research, to refine the 
assessment and to provide more reliable and robust estimates. They suggested 
that this should include collection of comparable data on quality of service and a 
longer period of analysis, instead of the 7-year period (i.e. 1994-2001) used for their 
study. 
   
2.4   Productivity and Efficiency Studies 
The second class of empirical studies looked at the effect of electricity sector 
reforms on productivity and efficiency levels achieved in the electricity sector. The 
main analytical approaches in the economics literature can generally be 
categorised as follows: 
 
i. Frontier Techniques: 
a. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
b. Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) 
 
ii. Non-Frontier Technique 
a. Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
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The frontier approaches generally seek to distinguish between technical change (i.e. 
efficiency frontier shift) and efficiency change, which measure the move towards the 
efficiency frontier (Diewert and Nakamura 1999; Sarafidis 2002; Jamasb and Pollitt 
2003). DEA technique is a non-econometric approach, which uses linear 
programming method to determine the efficiency frontier, while SFA is an 
econometric method for estimating the efficient frontier (Farrel 1957; Färe et al. 
1985; Coelli et al. 1998; Sarafidis 2002; Farsi and Filippini 200527). TFP is used to 
calculate the factor productivity index using an output/input index (Coelli et al. 1998; 
Cambridge Economic Policy Associates 2003). Unlike DEA and SFA, the final 
efficient index in TFP cannot be decomposed into technical or allocative efficiencies 
(Coelli et al. 1998). 
 
Plane (1999) used SFA to assess the impact of privatisation of Cote d’Ivoire 
Electricity Company (CIE) on efficiency and on the welfare distribution. This was a 
single country study and in the basic model, gross generation (Gigawatt-hours) was 
used as a function of installed capacity (Megawatts), and the number of permanent 
employees. The base model was later on enhanced to include variables like ratio of 
customers to length of distribution network, and a dummy variable for privatisation. 
The results supported the hypothesis of sufficient performance improvement in the 
post-privatisation period. With respect to welfare distribution, the results indicated 
that consumers benefited through a substantial price reduction, enhancement of 
quality of electricity supply, while electricity coverage increased by over 16%. 
 
Considering the fact that there was no restructuring, privatisation or divestiture, and 
since the only change was a management contract, the author argued that the 
improved benefits emanated from decentralisation, reduction of hierarchy of 
reporting layers and managerial incentives. He however cautioned that the 
achievements by the utility company should not be divorced from achievements of 
the overall macro-economic stability through re-alignment of exchange rate regime 
in Cote d’Ivoire. DEA and SFA have been used in the economics literature for 
                                                 
27
 The non-parametric approaches such as DEA and others are considered to be a deterministic 
function of the observed variables and require that no specific functional form is imposed. The 
parametric methods allow for random unobserved heterogeneity among different firms and also 
require the specification of a functional form. See further details in Farsi, M. and Filippini, M. (2005), 
“Analysis of Electricity Distribution Utilities in Switzerland”, Centre for Energy Policy and Economics, 
Department of Management Technology and Economics, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, 
Switzerland. See also Affuso et al (2002) for further discussions. 
 39 
benchmarking and efficiency analysis in the electricity sector particularly in Great 
Britain, the Nordic States and Austria. Jamasb and Pollitt (2003) performed an 
international benchmarking of 63 utility companies from 6 European countries by 
comparing several SFA and DEA specification. Their main conclusion was that the 
efficient frontier was populated by smaller utilities than the U.K. firms.  
 
Pollitt (1995) used DEA for 136 US firms and 9 U.K. firms. He found that there was 
no strong evidence that ownership affects performance of utility companies. This 
result was reinforced by the empirical work of Scarsi (1999), who carried out an 
analysis of technical efficiency of two local electricity distribution companies in Italy 
for 1994 and 1996, using Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) and Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA). In the econometric results, he found no statistically significant 
difference between private and publicly owned firms.  
 
Hjalmarsson and Kumbhakar (1998) undertook a study of the Swedish electricity 
distribution utilities for the period 1987-1990. The main objective of their study was 
to examine whether ownership or organisation of the distribution companies has 
any systematic impact on economics of scale, technical change and relative 
efficiency in labour, across different ownership categories.  They found that in the 
SFA models, municipal utilities were more efficient than mixed ownership firms, 
while the opposite was the case in the DEA models. Hjalmarsson and Kumbhakar 
(1998) interpreted the strong efficiency differences between private and publicly 
owned firms, as strong indication of the impact of indirect competition present in the 
market. 
 
Arocena and Waddams-Price (2002) also studied the impact of regulatory reforms 
on 33 publicly and privately owned coal-fired electricity generation plants in Spain, 
for the period 1984-1997, using Malmquist DEA. In their study, they used 
generation capacity (Megawatt), number of employees and volume of fuel as the 
inputs, while the output consisted of energy output (Megawatt-Hours) and declared 
plant availability. The conclusions from the study showed that public generators are 
generally more efficient under cost-of-service regulation, while private generators 
catch-up and overtake the public sector generators under price cap regulation, by 
responding to incentive regulation through increase in efficiency. 
 
In another study, Delmas and Tokat (2003) assessed the short-term impact of 
supply deregulation on the productive efficiency of electric utilities in the USA , as 
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well as the relationship between the level of vertical integration and efficiency in a 
de-regulated environment. They analysed the short-term impact of retail 
deregulation on the productive efficiency of 177 investor-owned electric utilities in 
the United States, from 1998-2001. They used a DEA technique to determine the 
efficiency scores and a Tobit model to test the following two hypotheses: 
i. In the short term, the level of deregulation will vary inversely with the 
level of technical efficiency 
ii. There exists a parabolic relationship between the level of vertical 
integration and efficiency. 
 
The study used Operating and Maintenance, Capital Cost and Cost of Electricity 
produced as the input variables. The volume of energy sales (MWh), discriminated 
by customer type served as the output variable. The results show that the process 
of deregulation has a negative impact on firms’ productive efficiency, measured 
using DEA. They also observed that firms that are vertically integrated into 
electricity generation, or that rely on the market for the supply of their electricity are 
more efficient than firms that adopted hybrid structures, comprising vertical 
integration and contracting. 
 
Though the results of the study supported the two hypotheses, the model suffered 
from the following weaknesses: 
i. The limited time span of the study 
ii. No control variables for economic changes and other characteristics like 
urbanisation or customer density are included 
iii. A lot questions have been asked concerning the use of DEA technique 
to carry out the analysis, since DEA is known to be best suited for 
comparing similar activities and technologies 
iv. The use of second stage Tolbit regression on DEA scores is generally 
performed for the purpose of adjusting the efficiency scores for factors 
that are beyond the control of utility management. 
 
A similar study by Rodriguez-Pardina and Rossi (2000) used Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis (SFA) to study the technical change in 36 electricity distribution companies 
in South America (1994-1997), with the view to setting the efficiency or X-factor for 
use in  a price-cap (i.e. RPI – X) price regime. In their study, the number of 
connected customers was the dependent variable, while distribution network length, 
number of employees, service area, transformer capacity, percentage of sales to 
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domestic customers, total sales and an interaction variable between time and 
reform dummy, served as the independent variables. Their results supported the 
hypothesis of no change in inefficiency over the study period. They also found 
evidence of partial correlation between reforms and performance.  
 
Filipinni (1998) and Filippini and Wild (2001) used SFA in a productivity study of 39 
and 59 Swiss electricity distribution utilities respectively. The results of both studies 
showed that regional differences in service territory significantly influence 
productivity. One interesting aspect of the result is the identification of significant 
economies of scale such that smaller utilities can reduce costs  by merging and 
thus extend their sub-optimal service territory size.   
 
Rossi and Ruzzier (2001) and Estache et al. (2002), used DEA and SFA28 on 39 
electric distribution utilities between 1994 and 2000 in South America countries. 
They inferred from the results that the two approaches are consistent in their 
rankings and identification of the best and worst performers. They also observed 
that the efficiency scores were stable over time.29  Haupt, Kinnunen and Pferffenger 
(2002) compared the network access prices of German electricity distributors and to 
identify reasons for differences beyond the decision framework of companies. In 
their analysis, they took cognisance of structural variables and regional specificities 
like settlement density and consumer structures. The main drawback of their study 
was that they used a single utility benchmarking approach that dealt exclusively 
with prices.   
 
Whiteman (1999) evaluated the macroeconomic impact of reforms of the Australian 
electricity supply industry30. His analysis covered 3 industries namely electricity (41 
                                                 
28
 They used two parametric models namely SFA and  random effects model ad two non-parametric 
DEA approaches, one with variable returns to scale and the second one with constant returns to scale.  
29
 They argued that though utility operators control most of the information required for regulatory 
purposes, and have little interest in volunteering their dissemination, Latin American’s electricity sector 
could rely on an approach that utilises performance ranking, based on comparative efficiency to yield 
useful results. See details in Estache, A., Rossi, A. and Ruzzier, C (2002). 
30
 He argued that many industries are characterised by multiple outputs and consequently the 
application of single output models may yield misleading results, particularly in relation to sign and 
significance of labour exponent of a conventional production function. See Whiteman, J. (1999) for 
detailed discussions of empirical results. He estimated 8 different multiple-output technical efficiency 
models for each of the electricity, gas and telecommunications models. See empirical details in 
Whiteman, J. (1λλλ). “The Measurement of Efficiency, where there are multiple outputs”. 
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suppliers for the period 1996-1997), gas (51 suppliers for the period 1992-1994) 
and telecommunication (31 suppliers for 1992). He used DEA, COLS and SFA to 
measure efficiency and then calculated potential increase in Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP). His empirical results seemed to suggest that the multiple models 
are more likely to yield coefficients of labour with the expected positive sign. Based 
on his empirical results, he also observed that the technical efficiency estimates 
from the deterministic and stochastic models were highly correlated. He therefore 
concluded that given the problem associated with estimating stochastic frontier 
models, the deterministic or COLS for estimating efficiency is to be preferred.  
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CHAPTER 3  DATA COLLECTION: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE   
3.1 Introduction 
The questionnaire design commenced with a meeting with project supervisors31 at 
City University on February 1, 2005 to discuss details of the draft questionnaire. 
The amended version of the questionnaire and a project concept paper was 
forwarded to the Executive Council of the African Forum of Utility Regulators (AFUR) 
in South Africa in mid-February, 2005. With the permission of the Executive Council, 
a presentation on the objectives of the research project, as well as key aspects of 
the questionnaire was made to AFUR members, representatives of the World Bank 
and the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), USA. 
The presentation was made at the Second Annual Conference of AFUR, held from 
March 14-16, 2005 in Kampala, Uganda. The questionnaire which is annexed as 
Appendix 1, was finally sent to the AFUR countries in April, 2005. 
 
The next section provide details of the questionnaire and  examine how the 
questions have been couched to elicit information on the output performance 
measures (i.e. the dependent variables) and the main independent variables for the 
econometric analysis.  The questionnaire was structured to collect data and obtain 
relevant information, from the countries in the research sample, shown in Appendix 
2, under the following six main headings: 
i. Legal and Regulatory Framework 
ii. Price Regulation 
iii. Industry Structure 
iv. Generation Sector 
v. Transmission System 
vi. Distribution System 
 
3.2  Legal and Regulatory Framework 
The scope of the legal framework that established the regulatory body is very 
crucial to the performance of the institution (Gutiérrez 2002, 2003; Brown et al. 
2006; Kessides 2004). The stronger the legal mandate that established the 
institution, the more credible and sustainable would be the regulatory framework. 
Brown et al (2006) are therefore of the view that the regulatory agency should be 
created in a statute or primary law, that fully articulates its jurisdictional authority, 
powers, responsibilities and duties. In that regard, regulatory frameworks created 
                                                 
31
 Professor John Cubbin, Dr. Begona Garcia-Marinoso and Dr. Xeni Dassiou 
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by a country’s legislature and embedded in a primary law are generally more 
credible and sustainable than those enacted by presidential decrees, since a new 
executive can easily repeal former decrees (Gutiérrez 1999, 2002).  
 
The regulatory framework itself can be broken down along two dimensions namely, 
regulatory governance and content (Levy and Spiller 1994, 1996; Brown et al. 2006; 
Kessides 2004). Brown et al. (2006) identified the two important dimensions of 
regulation as regulatory governance and regulatory substance. They defined 
regulatory governance as the institutional and legal design of the regulatory system 
(i.e. the “how” of regulation), and referred to regulatory substance, as the actual 
decisions made by the regulatory agency (i.e. the “what” of regulation)32. 
 
The questionnaire has been designed to capture needed information on regulatory 
governance and regulatory content using Stern-Holder typology (1999). This 
approach will facilitate the construction of separate regulatory framework indices for 
the formal and informal aspects of regulation, for use in the econometric analysis. 
To elicit information on the formal aspects of regulation, questions such as when 
electricity law was passed, whether the regulatory agency was established by 
presidential decree and whether the regulatory functions are unambiguously spelt 
out in the primary law were asked.  
 
Since the operational autonomy of a regulatory agency is driven largely by factors 
such as source of funding, the legal and technical expertise as well as the 
government’s willingness to recognise the authority of the regulatory body (Brown 
et al. 2006; Kessides 2004; Au 2002), the questions were also formulated to 
capture responses from the countries on all these issues. Questions on the informal 
aspects relate to the existence of appeals mechanisms, the degree of consultation 
with stakeholders, transparency and consistency of regulatory decisions and ease 
of accessibility to key regulatory documents, such as rate-setting guidelines by 
stakeholders  
 
The questionnaire also investigated the regulatory organisation with respect to 
regulatory capacity and expertise, an area which has persistently served as a 
barrier to the development of strong and credible regulatory agencies in Africa. 
                                                 
32
 For details see Brown et al (β006), “Handbook for Evaluating Infrastructure Regulatory Systems”. 
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Details of the questionnaire on the legal and regulatory aspects, are annexed as 
Appendix 1A. 
 
3.3 Industry Structure  
When it comes to market structure, horizontal and vertical unbundling in most 
African countries have either slowed down considerably or stopped, such that no 
country is yet to establish a competitive wholesale electricity market33 (Eberhard 
2005). According to Eberhard (2005), the closest most countries have come to is 
limited to competition ‘for’ the market, through the issuance of competitive bids for 
new power projects, private concessions or management contracts. Issues relating 
to the market structures and the wholesale market designs in African countries, are 
being investigated as part of the study. Questions such as degree of unbundling 
between the generation and transmission or the level of vertical integration have 
been asked. This aspect of the questionnaire also elicit information on the level of 
privatisation or private sector participation (PSP) in generation and distribution 
sectors of each country’s electricity supply industry (ESI).  
 
Though complete retail competition34  may not necessarily exist in most African 
countries (Bhagavan 1999), there is a possibility that ‘partial’ retail competition may 
be present in some countries. The questions therefore ascertain whether 
consumers are allowed to choose their own suppliers and what is the minimum 
consumption threshold required for consumers to do that.  The structure of the 
questionnaire on industry structure is attached as Appendix 1C. 
 
3.4     Generation Sector Data 
Power utilities in most African and developing countries are supply constrained 
such that load generation is hampered by inability to expand the transmission and 
distribution systems to increase the number of connected customers (Karekezi et al. 
2001; Bhagavan 1999; International Energy Agency 2002). Information and relevant 
data was requested on the generation segment of the Electricity Supply Industry 
                                                 
33
 Denny and Dismukes (2002), define Wholesale Electricity Markets as bulk power markets where 
purchasers are not the ultimate end users of electricity. A wholesale power market transaction is 
therefore the one where a utility that is short on capacity purchases electricity from another utility in 
order to supply power to its own customers.   
34
 Retail markets are also defined as the type of markets where customers are the ultimate end users 
of the electricity purchased. See Denny and Dismukes (2002) for further discussions on power 
markets. 
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(ESI) to cover installed generation capacity, net energy generated for the various 
generation sources namely thermal, hydro, nuclear and renewable energy 
technologies. This generation data is used to calculate plant capacity utilization 
rates. 
 
The second set of questions asked for detailed information and data on ownership 
status and market shares between the public and private sectors. The information 
gathered can be used together with data on plant installed capacity, and to compile 
data for generation plant investment by the private and public sectors. The 
questionnaire is attached as Appendix 1D. 
 
3.5  Transmission Sector Data 
The transmission network is a natural monopoly and therefore considered a 
‘bottleneck’ facility in the power sector, delivering essential services to the mass of 
the voting consumer population (Bhagavan 1999; Newbery 2006). It is not 
surprising that issues like access pricing principles, structure and regulation of the 
transmission business function, are considered as crucial to power sector reforms 
in all countries (Denny and Dismukes 2002).  
 
One of the key requirements in the operation of the new power market is the 
provision of open-access to the transmission system which should be unbundled 
from generation (Newbery 2000, 2006)35. Unbundling will ensure that the monopoly 
network owner has no incentive to favour its own service provider (Newbery 2006) 
over network usage. Newbery (2001) argues that increased competitive pressure in 
generation is expected to reduce cost, but this will require unbundling transmission 
from generation. He was of the opinion that whether these gains would be passed-
through to consumers would depend on the intensity of competition and existence 
of open-access transmission network. 
 
The regulatory goal of the separation is to minimize horizontal and vertical market 
of incumbent utilities 36  (Denny and Dismukes 2002; Bacon 2001), and allow 
                                                 
35
 According to Denny and Dismukes (2002), the unbundling can be categorised into functional and 
physical unbundling. Functional unbundling requires the utility to establish functionally separate 
entities, while physical unbundling requires utilities to sell off or divest themselves of certain assets. 
36
 If left unchecked, the market power could skew market outcomes in favour of the incumbent utility 
and significantly reduce opportunities for societal gains from competition. For more details see Denny, 
F. and Dismukes, D. (β00β), “Power System Operations and Electricity Markets”, CRC Press. 
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competitive pressure to be put on the generation sector, while restricting cross-
subsidies from the competitive sector to domestic consumers (Newbery 2006).  
 
Bacon (2001) cautions that in many African countries, the total demand for power is 
extremely small, consumers are entirely dispersed, and this can make unbundling 
and competition ‘in’ the market difficult37.The transmission network is considered 
the core of power sector reforms since it is the transmission operator or the 
Independent System Operator (ISO), which monitors and controls the transmission 
grid in real time, manage network congestion, by taking over the operational control 
of all power flows and transactions (Denny and Dismukes 2002).  
 
The questions to the various countries were formulated taking cognisance of the 
afore-mentioned roles of the transmission business function. Some of the key 
questions relate to the technical aspects of the networks such as technical losses, 
system availability and transmission circuit kilometres. Responses to these 
questions would be used to determine the level of transmission system loss level 
and hence investment over the years, as well as the impact on the overall technical 
performance of the network system. 
 
The questions have also been designed to gather information on the operational 
efficiency of the transmission organisation. Details of questionnaire on the 
transmission system can be found in Appendix 1E. 
 
3.6 Distribution Sector Data 
In African countries, most of the distribution companies perform the retail functions 
which comprise metering and billing, and therefore most of these state-owned 
companies are confronted with wide-spread theft of electricity (International Energy 
Agency 2002). This has resulted in high commercial or non-technical losses and 
low revenue collection rates which tend to undermine the financial viability of the 
distribution companies (Bhagavan 1999; Karekezi et al. 2001; Karekezi and Mutiso 
1998).  
 
                                                 
37
 Bacon (2001) argues that the major gains in the future are likely to come from those steps, which 
introduce, which introduce the profit motive, rather than those designed to produce competition ‘in’ the 
market.  
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These problems are exacerbated by political interference and weak accountability 
such that the state-owned utility companies in Africa have little incentive to improve 
their performance (Karekezi and Mutiso 1998; ESMAP 1996). Private investors are 
reluctant to commit expensive capital investment, unless they can be assured hat 
they will subsequently be permitted to charge remunerative prices (Newbery 2006). 
Reducing technical and commercial losses can go a long way to enhance the 
financial position of the distribution utilities (Karekezi et al. 2001) and avoid the 
shock created by large increases in electricity tariffs. Newbery (2006) is of the view 
that the only solution under private ownership is regulation, but poorly designed or 
incomplete regulation is likely to lead to sub-optimal outcomes. 
 
The questionnaire for the distribution sector has been designed to capture the 
above concerns and the set of questions include among others, those relating to 
industry structure, distribution system access and regulation.  The second set of 
questions cover operational performance like staff strength, number of connected 
customers, total operating and maintenance expenses. The third group of questions 
request data and information on the following areas:  distribution system technical loss and commercial loss levels   revenue collection rate,  
Details of questions on the distribution segment of the ESI are annexed as 
Appendix 1F. 
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CHAPTER 4  REGULATORY FRAMEWORK INDEX  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the construction of regulatory index by using an empirical 
technique, Principal Component Analysis (PCA), and decomposing the index, into 
formal and formal regulatory indices, for use as independent variables in the 
econometric analysis. The method of PCA is used to produce a small number of 
variables (Hsieh 2004; Everitt and Dunn 1991; Hotelling 1933), that are 
uncorrelated and which account for most of the variation in the original data set 
(Hatcher and Stepanski 1994; Suhr 2003; Hsieh 2004). PCA operates on the 
principle that when different characteristics are observed about a set of events, the 
characteristic with the higher variation tend to explain a greater proportion of the 
event, compared to a variable which displays a lower variation (Andres et al. 2008). 
 
According to Brown et al. (2006), any regulatory system can be defined along two 
important dimensions namely, regulatory governance and regulatory substance. 
Regulatory governance or the formal aspects describe the institutional and legal 
characteristics, while the informal attributes or regulatory substance, describe the 
actual regulatory practices and quality of regulation, along with the rationale for 
regulatory decisions (Brown et al. 2006)38. It has however been observed that most 
previous empirical studies tend to focus on the institutional and legal aspects (i.e. 
the formal aspects of regulation), hence the attempt to decompose the regulatory 
index into formal and informal regulatory indices.  
 
This first part of this chapter identifies the key characteristics of ‘best practice’ utility 
regulation, to provide the basis for the construction of the formal and informal 
regulatory indices. The chapter ends by using the method of principal component 
analysis, to construct the indices over the study period to be used as part of the 
independent variables in the econometric estimation. This approach is in tandem 
with the observation by Brown et al. (β006) when they stated that “any evaluation of 
the regulatory effectiveness must examine the entire regulatory system and not just 
the characteristics and actions of the formally designated regulatory entity”39. 
                                                 
38
 Detailed description on methods of evaluation of regulatory effectiveness can be found in Brown, C., 
Stern, J., Tenenbaum, B. and Gencer, D., (β006). “Handbook for Evaluating Infrastructure Regulatory 
Systems”, the World Bank, Washington D.C., USA. 
 
39
 Brown et al. (2006) noted if such an approach is not adopted, this can lead to flawed conclusions 
being drawn because the new agency may possess only limited decision making authority, both in law 
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4.2  Characteristics of Best Practice Utility Regulation 
The last decade has seen a gradual restructuring of the electricity sector in most 
Africa countries to permit private sector participation, and progressively open the 
generation sector to competition.  Since electricity is essential to the life of the 
citizens of a country, the health of the economy and also affect the international 
competitiveness of its industries (Office of Water Regulation, Australia 1999), most 
governments have embraced the idea of establishing regulatory agencies. Apart 
from the significant public interest dimensions, regulation is also necessary to mimic 
or be a surrogate for competition in the market (Au 2002).  
 
The regulatory body has a very critical role to play to ensure a successful 
implementation of the power sector reforms, since its decisions are bound to have 
far reaching implications for consumers, producers and the entire economy. An 
effective and efficient regulatory framework will require a regulator to carry out its 
functions in a fair manner and be seen to be doing so, in order to gain the trust, 
credibility and confidence from all stakeholders and market participants (Office of 
Water Regulation, Australia 1999; Au 2002). 
 
Kennedy (2003) cautions that in discussing regulatory frameworks, it is advisable to 
follow the distinction by Levy and Spiller (1996), by differentiating between 
regulatory governance and regulatory content. Kennedy (2003) is of the view that 
regulatory governance, which basically refers to the institutional context for 
regulation, is key to monitoring regulatory or political risk. He defines regulatory 
content to cover issues relating to regulatory rules, tariff methodology etc.  
 
Many African countries that have established regulatory bodies face severe 
challenges such as lack of professional expertise, inadequate financial resources 
and obtaining the necessary statutory authority (Kessides 2004). In that regard, one 
requires both the legal aspects of regulation and actual regulatory practice, as the 
key determining factors of how an effective regulatory environment can support 
reforms, promote efficiency and fulfil the desired social objectives (Smith 1997; 
Stern and Holder 1999; Brown et al. 2006). According to Stern (2000), effective 
regulation requires more than the formal attributes such as the enactment of 
                                                                                                                                         
and in practice. Detailed discussions are available in Brown A., Stern, J., Tenenbaum, B., and Gencer, 
D. (β006), “Handbook for Evaluating Infrastructure Regulatory Systems”, World Bank, Washington 
D.C., USA.  
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electricity sector law, clarity of roles and objectives. This implies that a regulatory 
framework will not operate effectively unless in addition to the formal attributes, the 
informal aspects of regulation namely participation, transparency and predictability 
or consistency in decision making are given the necessary attention. 
 
4.2.1  Formal Attributes of Regulation. 
Formal aspects of effective regulation relate to matters of institutional design and 
the legal framework for establishing the regulatory agency. These attributes cover 
issues relating to clarity of the roles of the new agency, regulatory independence, 
the legal framework which established the regulatory body and accountability. 
These sub-components are now discussed below: 
 
4.2.1.1 Clarity of roles and avoidance of conflicts of interest. 
A good regulatory model is one which unambiguously spells out the functions of the 
regulator in the primary law or any other relevant document, and removes any 
possible sources of confusion between the regulator, the sector ministry or any 
other agency (Bertolini 2006; Brown et al. 2006). Regulation is made more effective 
through the separation of the role of the policy/regulation maker (i.e. the 
government), the policy/regulation implementer (i.e. the regulator), the utility 
operators or other regulatory agencies, such as the environmental agency (Au 
2002). To minimise policy confusion and overlapping or contradictory 
responsibilities, the functions of the regulatory agency should as far possible, be 
kept separate from policy functions (Bertolini 2006).  
 
4.2.1.2 Independence   
Regulatory independence can be defined as “independence of control by the 
governor and the legislature, independence of control by utility companies and 
independence in the sense of integrity and impartiality” (Fesler, quoted in Mitnic 
1980, Pg. 69). This definition emphasises the independence from government, from 
the regulated industry, thus ruling out any traditional corporatist arrangement 
(Johannsen 2003). Regulatory independence thus refers to a situation where the 
regulator’s decisions are free from undue influences, which could compromise 
regulatory outcomes (Office of Water Regulation, Australia 1999; Brown et al. 2006). 
According to Au (2002) Regulatory independence can be analyzed from the 
following two perspectives: 
(a) Independence from the Executive or any arm of government. 
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(b) Independence from market players, such as industry consumers and the 
regulated industry. 
 
(a)  Independence from the Executive arm of government: 
Regulatory Agencies must be objective, apolitical enforcers of policies in controlling 
statutes (Kessides 2004). Eberhard (2005) identified at least three dimensions of 
regulatory independence as follows:  
i. decision making independence  
ii. institutional and management independence 
iii. financial independence 
 
Regulatory independence can be realized by clearly spelling out the functions of the 
regulator in the primary law which established the regulatory agency. A clear 
separation of functions will ensure that independent regulators hold exclusive 
decision-making powers to ensure that the decisions relating to electricity tariff 
levels or rates of return earned by operators, are not compromised by government 
pressure (Kessides 2004; Demarigny 1996). In addition, the independent regulator 
should be able to effectively combine the functions of rule making, rule application 
and litigation (Demarigny 1996) 
 
The list of regulatory bodies in Africa and their mode of creation, as well as the year 
of legal establishment is presented in table 4.1 below: 
 
Table 4.1 Regulatory Agencies and mode of creation 
Country Name of regulatory 
Body 
Created by: Year of Legal 
Establishment 
Algeria 
 
 
 
Cameroon 
 
 
Ethiopia 
 
 
 
Gambia 
 
 
 
Ghana 
Electricity and Gas 
Regulatory 
Commission 
 
Electricity Regulatory 
Agency 
 
Ethiopian Regulatory 
Agency 
 
 
Public Utilities 
Regulatory Authority 
 
 
Public Utilities 
Electricity Act 2002,  
 
 
 
Electricity Sector Law 
No. 98/022 
 
Electricity 
Proclamation No. 
86/1997.   
 
Public Utilities 
Regulatory Authority 
Act, 2001.  
 
Public Utilities 
2005 
 
 
 
1998 
 
 
1997 
 
 
 
2001 
 
 
 
1997 
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Ghana 
 
 
Kenya 
 
 
 
Malawi 
 
 
Mali 
 
 
 
Namibia 
 
 
Nigeria 
 
 
 
Rwanda 
 
 
 
Senegal 
 
 
 
South Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Uganda 
 
 
Zambia 
 
 
Zimbabwe 
Regulatory 
Commission 
 
 
Energy Commission 
 
 
Kenya Regulatory 
Board 
 
 
National Electricity 
Council  
 
Water and Electricity 
Regulation 
Commission 
 
Electricity Control 
Board 
 
Nigerian Electricity 
Regulatory 
Commission 
 
Rwandan Regulatory 
Agency 
 
 
Electricity Sector 
Regulatory 
Commission  
 
National Electricity 
Regulator, later 
replaced by the 
National Energy 
Regulator 
 
 
Electricity Regulatory 
Authority 
 
Energy Regulatory 
Board 
 
Electricity Regulatory 
Commission  
Regulatory 
Commission Act, Act 
538 
 
Energy Commission 
Act, Act 541 
 
Electricity Power Act 
No. 11 of 1997 
 
  
Electricity Act of 1998 
 
 
Parliamentary Law, 
Order No. 00019/RM 
 
 
Electricity Act, 2000 
 
 
Electricity Power 
Sector Law, 2005 
 
 
Energy Reform Law 
18/89 
 
 
Parliamentary Law 
No. 98-06 
 
 
Electricity Act of 1994, 
amended by the  Act 
of 2004 
 
 
 
 
Electricity Act of 1999 
 
 
Energy Regulation Act 
No. 16 
 
Electricity Act 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1997 
 
 
1997 
 
 
 
1998 
 
 
2000 
 
 
 
2000 
 
 
2005 
 
 
 
1999 
 
 
 
1998 
 
 
 
National Electricity 
Regulator was 
established in 1995, 
and replaced by the 
National Energy 
Regulator40 in 2005. 
 
1999 
 
 
1995 
 
 
2003 
 
 
 
                                                 
40
 The National Energy Regulator is a multi-sector body with responsibilities for electricity, natural gas 
and piped petroleum products. 
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It emerged from the country survey that in Africa, government or ministerial 
interference seemed to have hampered the smooth performance of the regulator’s 
function. This observation seems to have been corroborated by Kessides (2004) 
who noted that political interference has undermined regulatory independence in 
many developing countries, because governments or the line Ministries are 
reluctant to leave important regulatory functions to independent agencies.  
 
In June, β001 for instance, the Ugandan Electricity Regulatory Authority’s decision 
to increase rates by almost 158% was brought to the floor of Parliament to be 
debated after which it was decided that the rates should be reduced. In Ethiopia, 
the regulator’s tariff setting responsibility is limited to that of an advisory role to the 
Minister, who ultimately determines the tariffs, thus making one to question the 
operational independence of the regulator. 
 
In Kenya, though the regulatory agency was established under legislation, a second 
statute, the State Corporation Act also covers the regulatory body, thus placing the 
regulator under the sector Ministry. In 2001, the entire Board of the regulatory 
agency was replaced. When it comes to issuing of licenses for operators, the 
regulatory agency’s function is limited to that of an advisory body. The sector 
Minister effectively takes decisions on matters relating to granting, suspension and 
revocation of licenses.   
  
An arms-length relationship with the government is expected to enhance the 
credibility and reliability of regulatory decisions, and assure stakeholders that 
decisions are based on clear criteria objectively applied, and that the regulator can 
be held accountable and answerable for all its decisions 41 . Kessides (2004) 
however cautions that in practice, compromise is needed to ensure that regulators 
are both independent and responsive to an elected administrator’s policy goals. 
This assertion appears to be supported by Au (2002) who noted that the 
relationship between the regulator and the government must reflect the legal and 
                                                 
41
 Au (2002) argues that where the government owns or has majority shares in the equity interest in 
the main utility companies, independence from the government is very crucial. This will ensure that 
regulatory decisions are not influenced by considerations relating to the interest in the revenue or 
profitability of the utility companies. Even if the government does not have any equity stake in the main 
companies, independence is still required to insulate the regulator from political pressure. See Au, M. 
(200β), “Country Experience with Competitionμ Enhancing Transparency and Credibility of the 
Regulatory Process”, Office of Telecommunications Authority, Hong Kong. 
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political systems of the country, and also reflect the status of development of the 
utility market in that country. 
 
(b)   Independence from Market Participants:  
Independence from market participants will ensure that decisions, procedures and 
guidelines adopted by the regulator are impartial. A regulator which is independent 
from market participants is more likely to take consistent, transparent and  
predictable decisions. These attributes help to build the trust and confidence in the 
regulatory process (Office of Water Regulation, Australia 1999). Independence from 
market participants will be bolstered if the regulator possesses the needed technical, 
economic and legal expertise for decision making without undue influence from, or 
reliance on market participants (Au 2002; Office of Water Regulation, Australia 
1999). 
 
Regulatory Independence, whether from political interference or market participants, 
is easier to achieve if the regulator derives its source of funding from levies, license 
fees or regulatory charges imposed on the regulated industry, instead of relying on 
government budgetary support (Bertolini 2006; Kessides 2004; Smith 1997; Au 
2002)42. The issue of secured source of funding implies that the regulator does not 
have to compete with other government departments for funds from the central 
budget. This will give the regulator the needed flexibility to react faster to deploy the 
needed resources to deal with industry problems, and meet other demands in a 
timely manner (Au 2002).  
 
4.2.1.3 Accountability.  
There is no doubt that regulators are generally vested with such extensive powers, 
and therefore a best practice regulatory model, according to Kessides (2004) and 
Bertolini (2006), should ensure that:  the necessary mechanisms are in place to guarantee that regulators 
behave in accordance with the legal  mandate  which established the 
agency  regulators are held accountable and answerable for their decisions. 
 
                                                 
42
 Bertolini (2006) however cautions that independence should be balanced by accountability. Legal 
and regulatory instruments should permit stakeholders to challenge regulators’ decisions and seek 
redress. 
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The Regulator’s independence should therefore be reconciled with its accountability 
(Kessides 2004)43. There should be adequate checks and balances to prevent any 
abuse of the extensive powers vested in the regulator, by ensuring that the 
regulator is fully accountable for its decisions (Au 2002). The regulatory framework 
is made more accountable through the establishment of well-defined decision 
making processes, discussing draft regulatory decisions and providing the rationale 
to support decisions. Publication of consultative papers and inviting comments prior 
to any major decision will also go a long way to enhance accountability44. The 
existence of an appeal mechanism and adherence to the principles of procedural 
fairness will also give confidence to all market players (Office of Water Regulation, 
Australia 1999). 
 
Since the regulator’s decisions will affect the investment decisions of operators, 
investors will be more confident if there is an appeal mechanism for resolving 
disputes between the regulator and the operators. This implies that the regulator 
should be allowed bounded and accountable discretion through supervision from 
the judicial system, the legislature or through an ombudsman, for dispute resolution 
in the performance of its functions (Au 2002).  
 
Based on the results of the country survey conducted as part of this study, it 
emerged that the dispute resolution mechanisms in most African countries work 
through either a Ministerial appeal system or normal courts. For example in 
Cameroon, though there is a competition commission, the Ministry of Energy is 
required to handle all disputes between the regulator and operators. The regulator 
is not required under the Act which established the agency, to submit annual 
reports to Parliament or any other body.  
 
                                                 
43
 According to Kessides 2004, a regulator has considerable leeway for opportunism and therefore 
checks and balances are required to ensure that the regulator do not behave capricious, is not corrupt 
or grossly inefficient. He however admitted that it is difficult to strike a proper balance between 
independence and accountability in practice, though certain measure can help. See detailed 
discussions in Kessides (20064). 
44
 As noted by Au (2002), by consulting with stakeholders, the regulator is seen to have addressed all 
relevant concerns. Although in practice it is not possible to satisfy all wishes because of divergent 
views from stakeholders, the consultation process will enable the regulator to make better and more 
informed decisions. 
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In Namibia, an appeal against a decision is made directly to the Minister within 30 
days of the regulator’s decision. The regulator is required to submit its annual report 
to the sector Minister, within six months after the end of the year. In Ghana, South 
Africa and Ethiopia, the regulators are required under their respective Acts which 
established them, to submit annual reports directly to Parliament, while any appeals 
against their decisions are routed through the normal court system.   
 
4.2.2  Informal Attributes of Regulation. 
The informal attributes of regulation refer to actual actions or decisions of regulators 
which affect the performance of the regulated industry and the overall sector 
(Brown et al. 2006). Informal attributes thus refer to the practical operation of 
regulatory practices and process (Stern and Cubbin 2005). Though the formal 
requirements are essential for effective regulation, they are not sufficient (Kessides 
2004), hence the need for an effective regulatory agency to also possess good 
informal regulatory characteristics. The key components of informal aspects of 
regulation are discussed below. 
 
4.2.2.1 Transparency and Openness 
The Regulator can gain the needed stakeholders’ confidence and acceptance if it 
maintains a high degree of openness and transparency in its decision-making 
process through dissemination of information (Stern 1997), adopting a consultative 
approach to decision making and providing rationales for decisions made (Office of 
Water Regulation, Australia 1999)45.  Transparency will enable stakeholders have a 
better understanding of the regulator’s decisions, and enhance the acceptance of 
that decision. This will greatly catalyse investment and avoid costly, time- 
consuming regulatory disputes (Kessides 2004). By making the regulatory process 
less opaque, the integrity of the decision making process is enhanced and fewer 
appeals and complaints are likely to come from the operators, thus creating a less 
adversarial climate for regulation. 
 
Some of the tried and tested approaches for enhancing the openness and 
transparency in the regulatory design according to Brown et al. (2006), Bertolini 
(2006) and Au (2002) are as follows: 
                                                 
45
 As was also noted by Au (2002), the media has an important part to play to promote openness and 
transparency through press releases to accompany major regulatory decisions and explain salient 
points in the layman's language. 
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(i) Conducting public hearing prior to making major decisions46  
(ii) Invitation to meetings, seminars and conferences to explain the work 
and processes of the regulatory framework. 
(iii) Publication of reasons behind decisions, which can be done effectively 
on the regulators website.  All other information which may be useful to 
the industry, subject to the rule of confidentiality, can be put on the 
website. 
(iv) Making major regulatory documents such as technical reports, rate-
setting guidelines, and market statistics available to stakeholders via the 
website. 
 
To promote transparency in the regulatory framework, the regulator must take 
cognizance of the fact that some information provided by the regulated industry are 
commercially sensitive (Office of Water Regulation, Australia, 1999) and a full 
disclosure to the public may adversely affect the interest of the operator. To give 
comfort to operators and to make the regulatory process very credible, the rules 
regarding which information is classified as confidential should be identified early, 
as part of the regulatory decision process (Office of Water Regulation, Australia 
1999). It is important that in dealing with the issue of confidentiality of information, 
the regulator must strike a good balance between the interests of the operator 
against the public interest to disclose, in order not to create an opaque regulatory 
environment (Au 2002). 
 
4.2.2.2 Participation  
A regulatory process is said to be participatory if stakeholders are given the 
opportunity to contribute effectively to enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the 
process (Au 2002).  Participation may take the form of a formal consultation with 
stakeholders to build the latter’s commitment to the process. It also provides a 
conduit for stakeholders to discuss the impact of regulation, make constructive 
criticisms and suggest alternatives for improvement (Bertolini 2006). Effective 
participation offers opportunity to all stakeholders to contribute to the decision 
                                                 
46
 Brown et al (2006) cautioned that no major decision should be made without being set down in a 
publicly available written document. They suggested the following as some of the measures which can 
be adopted among others: 
i. providing a clear statement of the decision 
ii. providing a summary of statement of views offered by stakeholders 
iii. providing a full disclosure of underlying rationale for decisions  
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making process so that the quality of regulation is maximized by the regulatory. It 
also enhances the level of communication between the regulator and other players 
in the market (Office of Water Regulation, Australia, 1999).  
 
Effective participation by stakeholders reduces the degree of information 
asymmetry between the regulator and stakeholders (Au 2002), by enabling the 
latter to have a better understanding of regulatory objectives and decisions. It also 
reinforces openness and transparency, which is achieved by making key regulatory 
documents available to stakeholders, and explaining the rationale behind major 
regulatory decisions. 
 
4.2.2.3 Consistency and Predictability    
Regulatory decisions should as far as possible, be consistent with previous 
decisions or determinants in the past (Brown et al. 2006). The principles of 
consistency and predictability will assure investors that there will not be unexpected 
changes to the regulatory environment and this will enable them to make future 
investment decisions which are long-term in nature with a high degree of certainty 
(Office of Water Regulation, Australia 1999). Lack of predictability and consistency 
in the regulator’s decision will result in lack of confidence in the regulatory process 
by stakeholders, and undermine the size, scope and quality of infrastructure and 
related investment (Kessides 2004). 
 
To achieve consistency and predictability in decisions, the regulator must note that 
the practice of utility regulation is one of the most dynamic disciplines to have 
emerged and it is imperative that as circumstances change over time, the regulator 
must be flexible and develop new ways of solving emerging regulatory challenges. 
Bertolini (2006) notes that in practice, the regulator should ensure some trade-off 
between predictability and flexibility, and cautions that this trade-off should be 
handled with care. This flexibility to achieve evolutionary change in regulatory 
approaches should be orderly and must take cognizance of the local institutional 
endowment and local market conditions (Office of Water Regulation, Australia, 
1999). 
 
4.3   Construction of Regulatory Framework Index 
Though Gutiérrez (2002) made an attempt to measure the regulatory trend in the 
telecommunications sector, by constructing an index of regulatory framework for 22 
Latin America and Caribbean countries for the period 1980-1997, similar empirical 
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work is yet to be carried out exclusively for African countries. The focus of this 
section of the study, is therefore to examine the trend in Africa’s electricity sector 
regulatory framework, by constructing separate formal and informal regulatory 
indices for the period 1988-2005. The derived indices would then be used as part of 
the independent variables, in panel data econometric analysis.  
 
4.3.1   Previous Work 
According to the economics literature, one of the first attempts to construct an index 
of regulatory framework was by Gutiérrez and Berg (1999). They used the following 
factors from a paper by Galal and Nauriyal (1995):  
(i) Regulatory neutrality and autonomy 
(i) Agency enforcement power 
(ii) Conflict resolution mechanism.  
 
Gutiérrez and Berg (1999) adopted an approach which involved the construction of 
a dichotomous index where a value of one was attributed to a regulatory agency 
possessing at least two of the afore-mentioned factors and zero otherwise. There 
was no doubt that the construction of the index was a major step which later proved 
useful in econometric analysis. According to Gutiérrez (2002), the index by 
Gutierrez and Berg (1999) however suffered from the following shortcomings:  
 
(i) Data was based on secondary sources and it involved a high degree of 
subjectivity.   
(ii) There was ambiguity in result interpretation. For instance an attainment 
of a value of one by a country may erroneously be interpreted to mean a 
country has achieved a complete regulatory development. 
  
In an attempt to ensure the robustness of the regulatory index for econometric 
analysis, Gutiérrez (2002) later made an attempt to construct an 8-element index, 
each with a weight of 12.5%, for 22 Latin American and Caribbean countries. The 
major breakthrough by Gutiérrez (2002) was that, the index was dated or time-
dimensioned. Table 4.2 summarizes the approach used by Gutiérrez (2002). 
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Table 4.2  Regulatory Index Methodology by Luis Gutiérrez (2002) 
Attribute of Regulation  Factors or Elements  Weight (%) 
1.  Legal Mandate (i) Regulatory established by 
Law or Presidential Decree  
12.5 
2.  Separation  (ii)  Separation of regulatory 
and Operating activities  
12.5 
3. Clarity of roles and 
objectives  
(iii)  Ability to impose fines  
(iv)  Ability to set tariffs 
12.5 
12.5 
4.  Independence  (v)  Financial/Budgetary 
Independence 
(vi) No free removal of 
commissioners 
12.5 
 
12.5 
5.  Accountability  (vii)  Existence of Dispute 
Resolution Mechanism 
12.5 
6.Transparency/Participation  (viii)  Existence of hearings 
for setting tariffs  
12.5 
 8-Elements  100.0 
 
Cubbin and Stern (2005) also used a regulatory index as a key explanatory variable 
to carry out econometric analysis on the electricity sector. In constructing their index 
they used four factors shown in the table below. 
 
Table 4.3 Regulatory Index Methodology: Cubbin and Stern approach (2005)   
Attribute of Regulation  Factors of Elements  Weight  
1.  Legal Mandate  (i)  whether the country has an 
electricity or (energy) regulator law  
1.00 
2.  Type of Regulator  (ii)  Whether the country has an 
autonomous or a ministry regulator  
1.00 
 3.  Independence  (iii)  Whether funding is derived from 
licence fees (or equivalent) or out of 
government budget  
1.00 
4. Independence (Staff 
Salary)  
(iv)  Whether staff is confined to civil 
service pay or staff pay is based on 
appropriate skills  
1.00 
 
4-Elements  4.00 
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Gual and Trillas (2004 and 2006), also measured the regulatory independence in 
the telecommunication sector for 37 countries, from North and South America, 
Europe and Africa, for one year (i.e. 1998), by creating two principal indices. The 
first index was for liberalisation policies, while the second index comprised eleven 
elements. Edwards and Waverman (2006) constructed a 13 element index of 
regulatory independence for 15 European Union countries. Zhang et al. (2005) also 
constructed a 4-element regulatory governance index which measured the formal 
attributes of regulation. 
 
Muntoya and Trillas (2006) also measured regulatory independence of 23 Latin 
American countries in the telecommunications sector, for the period 1990-2004.  
Muntoya and Trillas (2006) constructed 3 separate indices namely IR1 using Gual 
and Trillas (2004 and 2006), IR2 using Edwards and Waverman (2006)47, and IR3 
using Gutiérrez (2002).48  
 
Though the above attempts to construct an index of regulatory independence is 
expected to make a significant contribution to the literature, the issue raised by 
Cubbin and Stern (2005), and Stern and Cubbin (2005), concerning the non-
inclusion of informal attributes of regulation, appeared not to be fully addressed. 
Cubbin and Stern (2005) argued that the use of a regulatory index in econometric 
analysis, to take account of the informal aspects of regulation, will go a long way to 
enhance the robustness of the estimates. They also cautioned that the absence of 
data on the informal aspects of regulation due probably to data unavailability, could 
lead to the problem of errors-in-variables in econometric analysis. They therefore 
recommended that researchers must in future, endeavour to include data on the 
informal characteristics.  
 
Cubbin and Stern (2005) also raised issues on the use of the equal weights on 
each of the factors or elements. To address this problem in the present study, 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) has been used to determine the weights used 
for calculating the formal and informal regulatory indices. 
                                                 
47
 Edwards and Waverman (2006) used 13 components to construct the index, while Muntoya and 
Trillas (2006) used 11 components. The difference was due to lack of information on interconnection 
and agency budgets. 
48
 Muntoya and Trillas (2006) noted that all the 3 different approaches provide approximately the same 
conclusions that regulatory independence, at least de jure, appears to have a positive impact on 
network penetration.  
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4.4  Proposed Approach  
4.4.1 Formal Regulatory Index. 
The construction of the formal regulatory index is based on the following three-
stage process: 
(i) Identification of key factors for measuring each attribute of regulation  
(ii) Assigning 0/1 dummy variable for each factor. 
(iii) Determination of appropriate weights for each factor. 
 
4.4.1.1   Identification of Factors and assigning dummy variables  
The formal regulatory index is based on seven factors which describe the four key 
attributes of regulation, by using Stern-Holder (1999) classification. The value for 
each factor is a dichotomous value of either 0 or 1, based on the criteria established 
in table 4.4 below, where the switch from 0 to 1 is dated and therefore a function of 
time. Table 4.4 summaries the approach adopted for the first two stages of the 
formal index construction process (i.e. identification of key factors, as well as the 
method adopted to assign 0/1 dummy value). 
 
Table 4.4 Formal regulatory factors: Assigning dummy values 
Formal Attributes  Factors  Yes  No 
1.  Legal Mandate  (i)  Whether country has 
energy/electricity sector law. 
(ii)  Regulatory Body established 
by Legislation or Decree  
1 
 
1 
0 
 
0 
2.  Clarity of Roles 
and objectives and 
avoidance of 
conflict of interest  
(iii)  Regulatory functions clearly 
spelt out in primary legislation or in 
any relevant document? 
1 0 
3.  Independence  (iv) Financial/Budgetary 
Independence  
(v) Whether the country has an 
autonomous or a Ministry 
regulator49  
1 
 
1 = Autonomous  
0 
 
0 = Ministry 
                                                 
49
 One important measure of a regulator’s independence is whether the regulator has final decision-
making on tariffs. Ministry type regulators are normally accountable to the sector Ministry and 
therefore only play an advisory role by recommending tariffs for consideration to the Minister, who 
determines the final tariffs.  It can be inferred that factor (v) in table 4.4 also measures the final-
decision making authority of the regulator.   
 64 
4.  Accountability  (vi) Existence of appeals  
mechanism for challenging 
regulatory decisions  
(vii)  Submission of Annual Report 
to Parliament or any other body. 
1 
 
 
1 
0 
 
 
0 
 TOTAL ELEMENTS:    7  
  
Source: Author’s construction 
 
 4.4.1.2  Apportioning Weights: Principal Component Analysis 
The problem of determining the weight for each factor is resolved by using a 
multivariate statistical technique called Principal Component Analysis (PCA). 
Principal Component Analysis is basically a variable reduction technique, which is 
used to reduce the observed variables which may be correlated with one another 
and are likely to be redundant, into a smaller number of principal components, 
which account for most of the variance in the observed variables50.  The details of 
steps used in conducting the PCA for the regulatory framework index calculation 
are annexed as Appendix 11. 
 
In Principal Component Analysis (PCA), the number of components extracted 
equals to the number of observed variables, with the first principal component 
accounting for most of the variance in the identified data. The second component 
identified, accounts for the second largest amount of variance in the data and is 
uncorrelated with the first principal component and so on. The components which 
account for maximal variance are retained for data analysis, while the other 
components which account for insignificant amount of variance are not retained 
(Hotelling 1993; Everitt and Dunn 1991; Hsieh 2004; Suhr 2003).  
 
The issue of determining the weights to be assigned to each factor is determined by 
the objective of maximising the variation in the linear composite of the variables. It 
is possible to determine the weights to be assigned from the magnitude of 
eigenvectors51 associated to individual variables (Hotelling 1933). A key underlying 
                                                                                                                                         
 
50
  Variables are redundant because they are correlated with one another and possibly measuring the 
same construct.  
51
 The eigenvectors are the weights in a linear transformation when calculating the principal 
component scores, while the eigenvalues indicate the amount of variance explained by each principal 
 65 
base to Principal Component Analysis 52  is that the chosen variables can be 
transformed into linear combinations (Suhr 2003)53 of optimally weighted54 average 
variables, which are unrelated and orthogonal (Hatcher and Stepanski 1994; Suhr 
2003). Since the first principal component, captures the majority of the variation in 
the attributes, and far more than the second or subsequent components, the first 
principal component is used to develop a composite index for the regulatory index 
for each country. The regulatory index for each country is thus derived from a linear 
combination of the observed variables, weighted by the eigenvectors as follows: 
 
RIndex = Bn1 X1 + Bn2 X2 + Bn3 X3 +--------------------------+ BnXn 
 
where: 
 
RIndex           = Regulatory Index  (i.e. formal or informal) 
 
X1, X2, ----------Xn   = Matrix of scores   
 
Bn1, Bn2,  ------ Bni  = Matrix of eigenvectors (i.e. weights). 
 
After the eigenvectors for all the principal components are determined, the next 
critical issue is to decide which principal component’s eigenvector should be used 
as the weights to calculate the index.  This problem was resolved using the Kaiser 
Criterion (1960) which states that55 principal components with eigenvalues greater 
than 1 should be retained. This means that each principal component will explain at 
least as much variance as 1 observed variable, and therefore accounts for a 
                                                                                                                                         
component or each factor. For further detailed discussions, see Suhr (2003); Hsieh 2004; Pruzek 1988; 
Everitt and Dunn 1991. 
52
 Although Factor Analysis and Principal Component Analysis often give similar results, the main 
practical difference between the two lies in the fact that if the number of factors is changed, all the 
loading in a factor analysis will change, while those from Principal Components do not. See Pruzek 
(1988) for further discussions. 
53
 Linear combination implies that the scores on a component are created by adding together scores 
on the observed variables being analysed. 
54
 Hatcher and Stepanski (1994) explain that the weights are created so as to satisfy a principle of 
least squares, similar (but not identical) to the principle of least squares used in multiple regressions. 
Optimal weights according to Hatcher and Stepanski (1999) means that no other set of weights could 
produce a set of components that are more successful in accounting for the maximal variance in the 
observed variables.  
55
 Other tests used include the ‘Scree Test’ (Cattell 1λλ6), Proportion of variance accounted for and 
the interpretability test (Hatcher and Stepanski 1994) 
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meaningful amount of variance (Kaiser 1960; Hatcher and Stepanski 1994)56. The 
results of the eigenvalues are now reported in table 4.5 below. 
 
Table 4.5  Eigenvalues for all Principal Components: Formal Index 
Principal 
Component 
Eigenvalue Variance 
Proportion (%) 
Cumulative 
Proportion (%) 
1 5.5166 78.81 78.81 
2 0.7983 11.40 90.21 
3 0.2541 3.63 93.84 
4 0.1792 2.56 96.40 
5 0.1124 1.61 98.00 
6 0.0962 1.37 99.38 
7 0.0432 0.62 100.00 
 
Based on the Kaiser test (1960), the eigenvectors for the first Principal Component, 
in table 4.6 below, are used as the weights for each of the 7 variables to determine 
the formal regulatory index. 
 
Table 4.6 Eigenvectors for first Principal Component: Formal Index 
Variable  Eigenvector (i.e. weight) 
1.  Existence of electricity sector law  0.4088 
2.  Regulatory Body established by law  0.4102 
3.  Regulatory functions clearly spelt out 
in primary legislation  
0.3911 
4.  Financial or Budgetary Independence  0.3941 
5.  Whether the country has autonomous 
or Ministry Regulator  
0.3972 
6.  Existence of dispute resolution or 
appeals mechanism  
0.2338 
7.  Submission of annual reports to 0.3793 
                                                 
56
 As noted by Stevens (1986), though the Kaiser criterion is very simple to use, it possess certain 
drawbacks such as the following: 
i. can lead to retaining the wrong number of components 
ii. can lead to retaining a certain number of components, when the actual difference in the 
eigenvalue of successive components is only trivial.  See details in Stevens, J. (1986), 
“Applied Multivariate Statistics for the Social Sciences”. Hillsdale, NJ, Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
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parliament or any other body  
TOTAL 2.6145 
 
The results in table 4.6 clearly confirm the assertion by Cubbin and Stern (2005) 
that it may be incorrect to assign the same weight to each variable. Using the 
eigenvectors and the time-dimensioned dummy values, the formal regulatory index 
was calculated for each country, as the weighted average of the formal variables, 
listed in table 4.6 above. From table 4.6, it can be inferred that the maximum 
attainable value (i.e. if a country records 1 for all the factors, during the study 
period), is 2.6145. The minimum value (i.e. if a country scores zero for all factors 
during the study period), is 0.0000. A summary of the results for the formal 
regulatory index, is presented in table 4.7 below.  
 
Table 4.7  Results of  Formal Regulatory Index. 
Country 1988-1997 
Average 
1998-2005 
Average 
1988-2005 
Average 
Algeria 0.0000 0.1520 0.0676 
Angola 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Botswana 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Cameroon 0.0000 2.2351 0.9934 
Congo Rep 
(Brazzaville) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DR of Congo 
(Kinshasa) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Cote d’Ivoire 0.0000 2.1387 0.9506 
Egypt 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Ethiopia 0.0803 1.8872 0.8834 
Gabon 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Gambia 0.0000 1.3901 0.6178 
Ghana 0.1607 1.9391 0.6178 
Kenya 0.1447 2.5181 1.1995 
Libya 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Malawi 0.0000 2.1361 0.9494 
Mali 0.0000 1.4905 0.6624 
Mozambique 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Namibia 0.0000 1.7147 0.7621 
Nigeria 0.0000 0.2976 0.1323 
Rwanda 0.0000 1.8866 0.8385 
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Senegal 0.0000 2.1841 0.9707 
South Africa 0.6004 2.3806 1.3916 
Sudan 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Tanzania 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Tunisia 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Uganda 0.0000 2.0908 0.9292 
Zambia 0.5191 2.3806 1.3464 
Zimbabwe 0.0000 0.9442 0.4196 
SOURCE: Author’s construction 
 
From the above results, there is no doubt that African countries have generally 
experienced improvement in the formal regulatory framework to oversee the 
electricity sector. Since the Formal Regulatory Index (FRI) is a function of time and 
most of the regulatory bodies were legally established and stared operating 
between 1998 and 2000, this is reflected by the relatively lower FRI values for the 
period 1998-2005, compared to the period 1988-1997. 
 
The results seem to identify the ‘early starters’ in the creation of regulatory 
frameworks as South Africa, Ghana, Kenya and Zambia. South Africa’s National 
Electricity Regulator (NER) was established in 1995 under two laws namely, the 
Electricity Amendment Act 46 of 1994 and the Electricity Amendment Act 60 of 
1995, as a successor to the Electricity Control Board, which was established by the 
Electricity Act of 1987 (Davidson and Mwakasonda 2003). In 2005, the NER 
metamorphosed into a multi-sector regulator, the National Energy Regulator, under 
Act No. 40, 2004 57 , with responsibility for electricity, natural gas and piped 
petroleum.  
 
Zambia’s regulatory agency was established by legislation through the Energy 
Regulation Act No. 16, while Ghana’s electricity sector reforms commenced with 
the enactment of Acts 538 and 541 in 1997. Kenya’s reform law was passed in 
1997, and the regulatory body was established under section 119 of the Electricity 
Power Act.   
 
It is worthy to note that among the North African countries that have passed an 
energy sector law, as at the end of 2005, it is only Algeria that has set a regulatory 
agency. The ‘late comers’ include countries such as Nigeria, Gambia and 
                                                 
57
 The National Regulator Act, 2004, received Presidential assent on April 6, 2005. 
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Zimbabwe, and therefore recorded a value of zero for the period 1988-1997, but 
showed positive values  below or above one, for the period 1998-2005. Analysis of 
the country survey results show that with the exception of Ghana and Ethiopia 
where the regulatory bodies derive their source of funding from government central 
budget, all the other bodies possess independent sources of funding which are from 
licence fees or levies, paid by the electric utility providers.  
 
4.4.2 Informal Regulatory Index 
4.4.2.1     Identification of factors and assigning dummy variables. 
The informal regulatory index was constructed by first determining the key informal 
attributes of regulation based on the Stern-Holder (1999) factor classification. From 
the three key informal attributes, five sub-factors were derived, and using the same 
approach adopted for the formal regulation index, the 0/1 dummy variables which 
are dated or time-dimensioned, are assigned to each factor. This approach is 
illustrated in table 4.8 below. 
 
Table 4.8 Informal regulatory factors: Assigning dummy values 
Informal Attributes  Factors  Yes  No 
1.Transparency and 
Openness  
(i)  Publication of reasons behind major 
decisions and where? 
(ii)  Public accessibility to key 
regulatory documents and where?  
1 
 
 
1 
0 
 
 
0 
2.  Participation  (iii)  Existence of public hearings prior 
to tariff or other major regulatory 
decisions and indicate occasions used 
1 0 
3.Consistency and 
Predictability  
(iv)  Difficult to change key regulatory 
documents such as licenses, Acts? 
(v)  Principles involved in tariff setting 
set out formally in a document such as 
rate-setting guidelines. 
1 
 
 
1 
0 
 
 
0 
 
TOTAL ELEMENTS:       5  
  
 
 
4.4.2.2 Apportioning weights   
The weights for each factor were determined using the method of Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA), the same approach used to calculate the formal 
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regulatory index. The eigenvalues for the five principal components are shown in 
table 4.9 below. 
 
Table 4.9 Eigenvalues for all Principal Component: Informal Index 
Principal 
Component 
Eigenvalue Variance 
Proportion ( % ) 
Cumulative 
Proportion ( % ) 
1 3.0577 61.15 61.15 
2 0.8203 16.41 77.56 
3 06977 13.96 91.52 
4 0.3056 6.11 97.63 
5 0.1186 2.37 100.00 
 
Using the Kaiser (1960) test, the following eigenvectors associated with the first 
Principal Component are used as weights for each of the 5 variables (see table 
4.10 below). 
 
 
Table 4.10   Eigenvectors for first Principal Component: Informal Index 
Variables  Eigenvector (i.e. weight) 
1.  Publication of reasons behind major decisions in 
practice  
0.4930 
2.  Public accessibility to key regulatory documents  0.5145 
3.  Existence of public hearings prior to major tariff 
decisions  
0.3049 
4.  Difficult to change key regulatory documents e.g. 
licenses, Acts etc. 
0.5248 
5.  Principles of rate-setting set out formally in a 
document such as rate-setting guidelines  
0.3518 
TOTAL 2.1890 
 
The next step was to use the eigenvectors and the time-dimensioned dummy 
variables to calculate the informal regulatory index for each of the countries. As 
explained in the case of the formal index, the informal index for each country was 
calculated as the weighted average of the factors listed in table 4.10 above. The 
maximum attainable value (i.e. if a country scores 1 for all factors during the study 
period) is 2.1890). The minimum value is 0.000, implying that a particular country 
has scored zero for all he factors, during the study period. The results for informal 
regulatory values are presented in table 4.11 below. 
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Table 4.11   Results of Informal Regulatory Index.  
Country 1988-1997 
Average 
1998-2005 
Average 
1988-2005 
Average 
Algeria 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Angola 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Cameroon 0.0525 1.4064 0.6542 
Congo Rep 
(Brazzaville) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DR of Congo 
(Kinshasa) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Cote d’Ivoire 0.0000 2.1387 0.9506 
Egypt 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Ethiopia 0.0877 1.3911 0.6670 
Gabon 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Gambia 0.0000 0.1955 0.0869 
Ghana 0.0000 1.8084 0.8037 
Kenya 0.0000 1.7729 0.7880 
Libya 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Malawi 0.0000 1.0393 0.4619 
Mali 0.0000 0.6509 0.2893 
Mozambique 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Namibia 0.0000 1.2432 0.5525 
Nigeria 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Rwanda 0.0000 1.2765 0.5673 
Senegal 0.0000 0.9750 0.4333 
South Africa 0.2603 1.8841 0.9820 
Sudan 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Tanzania 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Tunisia 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Uganda 0.0000 1.0849 0.4822 
Zambia 0.4062 0.5615 0.9078 
Zimbabwe 0.0000 0.5014 0.2228 
Source: Author’s construction 
 
As shown in table 4.11 above and also illustrated in figure 4.1  below, the informal 
regulatory index which measures the actual practice of regulation has generally 
improved during the study period, but whether this trend is enough to catalyze 
investment in the electricity sector is an issue to be examined later, using 
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econometrics. Figure 4.1 below summarizes the general trend of the regulatory 
framework in Africa. The period 1988-1994 (i.e. first 7 years of research study) can 
be described as the ‘formative’ period of the regulatory process in the electricity 
sector in Africa. The period 1995-2005 witnessed a significant transformation of the 
electricity sector regulatory framework in Africa as part of the Power Sector reforms. 
 
Figure 4.1  Average Trend of Regulatory Framework Index 
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Source: Author’s construction 
 
It was observed that all the regulatory bodies were established by legislation as 
opposed to presidential decrees, and this makes it difficult for a new political 
leadership in the country to engage in arbitrary changes in policy. According to 
Gutiérrez (2002), regulatory frameworks created by the elected legislature body are 
stronger safeguards of stability than those formed by executive decrees. This 
implies that a regulatory framework established by decree can affect the credibility 
of the institution and hence have an adverse impact on investor confidence. Though 
the results showed a gradual improvement in the overall regulatory environment 
over the study period, it also emerged that question marks still hang around the 
regulatory independence of the tariff setting responsibilities of the regulators in 
some African countries58.  
                                                 
58
 Wamukonya (2003) corroborates this observation when he noted that, when electricity tariff was 
increased by 158% on the average in 2001, consumer outrage forced the Ugandan President to 
intervene and seek tariff reductions. In 2002, the Court of Appeal in Kenya gave consumers to 
 73 
CHAPTER 5     DEFINITION OF ECONOMETRIC VARIABLES  
This section of the thesis provides the definition and the basis for selecting the 
dependent and independent variables for the econometric analysis. Where possible, 
these definitions are supported by the appropriate mathematical formula. 
 
5.1     Dependent Variables for Generation Sector 
5.1.1  Per Capita Installed Generation Capacity 
Increasing generation sector investment and capacity to reduce rampant load 
shedding and black-outs, are among the key objectives of most African 
governments, which have embarked on power sector reforms. To investigate what 
impact the reforms can have on generation capacity investment, per capita installed 
generation capacity has been used as a suitable proxy in the econometric 
modelling. The per capita installed generation capacity is expressed in kilowatt per 
person (i.e. kW per person) and calculated as follows: 
 
Total nameplate capacity of all installed power plants ÷ Total population. 
  
5.1.2  Generation Plant Utilization59 
In a reformed power sector which is accompanied by effective regulation, 
competition and private sector participation in generation, it is expected that 
installed power plants would be utilised with minimum plant shut down periods. 
Plant utilization captures the extent of power plant capacity utilization and is 
therefore a good proxy for plant availability60.  
 
5.1.3  Per Capita Generation Energy Output 
This is another important output indicator of power sector reforms which measures 
the performance of installed electric power plants. This output is expected to have 
wider socio-economic implications by impacting on a country’s electrification level.  
                                                                                                                                         
challenge a 40% rise in electricity tariffs approved by the regulator. In 2008, the PURC (Ghana) 
gazetted the end-user tariff structure for residential lifeline consumers (0-50 KWh), but this was later 
amended by the government to 0-150 kWh. 
59
 Mathematically, Load Factor is the same as the Capacity Factor, except that the former is used 
when referring to power users and consumers, while Capacity Factor is applied to power generating 
systems.  
60
 Plant Availability (or Availability Factor) is the time period that the power plant can be operated, 
divided by the total period considered. Therefore, Plant Availability should either be equal to or greater 
than Capacity Factor.  
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Per capita generation plant output is expressed in Kilowatt Hours (kWh) per person 
and defined as: 
  Total Energy Generation of a country ÷ Total population of a country 
 
5.2     Independent Variables 
The selection of the explanatory variables draws from similar studies in the 
economics literature (Zhang et al. 2002; Wallsten 2001; Cubbin and Stern (2005); 
Gutiérrez (2003). The independent variables are now described below. 
 
5.2.1  Regulatory Framework Indices 
In an attempt to capture both the formal and informal attributes of regulation, the 
regulatory index has been decomposed into the formal and informal regulatory 
indices. The separation of the regulatory index into two indices, is an attempt to 
build on previous works (Gutiérrez and Berg 1999; Gutiérrez 2003; Cubbin and 
Stern 2005). Though details of the approach for constructing the indices are fully 
described in chapter 4 and previous paper61, it is worth re-stating that by using the 
Stern-Holder (1999) typology, the formal index captures the following 
characteristics of regulation,  
i.     Existence of a legal mandate, particularly electricity sector law 
ii.  Clarity of roles and objectives, and avoidance of conflict of interest 
between the regulator, the sector ministry or other regulatory bodies 
iii. Regulatory Independence 
iv. Accountability on the part of the regulatory body, including the existence 
of an appeals mechanism. 
The informal index was constructed from the following key factors which reflect the 
actual regulatory practice, and are also based on the following Stern-Holder (1999) 
classification: 
i. Transparency and openness 
ii. Ensuring effective stakeholder participation 
iii. Ensuring consistency and predictability of regulatory decisions 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
61See Gboney, W. (2006) “Power Sector Reforms in Africaμ Emerging Lessons in Regulation, 
Competition and Privatisation: 
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5.2.2  Privatisation Variables 
The privatisation variables used for the study have been defined in line with those 
provided on the World Bank and PPIAF Data base (2008), on Private Sector 
Participation (PSP) options as follows: 
 
i. Management and Lease Contracts: 
Management and Lease contracts refer to a PSP option where the state-owned 
company transfers to a private company, the responsibility for management of the 
enterprise for a fixed period. The government or the public authority continue to 
remain the sole owner of the assets, and is also responsible for financing 
investments in infrastructure assets. While management contracts may be for 
duration of between 3 years to 5 years, lease contracts can be from 5 years to 10 
years but the duration may be extended to 20 years. 
 
ii.  Concession62 
Concession as a PSP option refers to a situation where the private operator (i.e. the 
concessionaire) is responsible for the operation, maintenance and management, as 
well as financing of capital investment for expansion of services. The assets remain 
the property of the government or the public authority, but are entrusted to the 
concessionaire for the duration of the contract. The assets must however revert to 
the government in the same condition at the end of the concession contract, which 
can be for a period of 25 or 30 years (World Bank and PPIAF Database 2008; 
Idelvovitch and Ringskog 1997). 
 
iii. Greenfield Projects63 
Greenfield Projects can either be a private or a joint venture public-private entity 
which builds and operates a new facility for a period specified in the contract. The 
project may at the end of the contract, return to the public sector. 
 
 
 
                                                 
62
  The World Bank and PPIAF Database classifies concessions as: Rehabilitate Operate and Transfer 
(ROT), Rehabilitate, Lease or Rent, and Transfer (RLT), Build, Rehabilitate, Operate, and Transfer 
(BROT). 
63
 The World Bank and PPIAF Database classifies Greenfield Projects as: Build, Lease, and Transfer 
(BLT), Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT), Build, Own, and Operate (BOO), Merchant Plants, Rental 
Plants. 
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iv. Divestitures 
With divestitures, a private entity purchases an equity stake in a state-owned entity, 
with the new operator being responsible for the operation, maintenance and 
investment. The World Bank and PPIAF Database (2008) classifies divestiture as 
either full or partial. Full divestiture implies that the state transfers 100 percent of 
the equity in the state enterprise to private entities, while with partial divestiture, the 
state transfers part of the equity in the state-owned company to private entities. 
With divestiture, the new operator assumes ownership of the assets, but based on 
the percentage of equity sold and conditions of the divestiture, the state may or may 
not retain full operational control of the project company. 
 
Data on all the above private sector participation (PSP) variables was constructed 
based on 0/1 dummy variable. The switch from 0 to 1 in all cases is time 
dimensioned or dated, where a value of 1 is assigned if there exist any of the above 
PSP options, and zero otherwise.  
 
5.2.3  Competition Variable 
Based on the results of the survey64 work on the African electricity market, it was 
observed that the installed generation capacities of most countries are below 1,000 
MW and most of the markets are either in the single buyer mode. This implies that 
in Africa there is no robust competition ‘in’ the electricity wholesale market. Instead, 
there is competition ‘for’ the market.65  
 
With competition ‘for’ the market, state-owned generators and independent power 
producers (IPPs) are allowed to compete for the construction of generation plants, 
through long-term contracts (Hunt and Shuttleworth 1997; Kessides 2004), as a 
way of simulating competition in the generation market (Arizu et al. 1997). The 
countries also accept bids for private concessions and management contracts. This 
implies that the PSP variables used for the analysis, are directly measuring the 
impact of competition ‘for’ the market. Therefore an attempt to separately model the 
impact of PSP and competition ‘for’ the market would amount to double-counting.  
                                                 
64
 Also refer to the document, Gboney, W. (2006), “Power Sector Reforms in Africaμ Emerging 
Lessons in Regulation, Competition and Privatisation”. 
 
65
 The concept of competition ‘for’ the market was invoked by Demsetz (1λ68), where robust 
competition ‘in’ the market was not possible. 
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5.3.   Control Variables  
5.3.1  Political Constraint  
The measure of political constraint, POLCON, is taken from Henisz (2005). 
POLCON measures the extent to which a change in a political actor is constrained 
in his choice of future policies. In constructing the POLCON variable, Henisz (2005) 
first identified the number of independent branches of government, and also took 
into account, the extent of alignment across the various branches of government. 
He used data on the party composition of the executive and legislative branches. 
POLCON values range from zero (i.e. least constrained or most hazardous) to one 
(i.e. most constrained and not hazardous). 
 
5.3.2  Economic Freedom of the World Index 
The Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) Index was taken from the Economic 
Freedom of the World, Report by Gwartney, Lawson and Gartze. 
The index measures the degree of economic freedom in the following five areas 
i. Size of government expenditures, taxes and enterprises 
ii. Legal structure and security of property rights 
iii. Access to sound money 
iv. Freedom to trade internationally 
v. Regulation of credit, labour and business 
 
For this research study, the ‘chain-linked’ economic freedom index has been used 
because that permits a much more precise comparison across time periods. 
According to Gwartney, Lawson, Gartzke (2006), the ‘chain-linked’ index 
methodology ensures that country’s ratings will change across periods only when 
there is a change in ratings for components during the overlapping years. Zhang et 
al. (2002) and Zhang et al. (2005) noted that the use of Economic Freedom as a 
control variable, can serve as a proxy for wider institutional factors associated with 
the success of market liberalisation, such as lower taxation and lesser restriction on 
foreign investment. 
 
5.3.3  Rural population density and urbanisation percentage 
These two demographic variables were taken from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (2006). Rural population density is measured as the total 
rural population of a country (i.e. number of persons) divided by the total area (in 
square kilometres) of that country. Urbanization percentage measures the degree 
 78 
of a country’s urbanization and it is calculated as the total urban population divided 
by the total population of a country. 
 
5.3.4   Real GDP per capita and Industry Value Added as a percentage of GDP 
The real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is measured in constant 2000 
US dollars. The Industry value added as a percentage of GDP is the ratio of 
industrial sector value added of a country as a percentage of the GDP. 
 
5.3.5    Export-to-Import Ratio 
The export-to-import ratio measures the extent to which a country can meet its debt 
service obligations. A value greater than one indicates a higher probability of a 
country’s ability to meet its debt service obligations. This ratio was calculated as: 
 
Value of exports of goods and service by a country ÷ by the import value of goods 
and services  
 
5.4    Network Sector Dependent Variables 
5.4.1  Transmission System Loss. 
The movement of electrical energy across the transmission system is inevitably 
associated with line loss, which is a function of the transmission network capacity, 
network congestion, as well as the line length. The transmission system loss level is 
defined as the percentage of energy generated which is lost in transmission. 
Electric Transmission Loss (%) for the econometric analysis was calculated as 
follows: 
 
Transmission Loss (%) = (Total Transmission and Distribution Loss%) – 
(Distribution Loss%)  
where:  Total Transmission and Distribution Losses(%) = [(Total Generation 
Output – Total Amount of Electricity Distributed) x 100%] ÷ (Total 
Generation Output)  Total Transmission and Distribution losses comprise all losses due to 
transport and distribution of electrical energy. It therefore includes losses in 
transmission between sources of generation and points of distribution to 
consumers. 
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5.4.2  Total Distribution System Loss 
The total distribution system losses comprise both technical and non-technical 
losses. Technical losses refer to losses due to operation, and those due to 
distribution of electricity through heat and transformation, from one voltage level to 
the other. The technical loss component thus gives an indication of the technical 
quality of power supply arising from adequate network investment.  
 
Non-technical losses consist of losses due to unmetered supply, illegal connections, 
theft and metering errors by the utility company. The level of non-technical losses, 
is thus a measure of the management efficiency of a distribution network company, 
and has a direct impact on the revenue collection from electricity sales. The total 
distribution system loss level is defined as: 
 
(Total electricity purchased  – Total electricity sold and paid for by customers)×100  
(Total electricity purchased by distribution company) 
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CHAPTER 6      ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
6.1  Econometric Issues   
A longitudinal or panel data set is one that follows a given sample of individuals 
over time, and provides multiple observations on each individual in the sample 
(Hsiao 2003). A panel data set thus contain repeated observations over time for 
individuals, firms, countries etc. (Windmeijer 2006). A typical panel data model can 
be formulated as follows: 
yit = ȕx΄it + ηi + εit 
 
where:  
yit  = dependent variables 
x΄it = explanatory variables 
ηi   = the unobserved constant individual effects 
and        i=1,…..Nν t=1,…..T. 
 
As noted by Hsiao (2003), since panel data involve two dimensions comprising a 
cross-section, N, and a time series, T, one expects the computation of panel data 
estimators to be more complicated than the analysis of cross-section data alone 
(where T=1) or time series alone (where N=1). The availability of panel data 
according to Hsiao (2003), has simplified the computation and making of inferences. 
Panel data sets are increasingly being used in applied work because they offer a lot 
of advantages over single time series or cross section data, and can also be used 
to fit econometric models which are more complex (Weinhold 1999; Semykina and 
Wooldridge 2005; Ashenfelter et al. 2003). It thus offers the researcher great 
flexibility in modelling differences in behaviour across individuals (Greene 2003).  
 
One of the key attractions for the use of panel data sets is that their use can offer a 
solution to the problem of bias caused by unobserved heterogeneity, characterising 
economic agents (Ashenfelter et al. 2003, Hsiao 2003; Semykina and Wooldridge 
2005; Windmeijer 2006). Unlike cross-section models, panel models can be used to 
control for the country-specific, time invariant characteristics through the use of 
country-specific intercepts or fixed effects (Weinhold 1999; Semykima and 
Wooldridge 2005; Greene 2003).  
 
Furthermore, because panel data sets are generally associated with large data sets, 
they yield large degrees of freedom and may allow the detection of dynamics. They  
can therefore be used to examine issues which are not apparent from individual 
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time series or cross section settings alone (Greene 2003). If the researcher can 
impose some condition of homogeneity upon the parameters across countries, then 
a panel data model will permit additional power and may allow the detection of 
relationships which are not apparent from individual time series (Weinhold 1999).   
 
Panel data also possess an advantage over cross-section data since one cannot 
estimate dynamic models from observations at a single point in time, and it is rare 
for single cross-section surveys to provide enough information about earlier time 
periods, to pave the way for dynamic relationships to be investigated (Bond 2002). 
Bond (2002) also noted that panel data models offer better opportunity to 
investigate heterogeneity in adjustment dynamics between different types of 
individuals, household or firms.  
 
As observed by Weinhold (1999), Semykina and Wooldridge (2005), Arellano 
(2003), Cubbin and Stern (2005), despite the afore-mentioned benefits, the use of 
panel data can give rise to the following problems:   problem of coefficient heterogeneity  dynamic nature of panel estimations   endogeneity problem 
These observed problems, as well as methods for dealing with them are discussed 
below: 
 
6.1.1 Unobserved heterogeneity: Fixed Effects versus Random Effects  
In discussing the various types of panel data, Greene (2003) considered the 
following regression model: 
yit = x΄itȕ + z΄iα + εit 
 
where:      
        yit  =  K dependent variables  
x΄it  = K regressors, not including a constant term 
z΄iα = heterogeneity or the individual effect and zi contains a constant term 
and a set of individual (i.e. unobserved or observed) variables.  
 
According to Greene (2003), if z
 I contains a constant term, the model is known as 
pooled regression, and ordinary least square will provide consistent and efficient 
estimates of α and the slope vector ȕ.  In the fixed effects model, the main 
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assumption is that there are unique unobservable attributes of an individual which 
are pre-determined and fixed (Ashenfelter et al. 2003). If z
 I is unobserved, but 
correlated with xit fixed effects panel data can be used to eliminate the potential 
bias introduced by the unobservable heterogeneity, and to estimate unbiased slope 
coefficients (Greene 2003; Ashenfelter et al. 2003) This assumption enables the 
intercept of the regression line to be shifted for each individual in a specific or a 
deterministic manner in the sample (Ashenfelter et al. 2003).  
 
The last panel data model is the random effects approach, where the unobserved 
individual heterogeneity is assumed to be uncorrelated with the included variables 
or regressors xit (Greene 2003; Windmeijer 2006). With the random effects 
regression model, individual-specific characteristic is not constant but is treated as 
a random variable specific to that individual. The shifts of the intercepts in the 
regression model are not specific but randomly distributed across individuals 
(Ashenfelter et al. 2003).  
 
If the panel model is specified as:     yit = x΄it ȕ+ ηi + εit 
then according to Windmeijer (2006), the Random Effects specification assumes 
that E(ηi ) = 0ν E(ηi/xit) = 0, implying that the individual effect, ηi is uncorrelated with 
the regressors xit.66 
 
From above, it implies that: E(yit/xit) = x΄it ȕ + E(ηi/xit) + E(εit/xit) = xit΄ȕ 
 
Though the random effects model has the advantage of not been associated with 
loss in degrees of freedom, one of the assumptions for its use which states that the 
unobserved individual effects (i.e. omitted country characteristics) are randomly 
drawn from a given distribution, may not be a reasonable one for the current study. 
This is because the units of observation and the sample consist of countries, which 
cannot be considered to represent a random sample of countries in Africa. The 
second assumption that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the included 
explanatory variables can be easily violated, hence the use of the fixed effects 
model for this research study. 
                                                 
66
 This assumes that though the OLS estimator on the poled data is unbiased, it is not efficient, and 
the estimated standard errors are wrong, since it does not take cognisance of the dependence of the 
error term within individual over time. See details in Windmeijer, F. (β006), “A Course in 
Pane/Longitudinal Data Analysis”, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practices (CEMMAP) and 
University of Bristol. 
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The use of fixed effects model for this research work makes it possible to 
circumvent the problem of potential bias, and allow the unobserved-country specific 
effects (i.e. omitted variables) to be correlated with any of the included explanatory 
variables. The use of the fixed effects for the research study will thus permit 
countries with unique characteristics and outcomes, to differ from others in a 
specific manner, since the intercepts for each country will also differ in a 
deterministic manner in the regression model.          
 
6.1.2 Dynamic Panel Structure  
Economic processes respond not only to current values of independent variables 
but also to past values, and so when effects persist over time, an appropriate model 
should include lagged variables (Greene 2003). Many processes including the 
electricity supply industry, possess a dynamic adjustment overtime. By not taking 
account of the dynamic aspect of data in the econometric modelling, this can lead 
to potential loss of important information and cause serious misspecification biases 
(Weinhold 1999). Weinhold (1999) also noted that the inclusion of lagged 
dependent variables in a model, can control to a large extent for omitted variables. 
According to Nerlove (2000), all models of economic behaviour are basically 
dynamic, whether or not the dynamic aspect is explicit. He argues that “current 
behaviour is almost always dependent on the state of the system describing it, and 
this state in turn, often depends on how it got to where it is”.  
 
A typical dynamic panel data model containing lagged dependent variable to 
estimate behavioural relationship that are dynamic in nature, was specified by 
Hsiao (2003) as follows: 
 
yit = αyi,t-1 + ȕ΄xit +  α*i +  Ȝt + uit  , i = 1, ………N 
                                t = 1,………,T 
where: 
yit = K X1 vector of dependent variables 
xit = K x1 vector of explanatory variables, including the constant term 
ȕ  = K x 1 vector of constants 
α*i , Ȝt  = (unobserved) individual and time-specific effects, which are assumed to 
stay constant for given i over t, and for a given t over i  
uit = (unobserved) variables that vary over t and i. 
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Short-run effect impact multiplier is = ȕ67  
Long-run, steady effect or equilibrium multiplier is =  ȕ/(1 – α) 
 
In the electricity sector for instance, since major capital investments are completed 
over one year and expected efficiency improvements are affected by past 
achievements, it is imperative that these adjustments are included in the 
econometric model. Such adjustment processes can be modelled by the inclusion 
of a lagged dependent variable (Hsiao 2003; Weinhold 2003; Windmeijer 2006; 
Cubbin and Stern 2005). Even in instances when the coefficients on the lagged 
dependent variables are not of direct interest, allowing for dynamics in the 
underlying process may be important for recovering consistent estimates of other 
parameters (Bond 2002). 
 
The use of dynamic panel data in a fixed effects model can however give biased 
parameter estimates on the lagged dependent variable (Weinhold 1999; Bond 
2002) 68  The second problem of dynamic models arises from the homogenous 
assumption which is often imposed on the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable, which can create biases, when in fact, the dynamics are heterogenous 
across the cross-section (Weinhold, 1999). To illustrate the issue of biased 
estimates, consider the simple dynamic model below:      
 yit = ȕyt-I + Ȗxit + εit  
 
 where: 
 εit = ȝi + ȟit   
i = 1,-----------,N  across sector units 
t = 1,-----------,T time periods 
  
                                                 
67
 According to Greene (β00γ), the accumulated effect, τ, periods later of an impulse at time t is  
 ȕτ = ∑i=0 ȕi 
68
 As noted by Bond (β00β), the OLS estimator of α (i.e. the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable) is inconsistent since yi,t-1  is positively correlated with the error term Ȝi + uit , due to the 
presence of he individual effects , and this correlation does not vanish as the number of individuals in 
he sample gets larger, nor does the correlation varnish as the number of periods increases. This 
makes the OLS estimators inconsistent form panels with large T.  For much more detailed explanation 
see Bond, S. (β00β), “Dynamic Panel Data Modelsμ A Guide to Micro Data Methods and Practice”, 
Nuffield College, Oxford and Institute for Fiscal Studies, University College of London 
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According to Nickell (1981), even if the fixed effects or Least Squares Dummy 
Variable is used, yt-I  would still be correlated with the error term, resulting in a bias 
of  order 1/T. This assertion is supported by Hsiao (2003) and Andersen and Hsiao 
(1981). One approach that can be adopted is to use the Within Groups estimator69, 
but according to Bond (2002), the estimators, can be inconsistent70. Furthermore, 
standard results for omitted variables bias indicate that at least in large samples, 
the Within Group estimator is biased downwards. Another suggested approach for 
dealing with this problem according to Weinhold (1999) is to use the first-
differencing approach to the data, to remove ȝi to give: 
 
yit – yit-1 = ȕ(yit-1 – yi,t-2) + Ȗ(xit - xi,t-1) +  (εit -  εi,t-1)     
or                          Δyit  =  ȕΔyit-1 + ȖxΔit + ∆εit 
 
This method or approach is known as the first-differenced Two Stage Least 
Squares (i.e. 2SLS) estimator for AR(1) panel data model, which was proposed by 
Anderson and Hsiao (1λ81, 1λ8β).  Because ∆yit-1 is correlated with the first 
difference error term, it is necessary to instrument for it. Andersen and Hsiao (1981) 
have suggested the use ∆yit-2 or yit-2 as instruments, since these are not correlated 
with ∆εit = εit - εit-1.  Thus it is possible to obtain consistent estimates of ȕ using βSLS 
with instrumental variables that are both correlated with Δyi,it-1 and orthogonal to Δεit. 
(Bond 2002)71. 
 
According to Weinhold (1999), in practice the inability to find good instruments for 
the first-differenced lagged dependent variable, can itself create estimation 
problems. This assertion is also reinforced by Kiviet (1995) who showed by using a 
broad range of Monte Carlo simulations that panel data models which use 
instrument variable estimation can result in poor finite sample efficiency and bias. 
                                                 
69
 This is achieved by first obtaining the mean values of yit, yi,t-1, Ȝi and uit across T-1 observations for 
each individual i. The next step is to express the original deviations as deviations from these individual 
means and OLS is used to estimate these transformed equations . Since the mean of the time 
invariant Ȝi is still Ȝi, these individual effects are successfully removed form the transformed equations. 
See details of the mathematical formulation in Ashenfelter et al. (2003) 
70
 For panels where the number of time periods available is small, the transformation to remove the 
individual effects rather induces a non-negligible correlation between the transformed lagged 
dependent variable and the transformed error term. 
71
 The 2SLS estimator is consistent in large N, fixed T panels and identifies the autoregressive 
parameter ȕ, provided, at least γ time series observations are available (i.e. T≥γ). It is worthy to also 
note that the Within Groups estimator is also consistent when T≥γ. See details in Bond (β00β). 
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Weinhold (1999) has however stated that as T gets larger, the biased estimate of 
the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable become less serious.  
 
6.1.3 Problem of endogeneity 
Consider a typical simple dynamic panel data model which is defined as: 
 
yit = αyi,t-1 + ȕxit + ηi + Ȟit     i = 1,β,……….Nν  t = β,γ, ………………T. 
 
If Ȟit is serially uncorrelated, then the xit series is endogenous if: 
i. xit  is correlated with Ȟit and earlier shocks  
ii. uncorrelated with vi,t+1  and subsequent shocks 
The issue of endogeneity has become important in recent econometric analysis 
related to Independent Central Banks (ICB), the telecommunications and electricity 
sectors. 
 
xit is described as being strictly exogenous if it is uncorrelated with all past, present 
and future realisations of vit. A key assumption for the OLS estimator, which 
minimises the sum of squared residuals to be a good, unbiased, estimator is that 
the regressors are exogenous, implying that they are uncorrelated with the error 
term. Quite often, it is possible for this assumption to be violated and the regressors 
become endogenous (Windmeijer 2006). 
 
Consider this simple model adapted from Windmeijer (2006) to illustrate the 
problem of endogeneity, which examines the impact of education (i.e. number of 
years in full-time education) on wage. 
 
 In wage = ȕ0 + ȕ1. Educationi + ui 
 
where: 
ȕ0 = Constant 
ui  = Error term 
ȕ1 = Unknown parameter to be estimated 
 
Assuming the error term ui contains unobserved ‘ability’, then the above equation 
can be re-written as follows: 
 
In wage = ȕ + ȕ1. Educationi + (abilityi + vi ) 
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If the unobserved ‘ability’ affects both wages and education level, then the OLS 
estimator for ȕ1 will be biased upwards, if Education and ability are positively 
correlated (i.e. endogenous). The problem of endogeneity can be resolved to 
provide unbiased and consistent estimates, using the method of instrumental 
variables (Windmeijer 2006), where a good instrument for the endogenous variable 
is one which: 
iii. explains part of the variation in Education   
iv. is uncorrelated with the error term, ui = abilityi + vi 
 
The issue of endogeneity was considered in Gutiérrez (2003) and Cubbin and Stern 
(2005). The significance of endogeneity was reinforced by Wallsten (1999) when he 
stated that, though he assumed all the key reform variables to be strictly exogenous 
in his study on the telecommunications sector, he was of the opinion that in similar 
future studies, competition, privatisation and regulation must be endogenised. He 
supported his position by noting that it is possible that the same factors which 
influence changes in telecommunications sector are likely to also influence the 
reforms. Though Cubbin and Stern (2005, pg.18) acknowledged the problem of 
endogeneity, they however noted that “it should be well-handled by country specific 
effects”. 
 
Nevertheless, this study, in addition to treating the variables of interest as strictly 
exogenous, goes a step further to assume the reform variables to be endogenous 
in a simple dynamic model, using one-step Generalised Method of Moments72 (1-
Step GMM), and adopting the method of orthogonal deviations, developed by 
Arellano and Bover (1995). The method of orthogonal deviations uses equations in 
first differences to eliminate the individual-specific effects and control for possible 
endogeneity. It does not however introduce serial correlation induced by the 
                                                 
72
 According to Bond (2002), most empirical work tends to focus on the results for the one-step 
estimator instead of the two-step estimator. This is because simulation studies have suggested only 
modest efficiency gains from using the two-step estimator, even in the presence of heteroskedasticty.  
Furthermore, the dependence of the two-step weight matrix on estimated parameters makes the usual 
asymptotic distribution approximations less reliable for the two-step estimator. Results of simulation 
studies show that the asymptotic standard errors are either too small or the asymptotic t-ratios too big 
in the case of two-step estimator. When similar tests were however conducted on  the one-step 
estimator, the results were quite accurate. See more detailed explanation in Bond (2002). See also 
Bond and Windmeijer (2002). 
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differencing, by applying a Generalised Least Square (GLS) transformation to the 
differenced data (Arellano and Bover 1995; Arellano 2003; Windmeijer 2006). 
 
For this study, the basis for selection of instruments for the reform variables is 
based on Bårdsen et al. (2002) and Gutiérrez (2003) who noted that endogenous 
variables in levels, lagged two or more periods would be valid instruments, provided 
there is no serial correlation in the error terms. In the light of this, this study has 
used lagged differences for the reform variable for at least two years as instruments. 
It is worthy to note that even though the use of orthogonal deviations to estimate 
the GMM equations is expected to remove serial correlation, in order to ensure 
robust estimates, this study goes ahead to test for the presence of autocorrelation 
using the Q-statistic, by examining the correlogram of residuals over 6 lags, in the 
simple dynamic GMM equations. 
 
6.2 Data Set for Generation Sector  
The data set is a panel covering 25 African countries for 18 years (i.e.1988-2005). 
The list of countries in the sample is annexed as Appendix 2. The table showing list 
of countries with regulatory bodies and PSP options, and year of passage of energy 
or electricity law, is shown in Appendix 4. The choice of countries for the study was 
informed by the need to minimise selection bias73, and ensuring that  countries in 
the research sample are representative of the target population (i.e. African 
countries)74 about which conclusions are to be drawn. The selection of countries 
also took into account, whether a country has a regulatory body and/or any of the 
PSP options, as well as accessibility to credible data and information, for both 
dependent and independent variables.  
 
                                                 
73
 The use of a randomization technique to select the countries from the larger population ensures 
removal or elimination of selection and other biases. Jamison, W. (2000) recommends three 
quantitative techniques to achieve namely: Simple Random Sample, Systematic Sampling and 
Stratified Sampling. These methods ensure the representativeness from the entire population, by 
incorporating an element of randomness to the selection. See details in Jamison, W. (2000), 
“Sampling and Errorμ Does the Bad Apple Spoil the Whole Bunch”, httpμ//www.wpi.edu/Dept/IGSD/IQP. 
74
 The list of countries in the research sample cuts across those in the sub-regions namely:  North 
Africa, West/Central Africa, East Africa and Southern Africa. The list also include countries which are 
relatively politically stable for a considerable period (i.e. South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria, Togo, Egypt 
etc), as well as those which have experienced brief or prolonged unstable political problems (Cote 
d’Ivoire, Rwanda, Zimbabwe etc.). 
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A complete list of variables used for the econometric modelling including the data 
sources, is shown in Appendices 3a, 3b and 3c. The correlation matrix and 
descriptive statistics are also annexed as Appendix 5 and Appendices 6-10 
respectively. To ensure high level of data reliability, primary data and other 
information obtained from the research questionnaire was cross-checked with at 
least four different reliable sources.  
 
6.3      Model Specification 
Because countries differ in so many ways, the fixed effects model has been used to 
control for unobserved country-specific factors. The econometric specifications to 
which the data are applied are derived from the following generation investment 
model: 
 
=f(Formal Regulatory Index, Informal Regulatory Index, Privatisation Dummy, 
POLCON, Economic Freedom, Real GDP per Capita, Industry Output as a % of 
GDP, Export-to-import ratio, Passage of Electricity Sector Law and  Urbanization). 
 
The use of the same model specification for the three generation performance 
measures draws from the literature and is based on similar empirical analysis by 
Ros (1999), Wallsten (1999, 2001), Cubbin and Stern (2005) and Zhang et al. 
(2002, 2005). Similar model and functional form has been used by Bergara et al 
(1997), Henisz and Zenith (2000, 2004) 75 , as well as Gutiérrez (2003). The 
seemingly appeal for use of this functional form and model in the literature, is 
summarised by Cubbin and Stern (2005) when they noted that, “there appears to 
be no obvious well-defined theoretical model on which to base a more sophisticated 
approach”. The static model in equation (1) below, where all the reform variables 
are treated as exogenous, is first used to first explore the impact of regulation, 
competition and privatisation on generation performance indicators (i.e. dependent 
variables).  
 
In yit = αo+ȕ1(FRI it )+ȕ2(IRIit)+ȕ3(Cit)+ ȕ4 (Pit)+ȖXit +vi+ȟit------------------------------(1) 
where:  
 
In yit=  The natural logarithm of generation sector performance indicators namely  
Per capita Installed Generation Capacity (kilowatt per person), Per Capita 
                                                 
75
 See also Gutiérrez (2003); Fink et al. (2002) 
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Generation Plant Energy Output (kilowatt-hours per person), Generation Plant  
Capacity Utilization. 
αo     =      Constant term 
vi      =      Time-invariant or country specific fixed effect 
FRI   =      Formal Regulatory Index 
IRI    =      Informal Regulatory Index 
ȟit      =      Error Term 
P      =      Privatisation Dummy 
Xit    =       Control Variables namely:  POLCON, Economic Freedom, Real GDP per 
capita, Industry Output as % of GDP, Export-to-import ratio, Urbanisation 
percentage and Passage of Electricity Law. 
 
For all cases, the variables are defined for  i = 1, -----------N   countries over  
                                                                     t = 1, -----------T   time periods  
The inclusion of control variables (i.e. non-reform variables) such as POLCON, 
Economic Freedom, Real GDP per capita, Industry Output as a percentage of GDP, 
Export-to-Import ratio and urbanisation ratio, are all in line with the economics 
literature, where such variables have been found to be statistically significant. One 
expects that as GDP and industrial output as a percentage of GDP all increase, this 
will call for more generation capacity and higher plant utilization. The inclusion of 
economic freedom variable is to serve as a proxy for wider institutional factors 
associated with trade liberalization, lower taxation and reduce government 
incentives to expropriate the returns that the investor generates (Williamson 1976; 
Levy and Spiller 1994). If there are no institutions in a country to sufficiently 
constrain political actors, this could act as a disincentive to potential electricity 
producers to deploy capital to build the needed capacity (Henisz and Zelner 2000). 
The models thus include a measure of political constraints (i.e. POLCON) on 
executive discretion. The POLCON values are taken from Henisz (2005). 
 
Evidence from the economics literature, show that privatisation alone cannot yield 
the desired results in electricity sector reforms. This require that competition and 
regulation are introduced to co-exist with privatisation, and ensure that the desired 
results are achieved. To test for the conditional effects will require that a 
multiplicative interaction terms are included in the econometric specification 
(Fredrich; 1982; Jaccardi, Turisi; and Wan 1990). This assertion is supported by 
Zhang et al. (2002) who suggested that in assessing the results of electricity sector 
reforms, the effects of privatisation, competition and regulation should be taken into 
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account both separately (i.e. in an additive fashion) and in a combined or an 
interactive manner (i.e. in a multiplicative manner)76. In the light of the above, the 
econometric estimations offer the opportunity to explore the separate effects of the 
reform variables, and if necessary, also explore their interaction. 
  
6.4   Generation Sector Results: Reform Variables Exogenous 
The results of the econometric estimations for the generator sector are explored in 
this section. All the equations in this section were estimated using fixed effects 
static and dynamic models, where the key reform variables were assumed to be 
strictly exogenous. Section 6.4.1 examines the per capita installed generation 
capacity results, while sections 6.4.2 and 6.4.3 discuss the results on plant 
utilization and per capita generation plant energy output respectively.   
 
6.4.1  Per Capita Installed Generation Capacity 
For the results on per capita generation capacity, four equations are separately 
estimated for the static and dynamic models. On Electricity Sector Law, the variable 
is observed to be positively related to per capita installed generation capacity and 
statistically significant, at the 5% level in the static model. On regulation, FRI on its 
own, seem to have a positive and significant impact on installed generation capacity. 
When FRI and IRI are interacted, the variable is observed to be positively and  
significantly related to per capita installed generation capacity, at the 5% and 10% 
levels. It is worthy to note that the 1% significant level is achieved at lags of 3 and 6, 
for IRI and FRI respectively.  
 
Table 6.1  Results for Per Capita Installed Generation Capacity 
Est Method Fixed Effects: Static Model Fixed Effects: Dynamic Model 
Dep Variable= 
log(GenCap) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Constant -4.2782*** 
(-93.4090) 
-4.9944*** 
(-77.8997) 
-4.8528*** 
(-53.3533) 
-4.5821*** 
(-34.0417) 
-0.0405)* 
(-1.7178) 
-0.0288 
(-1.3823) 
-0.0298 
(-1.4110) 
-0.0641** 
(-2.3549) 
Log(GenCap 
(-1)) 
    0.9887*** 
(195.996) 
0.9911*** 
(203.308) 
0.9909*** 
(202.982) 
0.9779*** 
(155.845) 
ELECT. LAW 
 0.0155** 
(2.2355) 
     0.0039 
(0.5079) 
FRI(-7) 
  0.5167** 
(1.9713) 
     
IRI(-1)*FRI(-2) 
     0.0038** 
(2.2856) 
0.0037** 
(2.4341) 
 
IRI(-6) 
  0.0572 
(0.1636) 
     
IRI(-5)*FRI(-4) 
    0.0016 
(0.3661) 
   
                                                 
76
 See also Bergara et al (1997); Henisz and Zelner (2004)  
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IRI(-3)*FRI(-6) 
   0.0790*** 
(3.5165) 
    
IRI(-2)*FRI(-5) 0.0831* 
(1.7813) 
       
MGMTLEASE 
(-1) 
     0.0419** 
(2.2165) 
  
MGMTLEASE 
(-2) 
      0.04629** 
(1.9977) 
 
MGMTLEASE 
(-7) 
    0.0975** 
(2.0665) 
  0.1194** 
(2.2860) 
GREENFIELD 
     0.0021 
(0.1752) 
0.0050 
(0.0766) 
 
GREENFIELD 
(-10) 
0.2163*** 
(3.0712) 
       
DIVESTITURE 1.6545*** 
(26.6161 
  1.5644*** 
(28.1399) 
   0.0083 
(0.5262) 
CONCESS(-1) 
   0.0630 
(0.1640) 
    
URBANIS. 0.0163*** 
(14.6533) 
0.0553*** 
(21.7749) 
0.0507*** 
(20.9492) 
0.0217 
(6.7936) 
   -0.0005 
(0.2575) 
EXPIMP 
RATIO 
0.0010*** 
(16.5923) 
  0.0010*** 
(15.7298) 
    
ECON. 
FREEDOM 
 0.0183*** 
(2.5147) 
0.0153 
(1.3590) 
 0.0022 
(0.9886) 
   
POLCON 
 0.3321** 
(2.4201) 
 0.6315*** 
(3.8571) 
0.0320 
(1.3849) 
0.0272 
(1.5021) 
0.0282 
(1.5868) 
0.0534** 
(1.993) 
Long-run, 
steady state 
multiplier 
    88.4956 112.3596 109.8901 45.2489 
Adj. R-Sqd. 0.6292 0.4580 0.4126 0.5896 0.9972 0.9956 0.9959 0.9969 
S.E. of reg. 0.8052 1.033 1.0227 0.8578 0.0698 0.0901 0.0900 0.0725 
F-Statistic 24.6159 13.600 11.7690 22.1286 5227.21 3603.40 360.124 3662.105 
DW Statistic 0.0477 0.0539 0.0783 0.0703 1.8542 1.6416 1.6568 1.9034 
Q-Statistics+ 
(examined at 
least 6 lags) 
     insignific. 
(No serial 
Correl.) 
insignific. 
(No serial 
Correl.) 
insignific. 
(No serial 
Correl.) 
 insignific. 
(No serial 
Correl.) 
No. of Obs. 268 377 231 251 230 335 335 225 
NB: t-statistics in parenthesis are robust to heteroskedasticity  
***: statistically significant at 1%;    **: statistically significant at 5%;    *: statistically significant at 10%. 
+ :  If no serial correlation, Q-statistic should be insignificant and p-values should be large (i.e.>5%) at 
all lags. 
 
 
This finding on regulation seem to suggest that in  Africa, a considerable time is 
required after the establishment of a regulatory body, before one can expect an  
enhancement in per capita installed capacity. This finding also corroborates the 
assertion by Kessides (2004) that in developing countries, a considerable amount 
of time is required to build the regulatory capacity and develop a competent and 
well-trained work force in accounting, economic policy analysis, finance and law, 
even though the regulator may be strong in certain technical aspects. The results 
are generally consistent with the findings by Cubbin and Stern (2006) that both a 
regulatory law and higher quality regulatory governance are positively and 
significantly associated with higher per capita generation capacity.  
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On the impact of private sector participation (PSP), management and lease 
contracts lagged between 1 and 7 years, is found to be statistically significant at the 
5% in all the dynamic model equations. The implication of this result is that since 
management and lease contract require the public authority or the state-owned 
utility company to be responsible for financing capital investments, it is likely to take 
at least 1 year before an enhancement in per capita installed generation capacity, 
can be expected. In the long-run, management and lease contracts have the 
potential to increase per capita installed generation capacity, by almost 54%.  
 
The other PSP variables namely greenfield projects and divestiture (i.e. partial) are 
all positively related to the dependent variable and statistically significant at the 1% 
level. In the case of greenfield projects, the positive impact appears to be felt after  
10 years, with the potential to increase installed generation capacity per capita, by 
almost 20%. This observation is consistent with the results by Zhang et al. (2002) 
who found that in the presence of independent regulation, privatisation in the 
generation sector increases generation capacity to reduce the threat of ‘hold up’. 
 
On the control variables, the effects of Polcon, Economic Freedom and Export-to-
import ratio on per capita installed generation capacity are all positive and 
significant. This result seem to suggest that there is likely to be enhancement in 
generation capacity in countries with more economic freedom, higher political 
constraint on investment decisions by political actors . The result is also consistent 
with the findings by Zelner and Henisz (2001) that higher levels of political 
constraint will increase investment, by reducing government expropriation, thereby 
encouraging private sector participation in the generation sector. 
 
One observation from the results in table 6.1 above is the low Durbin-Watson 
Statistic from the static models, which seem to suggest the presence of serial or 
autocorrelation. Though autocorrelation can still lead to unbiased estimators, it 
could yield incorrect standard errors and thus lead to over-estimating the t-statistics 
for hypothesis testing. The dynamic models have also been estimated as part of the 
econometric analysis to ensure that the results and inferences are fairly robust. 
 
It is however worthy to note the limitation of the Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic in the 
dynamic model (i.e. if there is a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side of 
the equation). In such a situation,  the DW statistic is no longer valid for testing for 
autocorrelation (EViews Users’s Guide β004). To overcome this limitation, the Q-
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statistic has been used to check for serial correlation in the residuals for the 
dynamic model, by examining the correlogram of residuals over 6 lags. For the Q-
statistic test, If there is no serial correlation in the residuals, the autocorrelation and 
partial correlation at each lag should be nearly zero, and the Q-statistic for all lags 
should be insignificant, with the reported p-values being large (EViews User’s 
Guide 2004). 
 
6.4.2  Generation Plant Utilisation 
The econometric results on generation plant utilization in table 6.2 below shows that 
unlike IRI, the estimated coefficient on FRI is positive but statistically insignificant. 
This result implies that FRI on its own, does not appear to enhance plant capacity 
utilisation. When FRI and IRI are interacted, the interaction term appears to have a 
positive and a significant impact on the dependent variable. The coefficient was 
found to be statistically different from zero at the 1% level, and this was achieved at 
higher lags of up to 9 years for FRI and 2 years for IRI. In the long-run, the 
existence of a regulatory agency seems to enhance plant utilization by about 28%. 
The finding implies that impact of regulation on plant utilisation is likely to be felt 
after considerable number years of establishment of the regulatory agency.  
 
On PSP, partial divestiture, concessions and greenfield projects all seem to be 
associated with enhancement in plant utilization. The coefficient on partial 
divestiture is statistically significant at both 1% and 10% levels, while the estimated 
coefficient on concession is significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
Table 6.2  Results for Generation Plant Utilization 
Est.  Method Fixed Effects: Static Model Fixed Effects: Dynamic Model 
Dep. Variable 
= log(Plant 
Utiliz) 
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Constant -0.3114*** 
(-8.6366 
-0.8149*** 
(-8.2217) 
-0.8072*** 
(-9.4770) 
-0.3528*** 
(-4.6957) 
-0.0165 
(-0.1871) 
-0.0167 
(-0.1893) 
0.0140 
(0.1717) 
-0.1351 
(-1.2879) 
Log(Plant 
Utiliz(-1)) 
    0.9101*** 
(33.2118) 
0.9073*** 
(32.4129) 
0.9069*** 
(40.1023) 
0.8845*** 
(32.5440) 
FRI(-6) 
    0.0052 
(0.2882) 
   
FRI(-8) 
  0.0970 
(1.4628) 
     
IRI(-2) 
  0.0583** 
(2.2080) 
     
FRI(-5)*IRI(-4) 
   0.0523*** 
(3.7359) 
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FRI(-6)*IRI(-4) 0.0646*** 
(3.9741 
       
FRI(-8)*IRI(-2) 
 0.1095*** 
(15.4544) 
      
FRI(-9)*IRI(-6) 
       0.0322*** 
(7.2558) 
DIVESTITURE 
 0.2851*** 
(17.5407) 
  0.0279* 
(1.6447) 
0.0291* 
(1.8041) 
 0.0372*** 
(3.3634) 
CONCESS. 
 0.4578*** 
(10.2327) 
      
CONCESS.(-1) 
       0.1133*** 
(6.2951) 
GREENFIELD 
  0.0706* 
(1.6437) 
     
URBANIS 0.0011 
(0.9419) 
-0.0049*** 
(-2.6767) 
-0.0035* 
(-1.6588) 
0.0007 
(0.3869) 
0.0007 
(0.4879) 
0.0006 
(0.4869) 
0.0010 
(0.8165) 
-0.0001 
(-0.1185) 
log(Indout 
gdp) 
-0.1917*** 
(-8.0636) 
  -0.1919*** 
(-8.3839) 
-0.0326** 
(-2.2414) 
-0.0327** 
(-2.2751) 
-0.0330** 
(-2.4105) 
 
Log(RGDPPC) 
 0.0135 
(0.5570) 
0.0097 
(0.4322) 
0.0079 
(0.3574) 
0.0044 
(0.2149) 
0.0040 
(0.1998) 
-0.0042 
(-0.2190) 
0.0081 
(0.3425) 
Long-run, 
steady state 
multiplier 
    11.1235 10.7875 10.7411 8.6580 
Adj. R-Sqd. 0.1279 0.1414 0.0404 0.1167 0.8673 0.8675 0.8665 0.8248 
S.E. of 
regression 
0.2607 0.2522 0.2667 0.2639 0.1060 0.1057 0.1026 0.1119 
F-Statistic 3.2000 3.0536 1.5628 2.8974 75.1716 80.1029 89.0185 53.7459 
DW Statistic 0.1992 0.3269 0.2198 0.1825 2.0865 2.0843 2.1059 2.0038 
Q-Statistic+ 
(examined at 
least 6 lags) 
    insignific. 
(No serial 
Correl.) 
insignific. 
(No serial 
Correl.) 
 insignific. 
(No serial 
Correl.) 
insignific. 
(No serial 
Correl.) 
No. of Obs. 226 188 188 245 226 226 245 220 
NB: t-statistics in parenthesis are robust to heteroskedasticity  
***: statistically significant at 1%;    **: statistically significant at 5%;    *: statistically significant at 10%. 
+ :  If no serial correlation, Q-statistic should be insignificant and p-values should be large (i.e. >5%) 
at all lags. 
 
 
The coefficient on greenfield project was statistically different from zero at the 10% 
level. In the long-run, the enhancement from greenfield project is about 24%.        
This result corroborates the finding by Zhang et al. (2002, 2005) that in the 
presence of a regulatory agency, privatisation is associated with higher levels of 
plant utilization.  
 
6.4.3  Per Capita Generation Energy Output 
In both the static and dynamic model results on per capita generation energy output, 
shown in table 6.3 below, the coefficient on electricity sector law was positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% and 10% levels. This result was achieved at lags of 
at least 6, which seems to suggest that in African countries, it may take at least 6 
years after the enactment of the law, before one can expect an enhancement in per 
capita generation energy output. 
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Turning to the effects of regulation, the results seem to suggest that FRI on its own, 
is likely to enhance plant output. When the interaction variable of FRI and IRI is 
considered, there appears to be a positive relationship, which was statistically 
significant at the 1% level, in both the static and dynamic models. The long-run 
effect is estimated to be about 6%. The result was obtained at about 7 years for FRI 
and after 3 years for IRI.  
 
The implication of this result is that though electricity sector law and regulation may 
seem to have a positive and significant impact on plant, it appears this favourable 
result can be achieved after a considerable period of time of establishing the 
regulatory framework. The results are consistent with those by Cubbin and Stern 
(2005) when they observed that the existence of a regulatory body with good 
governance characteristics does not only improve electricity sector outcomes in 
principle, but actually do so in practice. 
 
Table 6.3  Results for Per Capita Generation Energy Output  
Est. Meth. Fixed Effects: Static Model Fixed Effects: Dynamic Model 
Dep. Var. 
=log(Gen. 
output) 
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Constant -0.7671 
(-1.0903) 
0.4957 
(0.6207) 
0.4297 
(0.6232) 
0.7072 
(1.1321) 
-0.4821 
(-0.9778) 
-0.9824* 
(-1.7658) 
-0.4411 
(-0.8819) 
-0.0803 
(-0.1583) 
Log(Genout
put(-1)) 
    0.8073*** 
(10.5464) 
0.8265*** 
(12.5330) 
0.7959*** 
(10.7328) 
0.6711*** 
(6.9718) 
ELECTLAW
(-6) 
     0.0443* 
(1.7660) 
  
ELECTLAW
(-7) 
0.0776*** 
(2.8790) 
   0.0472* 
(1.7971) 
   
ELECTLAW
(-8) 
 0.1090*** 
(5.1966) 
      
FRI(-7) 
      0.0256** 
(2.0731) 
 
IRI(-5) 
      0.0019 
(0.2031) 
 
FRI(-7)*IRI(-
3) 
       0.0207*** 
(2.6286) 
FRI(9)*1R1 
(-7) 
  0.0372*** 
(2.4696) 
0.0422*** 
(3.525) 
    
MGTLEASE
(-3) 
0.1915*** 
(5.3645) 
0.1322*** 
(3.2592) 
      
MGTLEASE
(-4) 
      0.0890*** 
(2.9929) 
 
MGTLEASE
(-5) 
     0.1275*** 
(4.5467) 
  
MGTLEASE
(-8) 
       0.1208* 
(1.7571) 
CONCESS. 
(-2) 
0.04124 
(0.7742) 
      0.0083 
(0.2573) 
GREEN 
FIELD(-1) 
  0.1059*** 
(2.6664) 
0.1067*** 
(2.6794) 
    
GREEN 
FIELD(-4) 
     0.0526** 
(2.1332) 
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GREEN 
FIELD(-9) 
 0.0652 
(0.8308) 
     0.0877* 
(1.6653) 
DIVEST(-6) 
     0.0951* 
(1.7310) 
  
DIVEST(-8) 
 0.0736*** 
(2.5348) 
0.0711* 
(1.7140) 
     
MGTLEASE
(-3) 
  0.1494*** 
(3.2445) 
0.1496*** 
(3.1571) 
    
POLCON -0.0760** 
(-2.3836) 
   -0.0609* 
(-1.9088) 
   
log(RGD 
PPC) 
0.7559*** 
(5.5570) 
0.5201*** 
(4.1946) 
0.5200*** 
(4.3299) 
0.5061*** 
(4.3654) 
0.2073*** 
(2.7665) 
0.2770*** 
(3.3972) 
0.2021*** 
(2.8311) 
0.2192** 
(1.9751) 
Log(Indout
gdp) 
0.0307 
(0.2114) 
0.3326*** 
(5.5758) 
0.3316*** 
(4.6789) 
0.3614*** 
(5.5856) 
0.1254* 
(1.6083) 
0.0025 
(0.0323) 
0.1009 
(1.3037) 
0.1205 
(1.2253) 
Urbanis 
    -0.0049* 
(-1.7646) 
0.0036 
(0.5633) 
-0.0025 
(-0.7553) 
 
Urbanis(-3) 
 0.0067 
(0.6651) 
0.0077 
(1.3189) 
     
Long-run, 
steady state 
multiplier 
    5.1894 5.7637 4.8996 3.0404 
Adj. R-Sqd. 0.9883 
 
0.9900 0.9901 0.9902 0.9959 0.9958 0.9960 0.9949 
S.E. of 
regression 
0.1692 0.1584 0.1581 0.1571 0.0992 0.1010 0.0987 0.1021 
F-Statistic 417.6352 415.1559 416.4960 448.8809 1223.339 1216.003 1236.226 1003.315 
DW 
Statistic 
0.5061 0.6380 0.6602 0.6618 2.1287 1.9370 2.1447 2.0540 
Q-Statistic+ 
(exam. at 
least 6 lags) 
    insignific. 
(No serial 
Correl.) 
insignific. 
(No serial 
Correl.) 
insignific. 
(No serial 
Correl.) 
insignific. 
(No serial 
Correl.) 
No. of Obs. 209 209 209 209 209 228 209 209 
NB: t-statistics in parenthesis are robust to heteroskedasticity  
***: statistically significant at 1%;    **: statistically significant at 5%;    *: statistically significant at 10%. 
+ :  If no serial correlation, Q-statistic should be insignificant and p-values should be large (i.e. >5%) 
at all lags. 
 
 
 
 
The result on PSP variables shows that management and lease contract, greenfield 
project and partial divestiture are all positively and significantly related to per capita 
plant energy output. Greenfield project seems to enhance plant output after 1 year, 
while management and lease contract do so after 3 years. The result also seems to 
imply that partial divestiture is likely to enhance plant output after 6 years. On the 
size of the effects, management and lease contracts appear in the long-run to 
enhance per capita plant energy output by at least 36%, while greenfield projects 
seem to increase per capita energy output by almost 30%. 
 
6.5   Generation Sector Results: Reform Variables Endogenous 
In this section, an attempt is made to endogenise the reform variables using 1-step 
Generalised Method of Moments (1-step GMM), making use of instrumental 
variables, which are correlated with the reform variables, but uncorrelated with the 
error term. The results from the endogenous model are then compared with those 
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from the exogenous (i.e. fixed effects models) to ascertain whether there is 
evidence of serious endogeneity, to cause a significant change in the findings made 
in the fixed effects model (i.e. exogenous model). 
 
On per capita installed generation capacity, the results in table 6.4, seem to indicate 
that both FRI and IRI when considered separately or allowed to co-exist (at higher 
lags), appear to enhance installed plant capacity. Turning to plant utilization, when 
the interaction between FRI and IRI is considered at lags of 4 and 9 respectively, 
the variable is noted to positively and significantly related at the 1% and 5% levels.    
 
The results on generation energy output show that at higher lags, the coefficient on 
FRI, IRI and Electricity Sector Law are all positively and significantly related with the 
dependent variable. These findings are consistent with those obtained in the fixed 
effects model.  
 
On the effects of the PSP variables, the results seem to indicate that greenfield 
project is likely to enhance installed plant capacity, but after 10 years. The result 
seem to support the notion that competition ‘for’ the market in Africa countries is 
likely to  encourage private sector participation in the generation segment of the 
electricity market..
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Table 6.4  Generation Sector Results: Endogenous Reform Variables 
Dep Var. Log(GenCap) Log(PlantUtiliz) Log(Genoutput) 
Est. Method 1-Step Generalised Method of 
Moments 
1-Step Generalised Method of 
Moments 
1-Step Generalised Method of 
Moments 
 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 
log(Gen 
cap(-1)) 
0.7651*** 
(15.0573) 
0.7740*** 
(13.1151) 
0.7895*** 
(15.4991) 
      
Log (Plant 
Utiliz(-1)) 
   0.5806*** 
(4.7282) 
0.6247*** 
(6.2483) 
0.5239*** 
(5.2724) 
   
log(Genoutput(-1)) 
      0.8798*** 
(14.4752) 
0.8138*** 
(10.7623) 
0.7984*** 
(11.9440) 
FRI(-2) 
  0.0159* 
(1.7449 
      
IRI(-2) 
  0.0252** 
(2.2004) 
      
FRI(-6) 
        0.0070* 
(1.6722) 
IRI(-8) 
        0.0707** 
(2.0649) 
FRI(-7) 
       0.0106* 
(1.7043) 
 
IRI(-1) 
       0.0159* 
(1.6957) 
 
FRI(-4)*IRI(-3) 0.0140** 
(2.0429) 
        
FRI(-4)*IRI(-9) 
   0.0209* 
(1.7150) 
0.0361*** 
(3.7183) 
    
FRI(-8)*IRI(-8) 
     0.0364* 
(1.8694) 
   
ELECTLAW(-7) 
      0.0129* 
(1.6863) 
  
GREENFIELD 
       0.0131*** 
(3.5034) 
 
GREENFIELD(-10) 0.0656** 
(2.0898) 
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DIVEST(-6) 
      0.0744** 
(2.1027) 
  
MGTLEASE(-1) 
    0.0695** 
(2.1292) 
    
MGTLEASE(-5) 
       0.1734*** 
(4.6218) 
 
MGTLEASE(-10) 
     0.0721* 
(1.8959) 
   
POLCON 0.0988 
(0.6935) 
0.0362 
(0.2508) 
0.0630 
(0.5299) 
      
 log(Urban) 0.2759* 
(1.6591) 
0.1903* 
(1.9178) 
0.1438 
(1.5487) 
0.3026 
(1.0319) 
0.4535 
(1.0336) 
0.2920 
(0.8150) 
   
  log(rgdppc) 
   0.1987 
(1.0763) 
0.1661 
(0.8708) 
0.0818 
(0.4562) 
0.3395*** 
(2.6226) 
0.4246*** 
(3.8577) 
0.3634*** 
(2.5476) 
 log(Indout 
gdp) 
   0.0047 
(0.0333) 
     
 ECONFREED 
 0.03876*** 
(2.9122) 
       
 EXPIMP(-7) 
  -0.0010* 
(-1.7824) 
      
Long-run, steady 
state multiplier 
4.2571 4.4248 4.7506 2.3844 2.6645 2.1004 8.3195 5.3706 4.9603 
S.E. of regress. 0.0688 0.0701 0.0682 0.1060 0.1060 0.1038 0.1004 0.1000 0.1032 
Q-Stat + (exam. at 
least 6 lags) 
insignific. 
(No serial 
Correl.) 
insignific. 
(No serial 
Correl.) 
insignific. 
(No serial 
Correl.) 
insignif. 
(No serial 
Correl.) 
Insignific. 
(No serial 
Correl.) 
insign, 
(No serial 
Correl.) 
insignific. 
(No serial 
Correl.) 
insignif. 
(No serial 
Correl.) 
insignific. 
(No serial  
Correl.) 
No. of Observ. 200 208 208 200 208 231 220 230 230 
NB: t-statistics in parenthesis are robust to heteroskedasticity  
***: statistically significant at 1%;    **: statistically significant at 5%;    *: statistically significant at 10%. 
+ :  If no serial correlation, Q-statistic should be insignificant and p-values should be large (i.e. >5%) at all lags. 
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On the impact of PSP variables on generation energy output, management and 
lease contracts, greenfield project and partial divestitures all appear to have a 
positive and significant impact. These results are consistent with the fixed effects 
model. On plant utilization, management and lease contract is observed to be 
positively related to plant utilization and statistically different from zero at the 5% 
and 10% levels.  
 
6.6    Network Sector: Reform Variables Exogenous 
6.6.1   Data Set  
The data set is a panel covering 25 African countries for 18 years (i.e.1988-2005). 
A complete list of variables used for the econometric modelling including the data 
sources, is shown in the table below.  
 
Table 6.5  Data sources for Transmission and Distribution System Losses  
Dependent Variable Data Source 
Total Transmission and Distribution 
Losses 
 
Primary data from country responses to 
research questionnaire, US Energy Information 
Administration (EIA, 2006), African Energy 
Policy Research Network (AFREPREN), World 
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2006) 
 
 
6.6.2 Transmission Sector Results 
This section discusses the transmission system loss results, where the key reform 
variables are assumed to be strictly exogenous for both static and dynamic models. 
As shown by the results in table 6.6 below, Energy Sector Law (ESLAW) is 
inversely related to transmission network loss, with the estimated coefficient being 
significantly different from zero at the 1% level. ESLAW, on its own, appear to 
reduce transmission network loss level by almost 20%. At a lag of 2, the co-
existence of ESLAW with either FRI and IRI appear to significantly reduce 
transmission network loss level.  
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Table 6.6  Results for Transmission Sector  
Estimation 
 Meth. 
Fixed Effects: Static Model Fixed Effects: Dynamic Model 
Dep. Var= 
log(Transloss) 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 
Constant -3.5807*** 
(-6.5073) 
-3.0615*** 
(-7.4235) 
-3.5365*** 
(-6.1097) 
-3.5372*** 
(-6.2752) 
-2.5673*** 
(-5.4063) 
-4.4729*** 
(-8.0431) 
-2.8448*** 
(-5.6281) 
-2.6392*** 
(-4.9721) 
log(Transm 
loss(-1)) 
    0.3580*** 
(3.2045) 
0.2821* 
(1.8314) 
0.3572*** 
(2.7903) 
0.3608*** 
(3.1692) 
ESLAW -0.1196*** 
(-2.6551) 
-0.1761*** 
(-3.8401) 
-0.1188*** 
(-2.5855) 
     
ESLAW(-1) 
    -0.1310*** 
(-2.9359) 
  -0.1218*** 
(-3.5425) 
ESLAW(-2)* 
FRI(-3) 
      -0.0442*** 
(-3.0606) 
 
ESLAW(-2)* 
IRI(-8) 
     -0.1209** 
(-2.2194) 
  
FRI(-2)*IRI -0.0166** 
(-2.0257) 
       
FRI(-3)*IRI(-1) 
  -0.0212*** 
(-2.4723) 
-0.0293*** 
(-3.4350) 
    
Greenfield -0.0217 
(-0.4405) 
 -0.0251 
(-0.4989) 
-0.0631 
(-1.0788) 
 -0.1506 
(-1.5423) 
-0.0501 
(-1.1040) 
-0.0221 
(-0.4952) 
log(RGDPCAP) 0.0609 
(0.7510) 
-0.0391 
(-0.6192) 
0.1049 
(1.0910) 
0.0873 
(0.9782) 
0.0806* 
(1.8644) 
0.2937*** 
(4.8836) 
0.1321* 
(1.7330) 
0.0852 
(1.3909) 
log(urbanis) 0.0535 
(0.6134) 
0.0723 
(0.9940) 
 -0.0046 
(-0.0407) 
0.0438 
(0.5499) 
0.0992*** 
(3.0620) 
 0.0482 
(0.5587) 
log(rpopdens) 
  -0.0217 
(-0.3925) 
-0.0015 
(-0.0327) 
-0.0072 
(-0.2010) 
0.0302 
(0.8733) 
0.0162 
(0.4285) 
 
Polcon 0.3413*** 
(5.9810) 
0.4175*** 
(7.6306) 
0.3329*** 
(4.9858) 
0.2426*** 
(4.8626) 
0.2431*** 
(3.6975) 
 0.1506** 
(2.4233) 
0.2393*** 
(3.6878) 
Long-run, 
steady state 
multiplier 
    1.5576 1.3930 1,5556 1.5645 
Adj. R-Sqd. 0.7676 0.7726 0.7673 0.7599 0.8128 0.7788 0.7954 0.8013 
S.E. of 
regression 
0.2415 0.2399 0.2430 0.2471 0.2179 0.2479 0.2279 0.2235 
F-Statistic 42.1600 53.4476 40.0361 37.9410 59.1922 28.1396 47.0239 54.4658 
DW Statistic 1.3620 1.3008 1.3114 1.2572 2.1070 2.0349 2.0295 2.1067 
Q-Statistic+ 
(examined at 
least 6 lags) 
    insignific. 
(No serial 
Correl.) 
insignific. 
(No serial 
Correl.) 
insignific. 
(No serial 
Correl.) 
insignific. 
(No serial 
Correl.) 
No. of Obs. 300 356 285 281 336 286 285 319 
NB: t-statistics in parenthesis are robust to heteroskedasticity  
***: statistically significant at 1%;    **: statistically significant at 5%;    *: statistically significant at 10%. 
+ :  If no serial correlation, Q-statistic should be insignificant and p-values should be large(i.e. >5%) at 
all lags 
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In the long-run, the co-existence of ESLAW and FRI is likely to reduce the network 
loss level by 7%, while the co-existence of ESLAW and IRI seems likely to drive 
down loss level by almost 17%. 
 
It is also worthy to note that though the regulatory indices on their own, do not seem 
to reduce transmission loss level, when they are allowed to co-exist, they appear to 
have a significant impact on loss reduction. The estimated coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 1% and 5% levels. 
 
The analysis also sought to investigate the impact of greenfield project or IPPs on 
transmission network loss level. Though the estimated coefficient on greenfield 
project is negative, it is not significantly different from zero. This implies that 
greenfield projects, on their own, do not appear to have a direct and significant 
impact on network loss reduction. This result further means that with the single-
buyer or vertically integrated market model associated with African electricity 
markets, the incumbent generator which also owns the transmission company, 
enters into a long-term power purchase agreement (PPAs) with IPPs. This market 
structure can however be a limitation because it does not permit the IPP to sign a 
direct contract with an unbundled transmission company. This structure does not 
therefore incentivise greenfield power operators, to exert direct pressure on the 
transmission company to strive for network efficiency by reducing loss level. 
 
On the control variables, real GDP per capita appears likely to increase network 
loss levels by almost 40%. The result implies that as the level of economic activity 
of a country improves, this is associated with overloaded network and transformers 
and hence higher technical loss levels. To ensure that loss level is kept low, it is 
imperative the timely investments are made at the right locations, to relieve the 
network of congestion. 
 
6.6.3 Distribution Sector Results 
The results on the distribution system total loss level are shown below in table 6.7. 
The results show the estimated coefficient on ESLAW to be inversely related to 
total distribution loss level, and statistically significant at the 5% and 10% levels in 
the static model. It is also noted that the two regulatory indices, whether on their 
own or in co-existence, do not appear to significantly reduce total distribution 
system loss level. 
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Management and lease contracts as a PSP option, appears to be a key driver of 
distribution loss reduction. In the long-run, Management and Lease Contract seems 
to reduce the loss level by almost 20%. It is also noted that though the estimated 
coefficient on concession contract is negatively related to distribution loss level, it 
does not appear to have a significant impact on distribution loss reduction.  
 
 
Table 6.7 Results for Distribution Sector 
Estimation Method Fixed Effects: Static Model Fixed Effects: Dynamic Model 
Dependent Variable 
= log(Distribloss) 
42 43 44 45 46 
Constant -2.1852** 
(-2.4422) 
-3.6001*** 
(-7.6710) 
-3.1534*** 
(-5.2095) 
-0.7438 
(-1.549) 
-1.5086** 
(-2.3363) 
Log(Distribloss(-1)) 
   0.5416*** 
(3.8061) 
0.5218*** 
(3.5167) 
ESLAW(-3) 
 -0.0717** 
(-2.0458) 
   
ESLAW(-4) 
  -0.0536* 
(-1.6727) 
-0.0099 
(-0.3764) 
 
FRI(-5) 
    -0.0032 
(-0.1692) 
FRI(-7) 
 -0.0036 
(-0.2032) 
   
FRI(-7)*IRI(-3) -0.0001 
(-0.0556) 
    
MGTLEASE(-2) 
  -0.1391*** 
(-3.3175) 
  
MGTLEASE(-3) -0.1688*** 
(-3.6186) 
-0.1441*** 
(-3.0112) 
 -0.0923*** 
(-2.6205) 
-0.1094*** 
(-3.1657) 
CONCESS 
   -0.0019 
(-0.0865) 
-0.0100 
(-0.3978) 
CONCESS(-2) -0.0063 
(-0.2277) 
    
Log(rpopdens) -0.1016 
(-0.6291) 
 -0.0535 
(-0.5444) 
-0.0771 
(-0.7629) 
 
Log(Urbanis) 0.0532 
(0.3598) 
0.2954** 
(2.2692) 
0.2809*** 
(3.5380) 
 0.0479 
(0.3466) 
Log(Indoutgdp) 
  -0.0277 
(-0.8988) 
 0.0395 
(0.5398) 
Long-run, steady 
state multiplier 
   2.1815 2.0911 
Adjusted R-Sqd. 0.8339 0.8386 0.8284 0.8749 0.8752 
S.E. of regression 0.1849 0.1863 0.1810 0.1535 0.1574 
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F-Statistic 45.9756 45.2883 54.1202 75.8842 69.3615 
DW Statistic 1.1288 1.1883 0.9706 2.3500 2.4091 
Q-Statistic+ (exam 
at least 6 lags) 
   all p-values insignif. 
(No serial Correl.) 
all p-values insignif. 
(No serial Correl.) 
No. of Obs. 216 200 254 258 235 
NB: t-statistics in parenthesis are robust to heteroskedasticity  
***: statistically significant at 1%;    **: statistically significant at 5%;    *: statistically significant at 10%. 
+ :  If no serial correlation, Q-statistic should be insignificant and p-values should be large (i.e. >5%) 
at all lags. 
 
 
The results from the fixed effects model seem to indicate that even though the 
presence of a regulatory agency is necessary, its presence may not be sufficient to 
significantly reduce distribution system loss level. Effective loss reduction is likely to 
be achieved if management and lease contract is introduced into the distribution 
segment of the Electricity Supply Industry (ESI), as a PSP option. 
 
On the control variables, urbanisation appears to significantly increase total 
distribution losses. This implies that as the urban population increase, it is 
necessary that the local distribution networks and transformers are upgraded to 
meet load growth, and hence reduce technical loss level. To ensure overall 
distribution loss reduction, the network loss reduction effort should be accompanied 
by commercial loss reduction such as controlling illegal connections and metering 
errors, as well as improving revenue collection. 
 
6.7   Network Sector Results: Reform Variables Endogenous 
In this section, the results from the endogenous model are examined and compared 
with those from the fixed effects (i.e. exogenous model), to ascertain whether there 
is serious evidence of endogeneity. The results from table 6.8 show that ESLAW on 
its own, appear to have a significant effect on transmission network loss reduction. 
The long-run effect is estimated to be 14% in the endogenous model. On the 
regulatory framework indices, even though the indices on their own, do not seem to 
reduce transmission network loss level, their co-existence appears to drive down 
transmission loss by almost 10%. The results on ESLAW and the regulatory indices 
from the endogenous model, seem to reinforce those from the fixed effects model.  
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Table 6.8 Results for Network Sector: Reform Variables Endogenous  
Estimation 
Method 
1-Step Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) 
1-Step Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Log(Transmloss) Log(Distribloss) 
 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 
Log(Transmloss
(-1)) 
0.2595*** 
(18.1690) 
0.2106*** 
(8.6560) 
0.2287*** 
(11.2709) 
    
Log(Distribloss 
(-1)) 
   0.3337*** 
(11.1007) 
0.3289*** 
(11.0547) 
0.3313*** 
(10.2263) 
0.3536*** 
(11.2458) 
ESLAW(-1) -0.1024*** 
(-7.0842) 
-0.0606** 
(-2.1589) 
-0.0405** 
(-2.3602) 
 -0.0100 
(-0.6563) 
  
ESLAW(-5) 
   -0.0168 
(-0.4872) 
 -0.0054 
(-0.1732) 
 
FRI(-5)*IRI(-4) 
  -0.0069** 
(-2.2018) 
    
FRI(-4)*IRI(-5) 
 -0.0078*** 
(-3.4122) 
     
GREENFIELD 
(-5) 
-0.0262*** 
(-7.1052) 
      
MGTLEASE(-4) 
   -0.2056*** 
(-3.9544) 
   
ESLAW(-3) 
*MGTLEASE(-4) 
      -0.2067*** 
(-3.6463) 
FRI(-3) 
*MGTLEASE(-3) 
     -0.0796*** 
(-4.5674) 
 
IRI(-3) 
*MGTLEASE(-3) 
    -0.0727** 
(-2.2632) 
  
CONCESS(-3) 
    -0.0269 
(-0.4949) 
 -0.0571 
(-1.1982) 
CONCESS(-4) 
   -0.0056 
(-0.1832) 
   
log(rgdppcap) 
   -0.3232** 
(-2.4531) 
   
log(rpopdens) 
    -0.1384* 
(-1.8457) 
-0.2563*** 
(-2.8994) 
-0.0121 
(-0.2276) 
log(Urbanis) 
   0.5246*** 
(2.7049) 
 0.4019*** 
(3.0517) 
0.2191*** 
(3.2109) 
Polcon 0.2181*** 
(6.9378) 
0.0976 
(1.2868) 
-0.0119 
(-0.1615) 
 0.0928*** 
(2.6569) 
  
Long-run, 
steady state 
multiplier 
1.3504 1.2668 1.2965 1.5008 1.4900 1.4954 1.5470 
S.E. of 
regression 
0.2349 0.2397 0.2449 0.1568 0.1563 0.1614 0.1575 
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Q-Statistic + 
(examined at 
least 6 lags) 
all p-
values 
insignific. 
(No serial 
Correl.) 
all p-
values 
insignific. 
(No serial 
Correl.) 
all p-
values 
insignific. 
(No serial 
Correl.) 
all p-values 
insignific. 
(No serial 
Correl.) 
all p-
values 
insignific. 
(No serial 
Correl.) 
all p-
values 
insignific. 
(No serial 
Correl.) 
all p-values 
insignific. 
(No serial 
Correl.) 
No. of Observ. 228 228 228 216 258 216 235 
NB: t-statistics in parenthesis are robust to heteroskedasticity  
***: statistically significant at 1%;    **: statistically significant at 5%;    *: statistically significant at 10%. 
+ :  If no serial correlation, Q-statistic should be insignificant and p-values should be large (i.e. > 5%) 
at all lags. 
 
 
 
On the impact of greenfield project, the results seem to indicate that at a higher lag 
of at least 5, the PSP variable may indirectly contribute towards reducing 
transmission network loss level. This is possible if an IPP signs a take-or-pay 
contract with the incumbent generator, which also owns the transmission network. 
Under this scenario, it is possible that the generator company, may at one stage in 
its operation, attempt to optimise power sales to the distribution companies and 
bulk industrial customers to meet unserved demand, by reducing transmission 
network loss level.  
 
The results on the distribution sector show that even though ESLAW is necessary, 
it is not likely on its own, to significantly reduce total loss levels, unless the market 
permits PSP in the distribution sector. When management and lease contract is 
interacted with ESLAW, the estimated coefficient is found to be statistically 
significant at the 1% level, with the long-run loss reduction estimated to be 32%. 
When FRI or IRI is allowed to co-exist with management and lease contract, the 
long-run reduction effect is estimated to be about 12%. Though concession is 
negatively related to distribution system loss level, the estimated coefficient is 
observed to be statistically insignificant.  
 
The results from the endogenous model on the distribution system corroborate 
those obtained in the fixed effects model, thus suggesting absence of serious 
evidence of endogeneity. 
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CHAPTER 7   DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Discussions 
The empirical results from the study seem to reinforce those from Cubbin and Stern 
(2005), Zhang et al. (2002) and Zhang et al. (2005) that the establishment of a 
regulatory agency and private sector participation in the electricity sector does have 
a long-term beneficial impact on electricity sector outcomes. The study also found 
that the favourable outcomes seem to be achieved at higher lags associated with 
the key reform variables. This implies that in Africa and most developing countries, 
the regulatory agencies are fragile and it will take quite sometime for the regulatory 
frameworks to be fully developed before they can have any significant impact on 
electricity sector outcomes.  This section reviews the main findings vis-à-vis the 
hypothesis which was formulated for the study. 
 
7.1.1 Generation Sector  
Hypothesis 1a: Regulation will increase per capita installed generation 
capacity, plant utilization and per capita plant output. 
 
The effect of having an autonomous regulation established by electricity sector law 
was found to be positively related to each of the generation sector performance 
indicators. For installed generation capacity, the positive outcome is achieved after 
2 and 6 years, for the formal and informal regulatory indices (FRI and IRI) 
respectively. On plant utilization, the results show that autonomous regulation does 
appear to enhance utilization rate, but once again, this is achieved after 7 years for 
IRI and 9 years for FRI. The estimated long-run effect is of the order of 28%. The 
results on plant energy output seem to suggest that regulation does have positive 
impact, and this is likely to be achieved after 3 years for IRI and 7 years for FRI.  
 
The higher lags associated with FRI and IRI seem to reinforce the assertion by 
Kessides (2004) and Eberhard (2005) that in Africa, a considerable amount of time 
is required to build the core competencies of the technical and other professional 
staff of the regulatory agencies. The empirical results seem to support the 
hypothesis, but with a caveat that regulation will enhance per capita installed 
generation capacity, plant utilization and per capita plant output, only after the 
agency has been in existence for sometime to enable it build the necessary 
capacity. 
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Hypothesis 1b: In the presence of regulation, private sector participation in 
generation will enhance per capita installed plant capacity and actual plant 
output. 
 
The regression results seem to identify management contracts, greenfield project 
and partial divestiture as the PSP options which are likely to enhance installed 
capacity and plant output, on per capita basis, but at higher lags. For management 
contracts, the result was statistically significant at the 10% level or better, while for 
greenfield project, the significance level was 1%. For installed plant capacity, the 
favourable outcomes were achieved after at least 1 year for management and lease 
contracts, and 10 years for greenfield project. On plant output, greenfield project 
seem to bring about favourable results after 1 year, 3 years for management 
contracts and 6 years for partial divestiture. 
 
Though the empirical results seem to support the hypothesis that the PSP does 
enhance installed capacity and actual plant output, these results are likely to be 
achieved after number of years of market reforms and passage of electricity sector 
law, which permit private sector participation in the generation segment of the 
Electricity Supply Industry.  
 
 
Hypothesis 1c: Competition ‘for’ the market or private sector participation in 
generation, will lead to higher plant utilization. 
 
On plant utilization, partial divestiture, concessions and greenfield projects all seem 
to bring about favourable outcomes. The implication of this result is that competition 
‘for’ the market or private sector participation in the market, is likely to bring about 
innovation and introduce modern maintenance practices, to reduce plant down-time 
and enhance plant utilization rate. The empirical results thus support the hypothesis. 
 
7.1.2 Transmission Sector  
Hypothesis 2a: The co-existence of Energy Sector Law and regulatory agency, 
will lead to reduction in transmission system loss level. 
 
Energy Sector Law (ESLAW) appear to reduce transmission system loss level by 
almost 20%, with the result being statistically significant at the 1% level. When 
ESLAW is interacted with FRI at a lag of 2, the variable seem to have a significant 
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impact on network loss reduction by almost 10%, while the co-existence with IRI 
appear to reduce average network loss level by 17%. The results thus support the 
hypothesis that co-existence of ESLAW, and autonomous regulatory agency is 
likely to have a significant and a positive effect towards reducing transmission 
network loss level. This favourable outcome is likely to happen after at least 2 years 
of establishment of a regulatory agency.  
 
Hypothesis 2b: The existence of a regulatory agency will reduce transmission 
network loss level. 
The empirical results seem to indicate that though none of the regulatory indices on 
their own, seem to reduce transmission network loss, when FRI and IRI was 
interacted, the variable appear to significantly reduce network loss level. The 
estimated coefficient is found to be statistically significant at the 1% or 5% levels, 
with the long-run reduction effect estimated to be 10%. This result is achieved after 
at least 4 years in the endogenous model. The results seem to support the 
hypothesis that the existence of a regulatory agency is likely to contribute to 
network loss reduction, but this outcome is achieved after a period of 4 years of 
existence of the agency, and if the agency is associated with good formal and 
informal attributes. 
 
 
7.1.3 Distribution Sector 
Hypothesis 3a: Energy Sector Law and presence of autonomous regulation 
will lead to reduction of total distribution system loss level. 
 
The results indicate that though passage of Energy Sector Law (ESLAW) and 
regulation are necessary, they may not be sufficient to cause a reduction in the total 
distribution loss level. Though the econometric estimation seems to support the 
hypothesis, better outcomes are likely to emerge if, ESLAW and regulation co-exist 
with management and lease contract. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Private Sector Participation will lead to lower total distribution 
system loss level. 
 
The econometric results on the distribution network seem to indicate that 
management and lease contract as a PSP option is likely to make a significant 
contribution towards total distribution system loss reduction. As the empirical results 
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show, better outcomes are likely to emerge after 2 years of existence of 
management and lease contract. Concessions, though negatively related to the 
dependent variable, do not however appear to significantly reduce total distribution 
loss level. 
 
 
7.2  Conclusion 
This study has used panel data econometric analysis for 25 African countries, 
covering the period 1988-2005, to ascertain the effects of regulation, competition 
and private sector participation on electricity sector outcomes. The study was 
carried out using fixed effects model, where all the reform variables were assumed 
to be strictly exogenous, and 1-step GMM, where all the reform variables were 
assumed to be endogenous. 
 
The results have to a large extent reinforced the notion that even though the sole 
existence of effective independent regulatory agencies in the African countries is 
necessary, this may not be sufficient to achieve the desired outcomes. The results 
seem to indicate that favourable outcomes are more likely to be achieved after 
considerable number of years of existence of the regulatory agency. The result also 
brings to the fore the notion that the non-availability of key skills in the various 
disciplines in a regulator agency can serve as a limiting factor. It is therefore 
imperative that the capacities of professional staff are well-developed to operate 
whatever systems and regulatory frameworks are chosen. 
 
Though one of the goals of Power Sector Reforms in all countries is to improve the 
overall sector efficiency and quality of service, the thesis has not been able to 
explore the impact of quality of service because of lack of credible and reliable data 
in this area. Most African countries do not possess the necessary network 
automation, remote controls and computerized systems such as the Supervising, 
Control and Data Acquisitions (SCADA) system, for effective monitoring of quality of 
service factors. Therefore an attempt to use other proxies for quality of service may 
affect the robustness of the econometric results. This fear was confirmed by 
Estache et al. (2006), who used transmission and distribution losses as proxies of 
technical quality in their empirical studies. As part of their econometric findings, they 
stated that “the econometric work reported casts doubt on the conclusions reached 
from the basic data analysis”.  
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Similarly, the impact of the reforms on prices could not be investigated because of 
problem of data reliability. The impact of prices and quality of service in Africa’s 
power sector therefore remains an area for future empirical analysis which would 
require further investigations. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1:  Questionnaire 
Appendix 1A:  Legal and Regulatory Framework 
 
 
Has Parliament passed any law aimed at reforming the  Power 
Power?  
  
If yes, list the following: 
Electricity Reform Law Year: 
Electricity Reform Law name: 
Actual Starting year of reform: 
  
Does the law allow the entry of new Independent Power Producers (IPPs)? 
  
Does the law allow the electricity sector or any segments of the sector 
to be privatised in part or in whole? 
 
REGULATORY REFORMS: 
1 
Was the regulatory body set by a decree or legislation? 
  
Are the regulatory functions clearly spelt out in  
Primary legislation or in any other relevant document? 
  
Can the Minister overrule the regulator? 
  
2 
Is the regulatory body a separate department within the Ministry 
or a body independent of the Ministry or government? 
  
How are members of the regulatory commission appointed? 
  
  
If the President or Ministry appoints the Chairman/Commissioners, is  
Parliamentary approval required? 
  
On what grounds can commissioners be dismissed? 
  
How is the regulatory body financed? 
  
3 
Is there an appeals mechanism for challenging regulatory decisions? 
Has the body been used since its inception to challenge any regulatory decisions? 
  
Is there a legal right of redress? 
  
Does the regulatory body submit annual reports to Parliament or 
any other body? 
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Does the regulator have to answer questions in Parliament or appear 
before a Parliamentary sub-committee to answer questions? 
 
4 
Does the regulator involve key stakeholders in major decisions or  
proposed approach to taking major decisions through seminars,  
workshops etc. 
  
Does the regulator conduct public hearings prior to tariff decisions? 
  
Have responses from stakeholders' meetings, seminars and  
workshops influenced the regulator's decision? 
 
5 
Can the public get access to key regulatory documents such as  
licenses, Acts, rate-setting guidelines etc.? 
How do people get access to these guidelines? 
  
Does the law require the regulator to publish decisions?  
If yes, where? 
  
Does the regulatory body publish reasons behind major decisions in  
practice?  
If yes, where? 
If decisions are not published, are the affected parties told of the  
reasons for the major reasons? 
 
 
6 
If yes, what is involved? 
  
Is it easy to change the key regulatory documents such as licenses, 
Acts,?  
If yes, what is involved? 
  
Are the principles involved in tariff setting set out formally in a 
document such as rate-setting guidelines? 
 
7 
Is the regulatory body headed by a single person or by a commission? 
  
What is the number of employees at post compared to the  
required/expected professional staff level? 
  
Professional staff: 
Economist: 
Lawyers: 
Engineers: 
Accountants: 
Financial Analysts: 
Regulatory Economists: 
Technicians: 
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Non-Professional Staff 
Secretaries: 
Drivers: 
Others: 
 
8 
Has the regulatory body designed a standardized financial/technical   
Performance information format? 
If yes, where is it published? 
  
Can the regulatory body compel financial/technical and performance 
information from the utility companies? 
  
Has the regulatory body designed a standardized Quality of Service  
Reporting Format? 
If yes, where is it published? 
  
Can the regulatory body compel Quality of Service performance 
information from the utility companies? 
  
Is the information provided by the utility companies audited by the  
regulator or by independent auditors? 
  
Has the regulator published regulatory accounting guidelines? 
If yes, where 
 
Appendix 1B: Price Regulation 
PRICE REGULATION 
Is there an agency with the power to determine prices? 
If yes, what is the name of the agency? 
Which of the price components are determined? 
  
  
Who monitors the end-user prices?  
  
How often are prices reviewed? 
(once in a year, once every two years or five years etc) 
 
Are the prices cost reflective? 
  
What is the principle for price regulation? 
  
AVERAGE END-USER TARIFF LEVELS: 
(in cents/kWh)-Please provide answers for 1988-2005 
Residential Consumers: 
  
Commercial Consumers: 
  
Industrial Consumers: 
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Appendix 1C: Industry Structure 
   
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE: PRIVATISATION AND COMPETITION 
  
ANSWER 
What is the existing electricity market model? 
    
(Vertically Integrated, Single-buyer model, Partial Retail    
Competition and Full Retail Competition etc.)    
     
Have the state-owned or municipal utilities corporatised? 
   
     
Which of the following best describes the company? 
   
Full unbundling    
Partial Unbundling    
Full Integration    
If partial unbundling, please explain 
   
     
What type of separation exist between generation and  
   
transmission? (Legal Separation, Accounting 
   
Separation or No Separation).    
     
Indicate Years the following Activities were initiated: 
   
Privatisation    
Vertical Unbundling    
Entry of first IPP    
Wholesale Market (I.e. Pool, Contracts, Spot etc.)     
 
 % of total  
OWNERSHIP: Please provide answers for 1988-
2005 
No of 
Companies System MW. 
Generation Sector:  
    
Public Ownership     
Majority Public Ownership (at least 50% of total shares)     
Majority Private Ownership (at least 50% of total shares)     
Private Ownership     
What % of the company is owned by foreign investors?     
Transmission Sector: 
    
Public Ownership     
Majority Public Ownership (at least 50% of total shares)     
Majority Private Ownership (at least 50% of total shares)     
Private Ownership     
Distribution Sector:  
    
Public Ownership     
Majority Public Ownership (at least 50% of total shares)     
Majority Private Ownership (at least 50% of total shares)     
Private Ownership     
What % of the company is owned by foreign investors?     
Are consumers allowed a choice of their own suppliers? 
    
     
If yes, please complete the table below:     
Customer Type: Please provide answers for 1988 -
2005 (kWh or KW) System  
  Consumption 
Industrial:     
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Commercial:     
Residential:     
 
ANSWER: 
 
Does a Management Contract exist between a state-owned    
utility company and the private sector?    
     
Has there been a Greenfield investment?    
If yes, when?    
   
LICENSING: ANSWER: 
 
Do there exist a formal process for granting license to 
generators,     
transmission or distribution companies?-Yes/No    
     
Who approves the license?     
     
What is the effective licence period?    
     
Can a license be revoked?-Yes/No    
     
If yes, for what reasons are the licenses revocable?    
 
 
Appendix 1D: Generation Sector- Please provide answers for 1988 - 2005  
Installed Generation Capacity in MW. 
Thermal: 
Oil Fired 
Natural Gas Fired 
Coal Fired 
Diesel Fired 
  
Hydro: 
  
Renewable Energy: 
Others: 
State the Peaking Plant: 
TOTAL: 
 
Total Energy Generated (GWh): 
Thermal: Please provide answers for 1988 – 2005 
Oil Fired 
Natural Gas Fired 
Coal Fired 
Diesel Fired 
 
 Hydro: Please provide answers for 1988 – 2005 
Renewable Energy: Please provide answers for 1988 – 2005 
  
Others: 
  
TOTAL: 
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Thermal Efficiency (%):Please provide answers for 1988 - 2005 
Thermal: 
Oil Fired 
Natural Gas Fired 
Coal Fired 
Diesel Fired 
 
Generation Ownership Status: Please provide answers for 
1988 – 2005 
Name of Company 1: 
  
Market Share (%): 
Ownership Status (i.e. 100% State-owned,  
Majority state-owned(>50%), Majority private- 
owned (>50%), 100% Private-owned. 
What proportion is owned by foreign investors? 
 
Employee Status:  
Total Number of Full time Employees: 
Total Number of part-time Employees: 
 
Appendix 1E: Transmission Sector- Please provide answers for 1988 - 
2005 
Is there separate ownership between generation and transmission? 
  
Does the Electricity law or Power Sector  
require non-discriminatory access to the  
transmission system? (Yes or No) 
  
Are there Guidelines for determining open- 
access rates/interconnections for all open- 
customers? (Yes or No) 
  
If yes, how are the rates determined?  
(i.e. regulated or negotiated?) 
  
Who controls the transmission access and  
approves applications? (Is it the regulator,  
Independent System Operator, Transmission 
or Generating Company?) 
  
How are conflicts related to access and 
interconnection resolved?  
 
Technical Loss (in GWh): 
(Total GWh Generated less Total GWh Sold to Dist. Companies and  
Bulk Customers) 
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Technical Loss (in %): 
(Total GWh Generated  less Total GWh Sold to Dist. 
Companies/BC)*100 
Total GWh Generated 
 
Transmission Availability: 
Transmission System Availability (%): 
  
Transmission Circuit Kilometers: 
Total Transmission Circuit Kilometers 
 
Appendix 1F: Distribution Sector- Please provide answers for 1988 - 
2005 
Does the law or sector reforms require 
non-discriminatory access to the distribution system? 
 
Are there guidelines for determination 
of open-access rates/connection? 
  
Who determines the access rates? 
  
Who controls the transmission access and  
approves applications? (Is it the regulator,  
Independent System Operator, Transmission 
or Generating Company?) 
  
How are conflicts related to access and 
interconnection resolved? (By the regulator, 
the Ministry etc.) 
 
Total Number of employees in the  
Distribution Company  
  
Total Number of Connected Customers: 
Sub-Transmission or High Voltage (State Voltage Level:) 
  
Medium Voltage (State Voltage Level:) 
  
Residential/ Low Voltage (State Voltage Level:) 
 
Performance Indicators: Technical 
Distribution System Losses: 
 
Distribution Technical Loss (in GWh): 
(Total GWh Bought by Distribution Comp -Total GWh Billed) 
  
Technical Loss (in %): 
(Total GWh Bought -Total GWh Billed)* 100 
                  Total GWh Bought 
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Non-Technical Loss (in GWh): 
(Total GWh Billed by Distribution/Retail Comp -Total GWh   
translated into actual revenue) 
Non-Technical Loss (in %): 
(Total GWh Billed -Total GWh translated into revenue)* 100 
                  Total GWh Billed) 
 
Performance Indicators: Commercial 
Revenue Collection Rate (%): 
(Total Actual Sales Collected as revenue in Local Currency)*100 
   (Total Sales Billed in Local Currency) 
 
Revenue Collection Period: 
Average Receivable Collection Period (in days): 
 
Electricity Accessibility Levels in %: 
Urban 
Rural  
TOTAL (%): 
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Appendix 2: List of Countries  
 
  
1 Algeria 
2 Angola 
3 Cameroon 
4 Cote d’Ivoire 
5 Egypt 
6 Ethiopia 
7 Gabon 
8 Gambia 
9 Ghana 
10 Kenya 
11 Malawi 
12 Mali 
13 Morocco 
14 Nigeria 
15 Mozambique 
16 Namibia 
17 Rwanda 
18 Senegal 
19 South Africa 
20 Tanzania 
21 Togo 
22 Tunisia 
23 Uganda 
24 Zambia 
25 Zimbabwe 
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Appendix 3a: Dependent Variables and Data Sources 
Dependent Variable Data Source 
Per capita Installed Generation 
Capacity (kilowatt per person) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Per Capita Generation Plant Output 
(kilowatt-hours per person) 
 
 
 
 
Generation Plant Utilization (i.e. Load 
Factor) 
Primary data from country responses to 
research questionnaire, US Energy 
Information Administration (EIA, 2006), 
African Energy Policy Research Network 
(AFREPREN), World Development 
Indicators (World Bank, 2006) 
 
Primary data from country responses to 
research questionnaire, US Energy 
Information Administration (EIA, 2006), 
African Energy Policy Research Network 
(AFREPREN), 
 
Primary data from country responses to 
research questionnaire, US Energy 
Information Administration (EIA, 2006), 
African Energy Policy Research Network 
(AFREPREN), 
 
 
Appendix 3b: Independent Variables and Data Sources   
Independent Variables Sources of data 
Formal Regulatory and Informal 
Regulatory Index 
 
 
 
 
Privatisation Options 
Was constructed based on information 
from country responses and information 
from research questionnaire, Acts and 
Laws on Electricity Sector Reforms for 
countries, AFREPREN. 
 
World Bank/PPIAF PPI Database (2008) 
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  Appendix 3c: Control Variables and Data sources   
Control Variables Sources of Data 
Passage of Electricity Law 
 
 
 
Political Constraint 
 
Economic Freedom 
 
 
Real GDP per capita, Industry 
output as a percentage of GDP, 
Export-to-Import ratio, Rural 
Population Density, Urbanization 
percentage. 
Responses to research questionnaire, 
AFREPREN, Electricity Sector Acts and 
Laws for countries. 
 
Henisz (2005) 
 
Economic Freedom of the World Report 
(2005) -Gwartney, Lawson and Gartzke 
 
World Development Indicators (World 
Bank, 2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 156 
 
Appendix 4:  Regulatory Bodies and Private Sector Participation (PSP) Options  
 
Country Energy 
Sector Law* 
Regulatory 
Body established 
outside Ministry  
Greenfield 
Projects (i.e. 
IPPs) 
Mgmt. & 
Lease Contracts 
Concession 
 
Divestiture 
  
Yes = 1.00 
No  = 0.00 
Yes = 1.00 
No  = 0.00 
Yes = 1.00 
No  = 0.00 
Yes = 1.00 
No  = 0.00 
Yes = 1.00 
No  = 0.00 
Yes = 1.00 
No  = 0.00 
1 Algeria 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 Angola 1.00 0.00** 0.00a 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3 Cameroon 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
4 Cote d’Ivoire 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
5 Egypt 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
6 Ethiopia 1.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
7 Gabon 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
8 Gambia 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
9 Ghana 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
10 Kenya 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00j 1.00 (partial) 
11 Malawi 1.00 1.00 0.00b 1.00 0.00 0.00 
12 Mali 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
13 Morocco 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
14 Nigeria 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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15 Mozambique 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00e 0.00 
16 Namibia 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
17 Rwanda 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
18 Senegal 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
19 South Africa 1.00 1.00 0.00c 0.00 0.00f 0.00g  
20 Tanzania 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
21 Togo 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
22 Tunisia 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
23 Uganda 1.00 1.00 0.00d 0.00 1.00 0.00 
24 Zambia 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00h 
25 Zimbabwe 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00i  
Sources:  Private Sector Participation (PSP) Options: World Bank & PPIAF, PPI Project Database (2008).  (http://ppi.worldbank.org) 
Energy Sector Law and Regulatory Bodies: Author’s construction 
 
*: New or Amended,     **: Regulatory Body present, but accountable to the sector Ministry.         a, b, c, d: Greenfield Projects present but  
                                                                                 considered insignificant for modeling impact        
j, e, f: Concession present but considered insignificant for modeling impact on reforms            
g, h, i: Divestitures are insignificant for the purpose of modeling impact on reforms 
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Appendix 5: Correlation Matrix 
 
COMPFMKT CONCESS DIVEST 
ECON 
FREED 
ELECT 
LAW EXPIMP FRI GENCAPP 
GREEN 
FIELD IRI MGMTLEASE POLCON URBANIS 
            
  
            
  COMPFMKT 
 1.0000  0.0503  0.468524  0.201652  0.088200  0.063842  0.329851  0.209897  0.0224  0.321891 0.03384  0.411441 -0.034978 
CONCESS 
 0.0503  1.0000 -0.028861 -0.014672 -0.023135 -0.065915  0.116344 -0.037455 -0.0558  0.108979 -0.03650  0.060761 -0.019129 
DIVEST 
 0.4685 -0.0288  1.000000  0.151031  0.211186  0.027036  0.323848  0.249565 -0.1199  0.360586 -0.07837  0.207481 -0.013124 
ECONFREED 
 0.2016 -0.0146  0.151031  1.000000  0.120399  0.394854  0.276839  0.259765  0.3374  0.258017  0.18566  0.249704  0.402589 
ELECTLAW 
 0.0882 -0.0231  0.211186  0.120399  1.000000  0.096714  0.071241  0.065720  0.0129  0.060918 -0.01713  0.109913  0.178089 
EXPIMP 
 0.0638 -0.0659  0.027036  0.394854  0.096714  1.000000 -0.004584  0.627722  0.0925 -0.035304  0.22101  0.089978  0.624141 
FRI 
 0.3298  0.1163  0.323848  0.276839  0.071241 -0.004584  1.000000  0.105531  0.1472  0.867386  0.09388  0.302077 -0.130445 
GENCAPP 
 0.2098 -0.0374  0.249565  0.259765  0.065720  0.627722  0.105531  1.000000 -0.0684  0.169877 -0.00077  0.125156  0.312944 
GREENFIELD 
 0.0224 -0.0558 -0.119913  0.337415  0.012953  0.092568  0.147214 -0.068491  1.0000  0.196964  0.15624  0.116750  0.169618 
IRI 
 0.3218  0.1089  0.360586  0.258017  0.060918 -0.035304  0.867386  0.169877  0.1969  1.000000  0.07675  0.224458 -0.138288 
MGMTLEASE 
 0.0338 -0.0365 -0.078377  0.185660 -0.017139  0.221015  0.093883 -0.000771  0.1562  0.076755  1.00000 -0.164958  0.076814 
POLCON 
 0.4114  0.0607  0.207481  0.249704  0.109913  0.089978  0.302077  0.125156  0.1167  0.224458 -0.16495  1.000000 -0.002539 
URBANIS -0.0349 -0.0191 -0.013124  0.402589  0.178089  0.624141 -0.130445  0.312944  0.1696 -0.138288  0.07681 -0.002539  1.000000 
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Appendix 6: Descriptive Statistics - Per Capita installed Generation Capacity 
 
COMP 
FMKT CONCESS DIVEST 
ECON 
FREED 
ELECT 
LAW EXPIMP FRI GENCAPP 
GREEN 
FIELD IRI 
MGMT 
LEASE 
POL 
CON URBANIS 
 
             
              
 Mean 
 0.22015  0.013263  0.058355  4.170532  0.949161  894.4368  0.591208  0.131202  0.188329  0.3315  0.0901  0.3805  28.20867 
 Median 
 0.00000  0.000000  0.000000  4.987800  0.801989  336.5300  0.000000  0.039574  0.000000  0.0000  0.0000  0.3871  24.28000 
 Maximum 
 1.00000  1.000000  1.000000  7.348022  32.39000  4313.780  2.614400  1.158263  1.000000  2.1890  1.0000  0.8582  72.15000 
 Minimum 
 0.00000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  74.74000  0.000000  0.003782  0.000000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  7.850000 
 Std. Dev. 
 0.41490  0.114549  0.234726  2.249577  1.684468  1102.551  0.975284  0.225726  0.391494  0.6262  0.2868  0.2919  14.37491 
 Skewness 
 1.35073  8.509609  3.768068 -0.987534  17.32081  1.640095  1.146032  3.289980  1.594329  1.5573  2.8613 -0.0573  0.828124 
 Kurtosis 
 2.82448  73.41344  15.19834  2.606363  323.6766  4.445348  2.477683  13.79758  3.541885  3.8439  9.1873  1.4611  2.624816 
 
             
 Jarque-Bera 
 115.122  82432.72  3229.519  63.71054  1634193.  201.8313  86.81011  2511.503  164.3277  163.57  1115.8  37.406  45.30164 
 Probability 
 0.00000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.000000 
 
             
 Sum 
 83.0000  5.000000  22.00000  1572.291  357.8336  337202.7  222.8854  49.46315  71.00000  124.97  34.000  143.46  10634.67 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 
 64.7267  4.933687  20.71618  1902.784  1066.874  4.57E+08  357.6435  19.15796  57.62865  147.45  30.933  32.050  77695.90 
 
             
 Observations 
 377  377  377  377  377  377  377  377  377  377  377  377  377 
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Appendix 7: Descriptive Statistics - Generation Plant Utilization 
 
COMPFMKT CONCESS DIVEST FRI GREENFIELD IRI MGMTLEASE INDOUTGDP PLANTUTILIZ URBANIS 
 Mean 
 0.219577  0.013228  0.058201  0.514239  0.187831  0.312748  0.092593  27.25021  0.416568  34.68071 
 Median 
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  24.28000  0.420679  33.34500 
 Maximum 
 1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  2.614400  1.000000  2.189000  1.000000  72.15000  0.785293  83.80000 
 Minimum 
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 Std. Dev. 
 0.414509  0.114399  0.234434  0.929544  0.391095  0.620503  0.290245  15.49082  0.148386  19.64369 
 Skewness 
 1.354833  8.521350  3.774072  1.367231  1.598504  1.660420  2.811057  0.564658 -0.623102  0.287109 
 Kurtosis 
 2.835573  73.61340  15.24362  3.060003  3.555214  4.147353  8.902041  2.580437  4.383251  2.542024 
 
          
 Jarque-Bera 
 116.0669  83108.13  3258.369  117.8239  165.8336  194.4243  1046.465  22.85939  54.59593  8.496612 
 Probability 
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000011  0.000000  0.014288 
 
          
 Sum 
 83.00000  5.000000  22.00000  194.3823  71.00000  118.2186  35.00000  10300.58  157.4626  13109.31 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 
 64.77513  4.933862  20.71958  325.7477  57.66402  145.1541  31.75926  90466.96  8.300990  145474.8 
 
          
 Observations 
 378  378  378  378  378  378  378  378  378  378 
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Appendix 8: Descriptive Statistics - Per Capita Generation Energy Output 
 
 
COMPFMKT CONCESS ELECTLAW FRI GREENFIELD IRI MGMTLEASE GENOUTPUT EXPIMP RGDPPC 
 Mean 
 0.230556  0.013889  0.269444  0.553196  0.197222  0.337586  0.097222  469.7672  0.908807  830.5123 
 Median 
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  115.8250  0.703837  330.5950 
 Maximum 
 1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  2.614400  1.000000  2.189000  1.000000  4778.500  32.39000  4313.780 
 Minimum 
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  11.21896  0.000000  0.000000 
 Std. Dev. 
 0.421775  0.117193  0.444289  0.961484  0.398455  0.631788  0.296672  843.1973  1.735481  1116.730 
 Skewness 
 1.279448  8.307472  1.039308  1.270927  1.521873  1.532797  2.719082  3.367428  16.65117  1.769826 
 Kurtosis 
 2.636988  70.01408  2.080161  2.789133  3.316097  3.765337  8.393407  14.51457  302.4574  4.791201 
 
          
 Jarque-Bera 
 100.1960  71504.16  77.50123  97.58237  140.4646  149.7541  879.9369  2669.155  1361757.  236.0630 
 Probability 
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 
          
 Sum 
 83.00000  5.000000  97.00000  199.1505  71.00000  121.5310  35.00000  169116.2  327.1706  298984.4 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 
 63.86389  4.930556  70.86389  331.8778  56.99722  143.2972  31.59722  2.55E+08  1081.270  4.48E+08 
 
          
 Observations 
 360  360  360  360  360  360  360  360  360  360 
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Appendix 9: Descriptive Statistics - Transmission System Loss. 
 
COMPFMKT CONCESS DIVEST FRI 
GREEN 
FIELD IRI 
MGMT 
LEASE 
TRANSM 
LOSS 
INDOUT 
GDP POLCON RPOPDENS URBANIS 
 Mean 
 0.210526  0.070175  0.064327  0.621721  0.239766  0.376364  0.064327  0.058623  29.43772  0.339008  276.6077  40.25629 
 Median 
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.055339  24.93500  0.320071  221.3650  39.55500 
 Maximum 
 1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  2.700000  1.000000  2.380600  1.000000  0.171273  73.49000  1.000000  1267.680  83.67000 
 Minimum 
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.004000  7.850000  0.000000  69.19000  0.000000 
 Std. Dev. 
 0.408280  0.255817  0.245695  0.995582  0.427566  0.685062  0.245695  0.028009  14.44252  0.313250  179.3823  17.59279 
 Skewness 
 1.420094  3.365334  3.551648  1.052939  1.219064  1.487350  3.551648  0.895170  0.735332  0.146319  1.324305  0.101597 
 Kurtosis 
 3.016667  12.32547  13.61420  2.234757  2.486116  3.677497  13.61420  3.797985  2.524021  1.349884  5.175497  2.729809 
 
            
 Jarque-Bera 
 114.9540  1884.795  2324.434  71.53951  88.47172  132.6367  2324.434  54.74990  34.04910  40.02140  167.4079  1.628647 
 Probability 
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.442939 
 
            
 Sum 
 72.00000  24.00000  22.00000  212.6286  82.00000  128.7166  22.00000  20.04921  10067.70  115.9407  94599.83  13767.65 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 
 56.84211  22.31579  20.58480  337.9933  62.33918  160.0347  20.58480  0.267509  71127.97  33.46088  10972703  105541.6 
 
            
 Observations 
 342  342  342  342  342  342  342  342  342  342  342  342 
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Appendix 10: Descriptive Statistics - Distribution System Loss 
 
COMPFMKT CONCESS DISTRIBLOSS DIVEST FRI GREENFIELD IRI MGMTLEASE RPOPDENS URBANIS 
 Mean 
 0.210526  0.070175  0.086051  0.064327  0.585116  0.239766  0.387026  0.064327  272.2415  40.23237 
 Median 
 0.000000  0.000000  0.069549  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  220.3950  39.60000 
 Maximum 
 1.000000  1.000000  0.600000  1.000000  2.614400  1.000000  2.380600  1.000000  729.0900  83.67000 
 Minimum 
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  69.19000  0.000000 
 Std. Dev. 
 0.408280  0.255817  0.065013  0.245695  0.984094  0.427566  0.695020  0.245695  169.6189  17.54069 
 Skewness 
 1.420094  3.365334  4.463408  3.551648  1.159852  1.219064  1.460857  3.551648  1.011693  0.074119 
 Kurtosis 
 3.016667  12.32547  28.03085  13.61420  2.467217  2.486116  3.605360  13.61420  3.031369  2.708564 
 
          
 Jarque-Bera 
 114.9540  1884.795  10063.80  2324.434  80.72454  88.47172  126.8660  2324.434  58.35476  1.523454 
 Probability 
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.466859 
 
          
 Sum 
 72.00000  24.00000  29.42940  22.00000  200.1096  82.00000  132.3628  22.00000  93106.61  13759.47 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 
 56.84211  22.31579  1.441294  20.58480  330.2386  62.33918  164.7212  20.58480  9810760.  104917.4 
 
          
 Observations 
 342  342  342  342  342  342  342  342  342  342 
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Appendix 11: Steps in conducting Principal Component Analysis for 
Regulatory Framework Index Calculation. 
 
This appendix highlights the key steps in conducting the Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) to determine the weights for the variables, for the formal and 
informal regulatory indices. PCA is basically a variable reduction technique which is 
used to reduce the observed variables which may be correlated and therefore 
redundant, into a smaller number of principal components, which account for most 
of the variance in the observed data or variables. Redundant variables in this case 
imply that the variables in question are correlated with one another, and therefore 
possibly measuring the same construct. In PCA, each component accounts for a 
maximal amount of variance in the observed variables which was not accounted for 
by the preceding components, and is uncorrelated or orthogonal, with all of the 
preceding components.77  
 
Each principal component in the completed analysis, is therefore a different linear 
combination of the original variables and that each component is statistically 
orthogonal to the others78.  It is this latter property which lends the property of low 
multicollinearity in the final variables. 
 
STEP 1: Component extraction  
In Principal Component Analysis (PCA), the number of components extracted, 
equals the number of variables analysed. So in the case of the regulatory 
framework index, since the number of variables being analyzed is 7, the number of 
components to be extracted will be 7. (See table 4.5 in the text). 
 
In PCA, one is extracting factors that account for less and less variance, thus 
guaranteeing minimal information loss. The first principal component is expected to 
account for a large amount of total variance, with each succeeding components, 
accounting for a progressively smaller amount of variance. PCA thus seeks the 
linear combination of the original variables, such that the derived variables capture 
                                                 
77
 For instance, the second principal component will account for a maximal amount of variance in the 
dataset,  which was unaccounted for by the first component. In addition, the second component is 
uncorrelated or orthogonal with the first component. 
78
 The components are therefore extracted with the restriction that they are orthogonal, and therefore 
display varying degrees of correlation with the original variables. 
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maximum variance. In other words, one wishes to extract from a set of ‘m’ variables, 
a reduced set of ‘n’ principal components that accounts for most of the variance in 
the ‘m’ variables.   
 
STEP 1b: Eigenvalue and the variance question:  
The second column of tables 4.5 and 4.9 in the text, provides the eignevalues for 
computing the formal and informal regulatory indices respectively. The eigenvalues 
presented in the tables represent “Eigenvalues of the Correlation Matrix”, and 
therefore represent the variance which is accounted for by a given component. In 
that regard, each eigenvalue represent the amount of variance captured by one 
component.  
 
To compute the Eigenvalue, one starts with the correlation matrix, where the 
variances of all the variables are equal to 1.0. For the thesis, since we have 7 
variables for the formal regulatory index each with a variance of 1, the total 
variability that can be extracted is equal to 7 times 1. Similarly, for the informal 
regulatory index, since there are 5 variables, the total variability which can 
potentially be extracted is 5 times 1.  
 
The results of the eigenvalues are presented in the second column of tables 4.5 
and 4.9, and they show the variance of the factors which are successively extracted. 
In column 3, these values have been expressed as a percentage of total variance 
under the heading “variance proportion”. The last column in tables 4.5 and 4.9 
contain the cumulative variance extracted, under the heading “Cumulative 
Proportion (%)”. 
 
The variance proportion accounted for is calculated as:  
 
Eigenvalue for the component of Interest ÷ Total eigenvalue of the correlation 
matrix. 
 
 
For example: 
 
From table 4.5, Principal component 1,  
 
The eigenvalue = 5.5166 
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Total eigenvalue of correlation matrix = number of variables being analyzed =  
7. 000 (since each variable contributes one unit of variance to the analysis).   
 
The variance proportion is then computed as: 5.5166 ÷ 7.000 = 78.81%. 
 
Similarly, for principal component 2 in table 4.5, the variance proportion is 
computed as:  
0.7983 ÷ 7.000 = 11.40%  
 
This method has been used to compute the variance proportion (%) in column 3, for 
tables 4.5 and 4.9 in the text.  
 
STEP 2: Which “meaningful” components to retain for analysis.  
From step 1, it is now clear that the number of principal components extracted 
equals the number of variables or factors being analysed.  In step 2, the critical 
question is “which components are meaningful and should be retained for 
further analysis?”  This question is resolved by using the Kaiser Criterion (Kaiser 
1960), also known as the Eigen-one criterion. The rationale for this rule is that since 
each variable is expected to contribute one unit of the variance to the total 
variance79, any principal component which possess an eigenvalue greater than 1.00 
is therefore accounting for a greater amount of variance and is worthy of being 
retained. In other words, any variable which cannot extract as much as the 
equivalent of one variable, is accounting for less variance than has been 
contributed by one variable, and is therefore dropped and not used for further 
analysis.   
 
Based on the Kaiser Criterion, the first principal component in tables 4.5 and 4.9 
with eigenvalues of 5.5166 and 3.0577, are retained and used to derive the 
eigenvectors and hence the weights in tables 4.6 and 4.10.  
 
 
 
                                                 
79
 In PCA, each variable is transformed such that it has a zero mean and a variance of one. 
Because of this, each observed variable is expected to contribute one unit of variance to the total 
variance in the data set. Therefore, the total variance will always be equal to the number of observed 
variables being analysed. 
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STEP 3: Eigenvector (i.e.  Factor Loading or Weights)  
 
The eigenvectors are the weights produced from the eigen equations, such that for 
a given set of data, there are no set of weights which are capable of producing a set 
of components, which are more successful in accounting for the variance in the 
observed variables or the data set.  The eigenvector or loadings are computed80 
and reported for each variable for the first principal component, and are used as the 
weights to derive the formal and informal regulatory indices in tables 4.6 and 4.10 in 
the text.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
80
 If an eigenvalue is known, its eigenvector can be computed. The reverse process is also possible; 
i.e., given an eigenvector, its corresponding eigenvalue can be calculated (Garcia 2006). See more 
details in Garcia, E. (β006), “Matrix Tutorialμ Eigenvalues and eigenvectors”, Mi Islita.com 
